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Editorial on the Research Topic
The Dialogue Between Forensic Scientists, Statisticians and Lawyers About Complex Scientific
Issues for Court
Courts across jurisdictions have seen a massive “scientification” of their evidential proceedings,
fueled by permanent technological advances, in particular with the advent of modern DNA
profiling analyses since the mid-1980s. Never before, in the history of forensic science, could
analyses be extended to such small quantities of trace material, and never before have forensic
experts had more powerful computational and data analytic devices at their disposal for handling
the vast array of data that their analyses produce. At the same time, conceptual questions on
how to assess the probative value of scientific findings have largely been settled: there is now a
broad agreement that evaluating scientific evidence should adhere to the precepts of logic, balance,
transparency, and robustness (e.g., Jackson, 2000; Association of Forensic Science Providers, 2009).
But as much as there have been advances, modern scientific evidence has been, and is still,
accompanied by challenges and contestation. What was once called the “DNA-wars” (Thompson,
1993) in the early 1990s, has developed during the last decade into refined discourses about selected
aspects of scientific evidence, such as algorithmic transparency. While some of these debates are
confined almost exclusively to scientific circles, they are also brought to the open bymeticulous legal
discussants, who care about the foundations of evidence and its ability to help discriminate between
prosecution and defense views (e.g., Imwinkelried, 2017). What is more, paradoxically, much of
the specialized discussion around these topics is confined to scientific journals whose deterring
paywalls prevent vital information from being distributed among those practitioners—especially
defense lawyers—for whom access to such information would be most beneficial. The purpose of
this Frontiers Research Topic thus is twofold. On the one hand, the aim is to bring together a broad
range of authors from various forensic science and legal disciplines (both academic and practice
oriented) to elaborate on key topics that sit at the intersection between (forensic) science and the
law. On the other hand, the purpose is to serve the scientific and legal community by providing
this collection of contributions freely and fully accessible (open access, OA), a goal that is achieved
through the Frontiers OA publishing model1.
1This is the second Frontiers research topic on forensic science after “DNA, statistics and the law: a cross-disciplinary approach
to forensic inference” (https://www.frontiersin.org/research-topics/1325).
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This collection of papers focuses on so-called evaluative uses
of evidence, in particular DNA evidence. That is, situations in
which a potential source (i.e., reference material of known origin)
for a given trace is available and the value of the results of
the comparison between the trace and the reference needs to
be assessed with respect to competing propositions regarding
the source of the evidential material, or propositions regarding
alleged activities (ENFSI, 2015; Gill et al., 2018). This is to be
distinguished from so-called investigative uses of evidence, which
are situations in which no potential source for recovered trace
material is available. See, for example, Butler and Willis (2020)
for a recent review on this topic, in particular investigative DNA
genealogy as used, for example, in the “Golden State Killer” case.
Developments in the latter field heavily rely upon large datasets
generated by the expanding direct-to-customer genomic industry
(e.g., Phillips, 2018).
Several papers in this collection address selected issues that
affect the sound use of DNA profiling analyses in evaluative
settings. Taylor et al. discuss matters that arise in connection
with the use of modern computer software for biostatistical
and the value of evidence computations, especially concerns
raised by legal commentators. In turn, Roberts addresses
general aspects of expert testimony, followed by a discussion
of these aspects in the context of the use of low-template
DNA profiling results by English and Northern Irish courts.
Biedermann et al. and Biedermann and Hicks focus on recurrent
misconceptions in the assessment of DNA profiling results,
in particular the distinction between issues of source and
alleged activities, and the importance of drawing this distinction
carefully by acknowledging the circumstances of the case and
the specific accounts provided by the prosecution and defense.
The importance of these topics has recently been reiterated
by guidelines published by the DNA Commission of the
International Society for Forensic Genetics (Gill et al., 2018,
2020). Scientific evidence other thanDNA is discussed in the legal
commentaries by Caruso and Symes and Kotsoglou.
Aitken and Aitken et al. focus on statistical methodologies
and concepts, in particular the likelihood ratio, which is now
widely recognized as providing the most suitable framework for
assessing the value of scientific evidence in a way that is logical,
balanced, transparent, and robust. Both these articles address and
rebut critiques (e.g., Lund and Iyer, 2017) that have recently been
leveled against the likelihood ratio.
Finally, Taroni et al. discuss a case example that
they consider demonstrates the gap that still exists
between what academics consider sound evaluative
procedures and what scientists in the field actually
practice and convey to recipients of expert information.
Burnier offers additional considerations regarding the
same case.
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INTRODUCTION
The proposal of a discussion about the use of software to help assign likelihood ratios for forensic
DNA profiling results, and the use of their output in the legal process, is both timely and important
(see also related contributions elsewhere in Frontiers, e.g., Biedermann et al., 2014). Ever since their
introduction in forensic science, DNA profiling analyses have been accompanied with the results
of calculations of various sorts. Their scope is well illustrated and documented in several reference
monographs (e.g., Evett andWeir, 1998; Buckleton et al., 2005; Balding and Steele, 2015). This solid
body of scholarly research and established practice has contributed to the widely held view among
scientists and recipients of expert information that eliciting the probative strength of forensic DNA
profiling results is per se a numerical task.
In this commentary, we intend—in a first part—to make the point that although calculations
are, by virtue, an integral part of the quantification of probative strength, it is equally important
at the outset to be clear about the question “Why are we doing a calculation?” (Buckleton et al.,
2005, p. 151). We will argue that this is not a question that statistics can answer. Stated otherwise,
we will contend that, as much it is important to be clear in any instance about what a particular
computation exactly purports to do, it is essential to define the questions that are of interest in
a particular case at hand. In a second part, we will emphasize on the extent to which, why and
how recently issued guidelines (e.g., ENFSI, 2015) encourage such thinking about cases prior to
conducting calculations, if any.
QUESTIONING DEFAULT CALCULATIONS
Experience demonstrates that many scientists working in operational laboratories decide on the use
of particular computational procedures—often provided by ready-to-use software packages—based
on the mere availability of those procedures at their workplace. This amounts to a convenience
choice, but what is more is that proceeding in this way is considered the best one could do. This
view may be reinforced if the software is based on Bayesian principles, because procedures that
belong to this class of inferential methods are referred to as the most inferentially sound. But the
sole fact that a procedure relies on Bayesian principles does not make it per se pertinent for the case
at hand. As noted by Lindley (2004, p. 74), “[t]hemain danger is that they [Bayesianmethods; added
by the authors] will be used automatically. (. . .) You must think about the real quantities involved,
like temperature or blood pressure, and not about symbols that represent them. This distinction
6
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between the thinking you and the unthinking, calculating
personal computer is essential.” This danger also exists in
the context of interpreting and reporting forensic DNA
results. Indeed, most of the commonly available computational
procedures1 lead to expressions of probative strength to help
discriminate between so-called sub-source level propositions
[e.g., “the person of interest (POI) is the source of the recovered
DNA” vs. “an unknown person is the source of the recovered
DNA”]. But, in many practical cases, the real question goes
beyond this level, e.g., how the detected DNA got where it
was found (Evett et al., 2002; Taroni et al., 2013), that is so-
called activity level propositions. Cases of alleged rape where the
competing versions only differ with respect to the activities that
led to the trace illustrate this. This is of course not a critique of
models being Bayesian in nature, but of the kind of questions to
which some of these models are tailored.
Skeptics may invoke that none of the above problems are
novel. But why then practice by and large remains unchanged?
While some scientists openly acknowledge that expressions
of probative strength of DNA considering sub-source level
propositions may indeed be insufficient for the needs, some hold
that it is for the Court to decide on that matter. We perfectly
agree with this stance, of course, because whatever the level of the
propositions, it is for the Court to decide on the probability of the
propositions. Notwithstanding, scientists can add considerable
value by assessing their results given activity level propositions.
Yet others contend that one can leave this debate until
the Courtroom. However, this may raise issues from a quality
management point of view, and render the situation very
uncomfortable for the witness, because of the inevitable difficulty
of the task. The challenge is real for a variety of case scenarios, in
particular where only low quantities of DNA are detected and/or
when POIs do not deny that the recovered DNA is theirs. We
seriously doubt that members of the judiciary are able to properly
appreciate the extent to which one can expect to obtain a low
quantity of DNA, recovered at a certain position on the crime
scene, the victim, or a POI, given one activity as compared to
another activity. We would not recommend either doing this
evaluation on the stand. This is because such assessments are
very challenging even for experts, and require scientific knowledge
about many factors, such as transfer, persistence, and the capacity
of a given donor to shed detectable quantities of DNA2. Let
us emphasize again that the question of whether the detected
DNA is that of the POI may be entirely uncontested (and thus
there would be no need for a likelihood ratio given sub-source
propositions as there is no uncertainty about sub-source). What
is really of interest is to assess the probability of observing such
a result for a DNA trace, that is a trace found in a particular
position, in a given quantity and leading to a profile of the
observed quality given the alleged activities and given relevant
1The scope of these procedures is large and includes topics such as complex
modeling of products (e.g., stutters) of the PCR amplification of STRs (e.g., Bright
et al., 2014; Gittelson et al., 2014) and the study of the sensitivity of expressions
of probative value due to the use of particular statistical techniques (e.g., MCMC
techniques, see for example Bright et al., 2015).
2On this topic, see for example http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/science/
9115916/The-case-against-DNA.html.
information such as the time lapse between collection of trace
material and the commission of the crime, environmental factors
to which the trace was exposed (e.g., temperature, humidity)
etc. Such assessments are highly case dependent, which calls
for the generation of more research with experiments under
controlled conditions, that can help build a community-wide
knowledge base (Evett, 2015)3. To further emphasize the need for
considering observations given activity level propositions, note
again that the result which is to be assessed is not only the rarity
of genetic features, but also extends to the very fact of finding, at
a given position, a detectable quantity of DNA (Evett and Weir,
1998), which may be nil. Sub-source level propositions cannot
deal with results that did not yield a DNA profile.
The mismatch between default evaluations given sub-source
level propositions and the decision makers’ interest in activity
level propositions is a cause of concern because the strength of
the observations in the former case can be radically different from
that of the latter, so that inappropriate conclusions can result if
the two are taken to be equivalent. We have seen this happen
in cases where scientists report likelihood ratios in the order of
>1020 with propositions at sub-source level when in fact the real
issue was one of activities and where the strength of the findings,
given the conditioning information of the case at hand, was way
more moderate4.
CURRENT RECOMMENDATIONS
The above discussion is not intended to suggest that evaluation
given (sub)-source level propositions is useless or detrimental
in principle5. The point we seek to make is that it is crucial
to assess the needs of the recipient of expert information prior
to choosing a computational procedure. This seems like an
obvious and moderate requirement, yet experience shows that
often it is given little attention in practice. Recent works by
forensic scientists from across Europe, published in the form of
a guideline (ENFSI, 2015), seek both to strengthen awareness of
this issue and help scientists and recipients of expert information
proceed in a more sensible way. For example, in its Guidance
Note 2 on propositions, the document specifies: “Source level
propositions are adequate in cases where there is no risk that the
court will misinterpret them in the context of the alleged activities
in the case” (ENFSI, 2015, p. 12). To illustrate this idea, the
following example is given: “A large fresh bloodstain is recovered
at the point of entry at a burglary scene and delivered to the
laboratory for DNA analysis. Combination of a presumptive test
and appearance allows the scientist to safely assume that the stain
is blood. A suspect says that he has never been in the premises.
The set of propositions can be (1) the bloodstain came from the
defendant and (2) the bloodstain came from another unknown
individual” (ENFSI, 2015, p. 12). In this example, source level
3For an example in other transfer traces, see Buckleton et al. (1989).
4Another issue, not pursued here, is whether likelihood ratios exceeding one
over the earth population, and multiples of that, are reasonable. There is much
argument to say they are not (e.g., Thompson et al., 2003; Hopwood et al., 2012).
5In fact, the strength of the DNA correspondence is so high that this will lead to
situations where the source of the DNA will be admitted (leaving no uncertainty
on the source of the DNA). This, then moves the issue to the activities.
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propositions are not problematic because no expert knowledge is
required regarding phenomena such as transfer and persistence,
as well as background levels of DNA. Such factors do not impact,
in this kind of circumstances, on the understanding of scientific
findings relative to the alleged activities. In particular, it is not
doubted that the bloodstain results from the act of breaking in.
This example also illustrates that there is more to the collected
trace than the DNA profile: there are aspects such as the freshness
of the stain, the quantity of material and the position where the
trace was found. In turn, it is clear that specialized knowledge
regarding transfer, persistence and background would matter in
the above scenario if DNA had been detected in low quantities,
rather than from a rich bloodstain.
The above understanding has far reaching implications: the
level of propositions depends on the factors and observations on
which forensic scientists have expert knowledge. It is their duty
to evaluate all their results so that the Court is not deprived of
information that is necessary for a balanced view. For example,
the ENFSI guideline explicitly advises against the changing
of propositions from activity to (sub-) source level when
relevant expert knowledge is not available: “In fact, the choice
between (sub-) source and activity should not be influenced
by the availability of data or expert knowledge but solely from
the consideration of factors such as transfer, persistence, and
background levels that could crucially affect the strength of the
findings within the context of the case circumstances.” (ENFSI,
2015, p. 13).
We acknowledge, from personal experience, that the
implementation of the above perspective is challenging. It may
be even more so in systems exposed to commercialisation
where forensic providers that conduct DNA profiling analyses
operate more and more separated from those entities that
collected trace material at the crime scene (Jackson, 2013).
Further obstacles may be operational constraints such as time
and costs, because evaluation given activity level propositions
does not rely on default computations, but generally requires a
case-based approach. Regarding the latter point, some scientists
deplore a lack of formulaic developments for evaluation given
propositions at higher hierarchical levels. But this critique
does fall short of the current state of developments. Formal
likelihood ratio approaches exist (e.g., Evett, 1984; Evett and
Weir, 1998), used also for other transfer materials (e.g., glass;
Curran et al., 2000), and there are reports that demonstrate the
relevance and practical feasibility (e.g., McKenna, 2013). Yet,
other developments allow one to account for uncertainty about
the relevance of the recovered material and the possibility that
material was left for innocent reasons (e.g., Evett, 1993; Evett
et al., 2002).
The role of statistics in evaluating DNA profiling evidence
has always been important, but we now must realize that,
increasingly often, the traditional perspective of sub-source
level propositions, and the main focus on the rarity of the
corresponding features (i.e., the so-called conditional genotype
probability), may represent only a first step of the evaluative
process. This does not make these evaluation approaches
wrong, only less comprehensive. The fact is that the extrinsic
characteristics of the trace material (i.e., low quantities of DNA)
and the propositions of interest have changed, and it is important
to realize that this represents the relevant starting point. This
recognition of the needs cannot be answered by statistics, only
the evaluative procedures that need to be built once the needs
are properly elicited. The importance of statistics in this endeavor
remains unaffected, and stands as noted by Lindley (2000, p. 38):
“(. . .) the first task of a statistician is to develop a (probability)
model to embrace the clients’ interests’ and uncertainties. It will
include the data and any parameters that are judged necessary.
Once accomplished, the mechanics of the calculus take over and
the required inference is made.”
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Adopting the interpretative/hermeneutical method typical of much legal scholarship,
this article considers two sets of issues pertaining to LTDNA profiles as evidence in
criminal proceedings. The section titled Expert Evidence as Forensic Epistemic Warrant
addresses some rather large questions about the epistemic status and probative value
of expert testimony in general. It sketches a theoretical model of expert evidence,
highlighting five essential criteria: (1) expert competence; (2) disciplinary domain; (3)
methodological validity; (4) materiality; and (5) legal admissibility. This generic model
of expert authority, highlighting law’s fundamentally normative character, applies to all
modern forms of criminal adjudication, across Europe and farther afield. The section
titled LTDNA Evidence in UK Criminal Trials then examines English and Northern Irish
courts’ attempts to get to grips with LTDNA evidence in recent cases. Better appreciating
the ways in which UK courts have addressed the challenges of LTDNA evidence
may offer some insights into parallel developments in other legal systems. Appellate
court rulings follow a predictable judicial logic, which might usefully be studied and
reflected upon by any forensic scientist or statistician seeking to operate effectively
in criminal proceedings. Whilst each legal jurisdiction has its own unique blend of
jurisprudence, institutions, cultures and historical traditions, there is considerable scope
for comparative analysis and cross-jurisdictional borrowing and instruction. In the spirit
of promoting more nuanced and sophisticated international interdisciplinary dialogue,
this article examines UK judicial approaches to LTDNA evidence and begins to elucidate
their underlying institutional logic. Legal argument and broader policy debates are not
confined to considerations of scientific validity, contamination risks and evidential integrity,
or associated judgments of legal admissibility or exclusion. They also crucially concern
the manner in which LTDNA profiling results are presented and explained to factfinders
in criminal trials.
Keywords: expert evidence, criminal adjudication, LTDNA profiling evidence, comparative criminal procedure,
Law-Science, interdisciplinarity
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INTRODUCTION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
TOPIC OF CONVERSATION
As originally conceived, this Research Topic focused on “the
interface between forensic scientists and statisticians when
calculating likelihood ratios for low template and complex
DNA results”1. The problem of calculating and interpreting
likelihood ratios was thereby implicitly characterized as a bilateral
conversation between statisticians and forensic scientists. Of
course, on further reflection, there is self-evidently a third
major conversation partner in this discussion, namely courts
and legal professionals. We might add that criminal “courts”
in jurisdictions such as England and Wales comprise a mixture
of professional judges and lay fact-finders, though jurists and
jurors alike are laypeople when it comes to DNA profiling
science. Our Topic Editors observed that “[t]here is a danger
for courts if [likelihood ratios] are produced by a black box
where the reporting forensic scientist has little input into
and less understanding” of statistical methods. The clear (and
unsurprising) presupposition is that difficulties associated with
Low Template DNA (LTDNA) evidence cannot simply be
conceptualized as “technical” questions to be resolved between
specialists according to mutually satisfactory methodological
criteria. There remains the challenge of communicating the
meaning and significance of technical fixes to lay audiences
in criminal adjudication. This communicative dimension is a
general feature of expert testimony, whether or not it concerns
anything properly categorized as “science”2.
This article considers two sets of issues pertaining to LTDNA
profiles as evidence in criminal proceedings, which are pertinent
to all modern legal systems in which this type of evidence is
currently or might in future be adduced. The section titled Expert
Evidence as Forensic Epistemic Warrant addresses some rather
large questions about the epistemic status and probative value of
expert testimony in general. The following section on LTDNA
Evidence in UK Criminal Trials then examines English courts’
attempts to get to grips with LTDNA evidence in recent cases.
These efforts might or might not appear impressive to outsiders,
but they do, generally speaking, follow a predictable judicial
logic—a logic which might usefully be studied and reflected
upon by any forensic scientist or statistician seeking to operate
effectively in this system of justice. In the spirit of promoting
more nuanced and sophisticated interdisciplinary dialogue this
article examines judicial approaches to LTDNA evidence and
begins to elucidate their underlying institutional logic.
The following discussion adopts the interpretative or
hermeneutical method typical of much legal scholarship.
1This was the title of the Research Topic originally announced on the Frontiers
website, and in my invitation to contribute to it, and was still the current version
when I first submitted this paper (11 March 2016). Now see Sue Pope and
Alex Biedermann, “Research Topic: The Dialogue Between Forensic Scientists,
Statisticians and Lawyers about Complex Scientific Issues for Court,” Frontiers,
http://journal.frontiersin.org/researchtopic/4000/the-dialogue-between-forensic-
scientists-statisticians-and-lawyers-about-complex-scientific-issues-f (accessed 17
May 2016).
2Generally, see Paul Roberts (ed.), Expert Evidence and Scientific Proof in Criminal
Trials (Ashgate, 2014).
It engages with primary and secondary institutional materials—
prominently featuring reported criminal appeals in England
and Wales—in an attempt both to understand judicial practice
and to contribute to the best normative (re)interpretation of
legal doctrine and institutions. It might fairly be conceptualized,
in methodological terms, as an elucidation of the internal
logics of legal argumentation and judicial reasoning, which are
often opaque to non-lawyers, even to those such as forensic
scientists who regularly participate in criminal investigations
and are no strangers to courtrooms. In striking contrast to
scientific knowledge, law is delimited by jurisdiction. The
second half of this article discusses appellate decisions drawn
from two specific, common law jurisdictions: Northern Ireland
(applying Northern Ireland law), and England and Wales
(applying English law). Whilst each legal jurisdiction has its
own unique blend of jurisprudence, institutions, cultures, and
historical traditions, there is considerable scope for comparative
analysis and cross-jurisdictional borrowing and instruction, the
more so in a shrinking world characterized by globalization
and cosmopolitan legality. Better appreciating the ways in
which UK courts have addressed the challenges of LTDNA
evidence may offer some insights into parallel developments in
other legal systems. Moreover, the practical challenges posed
by forensic science and other expert witness testimony cut
across conventional Comparative Law distinctions between
“adversarial” and “inquisitorial” procedures or “common law”
and “civilian” legal systems. In setting the scene for more detailed
doctrinal analysis, the first part of this article presents a generic
model of expert authority highlighting law’s fundamentally
normative mission which applies to all modern forms of criminal
adjudication, across Europe and farther afield.
EXPERT EVIDENCE AS FORENSIC
EPISTEMIC WARRANT
Criminal trials are practical exercises in reasoning under
uncertainty. We want to know what happened; but material
facts are contested (otherwise the accused would have pleaded
guilty in common law systems). Relevant evidence rationally
authorizes or “warrants” particular inferential conclusions. The
more probative value evidence has, the more warrant it provides
for the conclusion. In traditional common law thinking, the best
evidence is the oral testimony of a percipient witness, given on
oath, and tested through cross-examination. This category of
evidence is regarded as providing the best epistemic warrant for
the inferential conclusions supported by the witness’s testimony.
This doesn’t mean to say, of course, that every witness in court is
truthful, accurate and reliable. We know, for example, that there
can be many kinds of difficulty with eyewitness testimony3. But it
does not follow, as a general proposition, that we should therefore
prefer the testimony of those who did not see the incident
to testimony from witnesses who did. “Best” does not mean
infallible. Evidence adduced in criminal trials is often contested
3See e.g., Richard A. Wise, Clifford S. Fishman and Martin A. Safer, “How to
Analyze the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony in a Criminal Case” (2009) 42
Connecticut Law Review 435.
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or contradictory, and the factfinder must make the best of it,
resolving any enduring doubts in accordance with the applicable
burden and standard of proof. In criminal litigation, most (not
all) doubts are resolved in favor of the accused, in accordance
with the presumption of innocence4.
Expert evidence supplies inferential warrant through the
argument from authority. The expert says to the court, trust
me, I’m an expert. The authority paradigm underpinning the
inferential logic of forensic expert testimony has five major
components: (1) the expert is a genuine expert (competence);
(2) in a field in which expertise can be obtained (domain); (3)
and has correctly and conscientiously applied authentic domain-
specific protocols to produce proffered evidence (methodological
validity); (4) in relation to a legally relevant issue (materiality);
(5) and in a form that is likely to provide legitimate epistemic
warrant for legal adjudication (admissibility). The authority
paradigm is generic. It applies to “sciences” as conventionally
understood (and in idiomatic English, this generally means
“the hard sciences” like physics and chemistry), but also to
historical, social and psychological facts, and even to moral
and theological reasoning. This 5-fold taxonomy, albeit a
necessarily simplifying model, offers a powerful heuristic for
teasing out theoretical complexities and practical challenges
entailed by the familiar-sounding notion of forensic expertise5.
For example, components (1) to (3)—competence, domain
and methodological validity—interact in interesting ways. The
authority paradigm obviously breaks down if the testimony is
not proffered by a genuine expert; if the so-called expert is
an “incompetent” witness in the common lawyer’s sense. But
sometimes, it is not so much the qualifications and experience
of individual experts that are at stake, but the very possibility
of domain expertise. The objection to “expert” witch-finders6
or ghost hunters is more fundamental (and less ad hominem)
than any criticism that individual exponents have not taken
the appropriate training courses or gained enough job-related
experience.
Methodological validity, component (3), embraces a set of
important epistemic considerations arising even in relation to
genuine experts in well-established disciplinary domains. The
authority paradigm breaks down for different reasons when
genuine experts succumb to personal or professional biases,
fail to implement pertinent methodological protocols correctly,
or purport to speak beyond the boundaries of their domain-
specific expertise. It may be difficult in the general run of cases
for courts to differentiate between genuinely well-credentialed
4The leading case in English law is (still) Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462,
HL. However, the concept of “presumption of innocence” is complex and open
to a range of normative and epistemic interpretations. See further, Paul Roberts,
“Loss of Innocence in Common Law Presumptions” (2014) 8 Criminal Law and
Philosophy 317.
5Also see Susan Haack, Evidence Matters: Science, Proof and Truth in the Law
(Cambridge UP, 2014); Harry Collins, Are We All Scientific Experts Now? (Polity,
2014); Harry Collins and Robert Evans, Rethinking Expertise (Chicago UP, 2007).
6For pertinent historical context, see Malcolm Gaskill, “Witchcraft and Evidence
in Early Modern England” (2008) 198 Past and Present 33; Gregory Durston,
Witchcraft and Witch Trials: A History of English Witchcraft and its Legal
Perspectives, 1542 to 1736 (Barry Rose, 2000).
experts, and plausible-sounding charlatans and shysters7. This
practical challenge is so much greater, however, in relation to the
types of failing encompassed by component (3), where genuine
experts are over-reaching in one way or another8. Forms of expert
testimony incorporating multiple specialist domains, including
DNA profiling, pose such dilemmas acutely. Plainly, not every
opinion or judgment expressed by an expert properly qualifies
as expert opinion. Judges may be ill-equipped and trial procedure
ill-suited to policing experts’ disciplinary boundaries effectively.
Components (4) and (5) of the authority paradigm—
materiality and admissibility—introduce further major
complexities, in terms of managing the interface between expert
knowledge and forensic objectives, concerns and values. A vital
distinction is that, whereas components (1)–(3) are essentially
epistemic matters, criminal adjudication is fundamentally
normative. The overriding objective of criminal proceedings
is doing justice;9 and whilst epistemic considerations are vital
ingredients in the mix—we want to convict the guilty, and only
them, of the right offence(s)—epistemology is not the proof of
the pudding. We only want to convict the guilty in the right way
(“by due process of law”), not any which way—e.g., by vigilante
lynch mob or Dirty Harry policing10 in violation of the rule of
law. Thus, all evidence, including expert witness testimony, must
satisfy fundamental criteria of procedural fairness, transparency,
exposure to adversarial testing, and compliance with other
basic criteria of the right to a fair trial. Notwithstanding their
divergent legal histories, idiosyncratic procedural traditions
and distinctive institutional cultures, all 47 Council of Europe
nations are bound by a common conception of the fundamental
requirements of fair criminal trials under Article 6 of the ECHR11
(which is entirely separate from parallel or overlapping EU legal
frameworks applicable only to the 28 countries of the “smaller
Europe”12).
7Although in no sense representative, the literature contains examples of truly
egregious malpractice in pockets of forensics: see e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, “The
Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime
Laboratories” (1997) 4 Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law 439.
8Cf. Meadow v General Medical Council [2007] QB 462, [2006] EWCA Civ 1390;
Richard Nobles and David Schiff, “Misleading Statistics within Criminal Trials –
The Sally Clark Case” (2005) 2(1) Significance 17.
9This is now an explicit normative requirement in English law: Criminal
Procedure Rules 2015, r.1. For broader contextualizing discussion, see Paul
Roberts, “Groundwork for a Jurisprudence of Criminal Procedure” in R. A. Duff
and Stuart Green (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law (OUP, 2011).
10For idiomatic applications across the political spectrum, see e.g., Russell
Dean Covey, “Miranda and the Media: Tracing the Cultural Evolution of a
Constitutional Revolution” (2007) 10 Chapman Law Review 761; Joëlle Anne
Moreno, “What Happens when Dirty Harry Becomes an (Expert) Witness for the
Prosecution?” (2004) 79 Tulane Law Review 1; Richard Nobles and David Schiff,
“Due Process andDirty Harry Dilemmas: Criminal Appeals and the Human Rights
Act” (2001) 64Modern Law Review 911; Michael Stokes Paulsen, “Dirty Harry and
the Real Constitution” (1997) 64 University of Chicago Law Review 1457; Carl B.
Klockars, “The Dirty Harry Problem” (1980) 452 Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science 33.
11For general elucidation, see John D. Jackson and Sarah J. Summers, The
Internationalization of Criminal Evidence (CUP, 2012); Paul Roberts and Jill
Hunter (eds.), Criminal Evidence and Human Rights (Hart, 2012).
12Cf. Paul Roberts, “From Extradition to Surrender: EU Criminal Law and
Comparative Legal Method” (2014) 53 Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 545;
Jacqueline Hodgson, “EU Criminal Justice: The Challenge of Due Process Rights
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It is at this point in the discussion that, in my experience,
lawyers and scientists tend to see things differently; and
misunderstandings easily arise. Science investigates empirical
matters, and produces factual information about the world. It
is epistemic to its core and overwhelmingly instrumental in
outlook. The policy paradigm is “curing cancer.” A new drug
either works (in part), or it does not. It has particular side-
effects (in some degree), or it does not. It can be manufactured
by a particular process, or it cannot. Likewise, the DNA
collected from the crime scene was either deposited by the
accused, or by somebody else; the accused lacked capacity
to form the required intention at the material time (e.g.,
because catatonic or sleepwalking), or he did not; and so
on. These are all facts about the (empirical) world; they are
either true or false; and they invoke or presuppose causal
explanations. This is not to say or imply that “science”
always provides unequivocal, certain answers to discrete, well-
formulated questions. To the contrary, scientific investigation
is inherently uncertain (“experimental”), and conclusions
are typically framed in probabilistic terms—whether or not
employing explicitly quantitativemeasurements of uncertainty in
numbers or words. But the equivocation introduced by resorting
to probability is epistemic not ontological: it relates to the status of
our knowledge and beliefs about facts in the world, not to the facts
themselves (setting aside complications arising from quantum
physics and sub-atomic particles not pertinent to the present
discussion). Judgments of justice are of an entirely different,
normative, order. It is not merely doubtful or uncertain whether,
say, it would be just or fair if Drug X cured cancer; or just
or fair if the accused were the donor of crime scene DNA.
Such questions are incoherent. They perpetrate a category error,
confusing normative standards with empirical facts.
Criminal adjudication comprises a set of institutionalized
practices for determining liability and censuring and punishing
criminal wrongdoing13. This set of practices is normative
through and through. It is not just that epistemic considerations
are subject to normative side-constraints, as where we exclude
relevant evidence procured by torture irrespective of its epistemic
credentials14. Epistemic objectives are themselves normatively
constituted, in the sense that the standard of adequate epistemic
warrant is indexed to the institutionalized practices and
objectives of criminal adjudication. So what we require is
not “adequate warrant” (sufficient grounds) in the abstract,
but adequate warrant for the purposes of determining criminal
liability and censuring and punishing criminal wrongdoers. By
reframing the issue in this way, it should become clearer why
expert evidence cannot provide its own epistemic warrant for
judicial purposes, no matter how highly the evidence scores on
components (1)–(3) of the authority paradigm. Expert witnesses
within a Framework of Mutual Recognition” (2011) 37 North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation 308.
13Generally, see Paul Roberts (ed.), Theoretical Foundations of Criminal Trial
Procedure (Ashgate, 2014).
14A v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2) [2006] 2 AC 221,
[2005] UKHL 71; Gäfgen v Germany (2011) 52 EHRR 1, ECtHR (GC). For
discussion, see Paul Roberts, “Normative Evolution in Evidentiary Exclusion:
Coercion, Deception and the Right to a Fair Trial” in Paul Roberts and Jill Hunter
(eds.), Criminal Evidence and Human Rights (Hart, 2012).
do not decide what evidence is “good enough” for the purposes
of criminal adjudication. This is the role of the legally, indeed
constitutionally, authorized fact-finder. Furthermore, issues of
materiality and strategic application in individual cases are
determined by legal standards and judicial decision-makers, not
by the disciplinary standards embraced by particular sciences or
expert witnesses. This insight goes to the heart of the truism that
forensic science serves justice, not the other way around.
The logic of the authority paradigm and the priority of
normative over epistemic considerations in criminal adjudication
are general features of all modern legal systems. However, the
ways in which resulting interfaces are organized, opportunities
exploited, and tensions managed vary considerably from one
legal system to the next, working with the grain of local
procedural traditions, institutional practices and professional
cultures. For example, in the common law world lay fact-
finding is still regarded as significant (even though professional
judges increasingly predominate), whilst lay input in criminal
adjudication is diminished or even non-existent in most
Continental juristic traditions. The roles, relationships, and
distribution of powers between judges, prosecutors and defence
lawyers also vary considerably across legal jurisdictions. In
legal systems with stronger adversarial leanings, prosecutors and
defence lawyers tend to play a more active role in shaping the
course of the proceedings, whereas the “inquisitorial” judge is the
dominant figure in other procedural models. Criminal procedure
is dynamic and constantly evolving (we have seen major shifts
toward a philosophy of activist judicial trial management in
England and Wales in recent years, for example), and it is
always perilous to over-generalize abstract formal models or to
extrapolate too confidently from national traditions. It follows
that approaches to expert evidence in general, or to particular
types of scientific evidence such as LTDNA, which are utilized
successfully in one jurisdiction cannot automatically be expected
to operate with the same success, or at all, in a different
procedural environment structured by alternative normative
priorities. This observation holds irrespective of the epistemic
credentials of expert evidence, encapsulated in authority paradigm
components (1)–(3). Normative pluralism and jurisdictional
diversity are inherent features of modern legality requiring
detailed local knowledge and careful negotiation, not least on
the part of expert witnesses operating in multiple jurisdictions.
However, these elements of cultural relativity tend to provoke
intuitive resistance form scientists accustomed to prioritizing
universal (empirical) scientific truth over national ideology. In
one sense, skepticism is justified: sacrificing science to ideology
in general, and regardless of political variety, leads to Lysenkoism,
authoritarianism, crop failure and mass starvation. Nonetheless,
the subservience of science to normative criteria is an inherent,
fully rationalized and legitimate requirement of penal justice.
Two kinds of recurrent problems with expert evidence call
for practical solutions in all legal systems. The first is the
problem of expert disagreement; the second, more fundamental
problem concerns a recurrent dynamic between deference and
education in reliance on expertise. What should a court do
when expert witnesses disagree? An attractive first option would
be to find that, on further investigation, there is no genuine
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disagreement to resolve, e.g., because one of the protagonists
is not really an expert after all, or not an expert in the
relevant domain, or because the experts have been fed different
factual assumptions by their instructing lawyers, and once these
discrepancies have been clarified the ostensible disagreement
disappears. But this convenient resolution will not always
be possible. In cases of genuine, well-informed, unshakeable
disagreement between experts, various strategies are available to
the court. One approach would be to accept the disagreement
as a forensically significant fact in and of itself and resolve
the issue in accordance with the burden and standard of proof
(usually, but not invariably, giving the accused the benefit
of the doubt in a criminal trial)15. A second strategy would
be to side-step scientific disagreements by invoking individual
experts’ respective qualifications, experience and/or testimonial
credibility as proxies for the reliability of their evidence, e.g.,
by adopting the working assumption that the professor or
consultant is more likely to be correct than a laboratory
technician or medical student. A third possibility is for the court
to try to resolve the disagreement for itself. Strategies two and
three exemplify the education/deference dynamic in factfinders’
reliance on expert evidence. Strategy two entails deferring to
the most authoritative expert, as judged by the factfinder (with
or without the benefit of further judicial directions). The third
strategy initially sounds the most attractive, because it comports
with the factfinder’s overarching responsibility for determining
disputed questions of fact. The obvious problem is that, by
definition, the factfinder lacks domain-specific expertise. Can the
experts, through their courtroom testimony, effectively educate
the factfinder to arrive at its own decision? Perhaps some
element of “education” is possible, even in the constrained and
most unpromising pedagogical environment of the criminal
courtroom, but it seems quite implausible that factfinders in
criminal trials could be equipped with sufficient knowledge and
insight to resolve disputes between genuine experts with long
years of study and extensive practical experience under their
belts16. Worse, fact-finders’ lack of domain-relevant expertise
also undercuts strategy two, because how is it possible for jurors
to assess the comparative merits of experts’ disagreements when
their own knowledge of the field is tenuous or non-existent? The
worry is that, in the absence of rational criteria for making a
determination, factfinders will fall back on irrational proxies for
robust epistemic warrant, such as placing their faith in the expert
15This strategy was suggested in R v Cannings [2004] 1 WLR 2607, [178] (CA),
where Judge LJ advised prosecutors and trial judges that “if the outcome of the
trial depends exclusively or almost exclusively on a serious disagreement between
distinguished and reputable experts, it will often be unwise, and therefore unsafe,
to proceed.” But cf. R v Hookway and Noakes [2011] EWCA Crim 1989.
16These issues are well-debated in the legal literature: see further, Ronald J. Allen,
“Expertise and the Daubert Decision” (1994) 84 Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology 1157; Edward J. Imwinkelreid, “The Next Step in Conceptualizing
the Presentation of Expert Evidence as Education: the Case for Didactic
Trial Procedures” (1997) 1 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 128;
Gary Edmond, “The Next Step or Moonwalking? Expert Evidence, the Public
Understanding of Science and the Case Against Imwinkelreid’s Didactic Trial
Procedures” (1998) 2 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 13; Imwinkelreid,
“Correspondence: Didactic Trial Procedures” (1998) 2 International Journal of
Evidence and Proof 205.
with greater testimonial eloquence or the doctor with the most
reassuring bedside manner.
Legal systems resolve these pervasive issues of expertise
in their own distinctive ways. At the level of sweeping
generalization, common lawyers tend to think that “civilians
don’t try”17 and that inquisitorial judges too readily defer
to authoritative court-appointed experts18. Civilians, for their
part, tend to regard common law criminal procedure as
irrational in its preferences for adversarial theatre, excessive
technicality and lay over expert (including expert judicial)
decision-making19. These longstanding debates implicate deep-
rooted and enduring controversies, which it would not be
profitable to dig into here; save to say that there is no reason
for thinking that structures and cultures of criminal adjudication
must conform to a single uniform pattern (so long as they
adhere to fundamental standards of justice), any more than
we should expect rigid, monotonous uniformity in national
cuisine, manners or language. Recognition of legitimate scope for
national cultural diversity, even in procedural fundamentals, is
another major respect in which international, interdisciplinary
conversations about law and justice differ markedly from
international conversations about science and expertise.
LTDNA EVIDENCE IN UK CRIMINAL
TRIALS
Recent attempts by criminal courts in England and Wales and
Northern Ireland to get to grips with LTDNA profiling evidence
must be interpreted in light of the conceptual, normative and
juridical considerations summarized in the previous section. The
five principal components of the authority paradigm and the
diversity of national criminal procedures within a shared ECHR
framework mandating fair trials, in particular, need to be borne
in mind as the exposition unfolds. Just as the entirety of western
philosophy has evolved in productive antagonism with skeptical
doubt, legal recognition of LTDNA profiling was propelled by
challenges to its methodology, epistemic status and evidential
reliability. The evolution of English criminal jurisprudence
on LTDNA profiling may find some resonances with parallel
developments in other legal jurisdictions, and possibly inform
17William Twining, “Civilians Don’t Try: A Comment on Mirjan Damaska’s
“Rational and Irrational Proof Revisited”” (1997) 5 Cardozo Journal of
International and Comparative Law 69.
18MN Howard QC, “The Neutral Expert: A Plausible Threat to Justice” [1991]
Criminal Law Review 98. Such stereotypes are not without empirical foundation:
cf. Chrisje Brants, “Wrongful Convictions and Inquisitorial Process: the Case of the
Netherlands” (2012) 80University of Cincinnati Law Review 1069, 1111 (observing
that, “[j]udges may be inclined to give too much weight to expert testimony and
forensic evidence (especially true of DNA).... [I]t is perhaps more problematic that
judges will generally have at their disposal the evidence of only one expert.... [T]he
routine absence of an expert for the defence means that the court is dependent
upon its own, often amateur, evaluation of the evidence”).
19See further, J. R. Spencer, “Court Experts and Expert Witnesses: Have We a
Lesson to Learn from the French?” (1992) 45 Current Legal Problems 213; William
T. Pizzi, Trials Without Truth (NYU Press, 1999); Gordon van Kessel, “Adversary
Excesses in the American Criminal Trial” (1992) 67 Notre Dame Law Review
403; Mirjan R Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative
Approach to the Legal Process (Yale UP, 1986).
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legal argument and policy debates in criminal trials and appeals
elsewhere.
(a) Legal Recognition
Our story begins in 2007 with the judgment of the Northern
Ireland Crown Court in R v Hoey20, in which Weir J, sitting
without a jury in a “Diplock” trial court21, commented on the
reliability of what was then generally referred to as Low Copy
Number (LCN) DNA profiling evidence. LCN profiling evidence
in this case, generated by the Forensic Science Service (FSS)
laboratory in Birmingham22, purported to link the accused to
explosive devices used in a string of terrorist bombings across
Northern Ireland, including “the infamous car bomb explosion
that destroyed much of the shopping Centre of Omagh on
the afternoon of Saturday, 15 August 1998 with... appalling
consequence[s]... leaving permanent and widespread physical
and psychological scars.”23 During the course of the trial, serious
concerns were identified regarding the integrity of the evidential
samples collected from crime scenes, which had not initially
been taken, handled or stored with DNA profiling in mind.
The Court found that “the arrangements within the police in
1998 and 1999 for the recording and storage of items were
thoroughly disorganized”24 and that “thoughtless and slapdash”
exhibit handling and anti-contamination practices extended
to the laboratories and staff of Forensic Service Northern
Ireland (FSNI)25. Mr. Justice Weir considered it “extraordinary”
that “knowing that these items had not been collected or
preserved using methods designed to ensure the high degree
of integrity needed not merely for DNA examination but for
the more exacting requirements of LCN DNA, examinations
were performed at Birmingham with a view to using them for
evidential rather than solely intelligence gathering purposes.” Yet
analytical results fromDNA profiling had then been “put forward
and stoutly defended” at trial “as evidence that the Court might
safely rely upon as tending to establish the guilt of the accused.”26
As a matter of legal logic, Weir J’s decisive conclusion flowed
almost ineluctably from the prosecution’s failure to establish the
integrity of its evidence:
[O]ne police and SOCO witness after another and also Dr. Griffin
[of FSNI] had candidly made clear that possible examination
for DNA was not in their minds at all as they were collecting,
storing, transmitting and dealing with these items in 1998. Why
therefore would they then have had present to their minds and
been complying with the exacting integrity requirements which
reliable DNA examination and most especially that in its LCN
form demands? All this [FSNI] must have known very well when
20R v Sean Hoey [2007] NICC 49.
21See John Jackson and Sean Doran, Judge Without Jury: Diplock Trials in the
Adversary System (OUP, 1995).
22The FSS was subsequently, and controversially, closed down to save public
money: see House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Forensic
Science, Second Report of Session 2013–14, HC 610 (TSO, 2013).
23R v Sean Hoey [2007] NICC 49, [1].
24Ibid [51].
25“The position so far as [FSNI] is concerned is even more difficult to comprehend
as everyone there must have been very well aware of the risks of improper labeling,
storage and examination”: Ibid [59].
26Ibid [60].
it co-operated in searching for and collecting items for LCN
examination in Birmingham and again later when the idea of
using the results of those examinations as evidence in this trial
must have been under discussion. By that stage the problems
inherent in the need to prove integrity had plainly come to
be appreciated by one or more police officers concerned in
this investigation as was shown by the mendacious attempts to
retrospectively alter... evidence so as to falsely make it appear that
appropriate DNA protective precautions had been taken at that
scene.... [H]aving carefully reviewed all the evidence on this issue,
I am not in the least satisfied in relation to any one of the items
upon which reliance is sought to be placed for the results of their
LCN DNA examinations that the integrity of any of those items
prior to its examination for that purpose has been established
by the evidence. Accordingly I find that that DNA evidence...
cannot satisfyme either beyond a reasonable doubt or to any other
acceptable standard27.
That is to say, in terms of the conceptual framework sketched
in the previous section, the DNA profiling evidence lacked
adequate epistemic warrant for grounding a criminal conviction,
owing to the well-established fact that forensic samples were
compromised—at least in the sense that their integrity could not
be demonstrably assured.
Weir J’s judgment might have stopped there, but instead
briefly addressed the validity and merits of LCN profiling
techniques themselves, since these had been extensively
canvassed during the trial and conflicting expert views had been
expressed. Weir J was “concerned at the wide variance in expert
opinions, not only as between the Prosecution and Defence but
also between the two experts called for the Prosecution,”28 as
well as by the “manner and content of the response” of the main
FSS expert to defence criticisms. This witness appeared to Weir
J to be “inappropriately combative as an expert witness and
his unwillingness to debate constructively the various matters
put to him was unhelpful in the extreme.”29 Notice that, in
the absence of domain expertise, Weir J predictably falls back
on general proxies for testimonial reliability, such as the (not
unreasonable) working assumptions that a conscientious and
objective scientist will display an open mind and be prepared
to debate criticisms and objections in a fair-minded way. A
second prosecution expert, by contrast, came over to the Court
as “willing to carefully consider the propositions put to him”
by defence counsel, such that “his evidence greatly helped to
inform and bring some objectivity to the debate.”30 Weir J
registered “concern about the present state of the validation of
the science and methodology associated with LCN DNA and, in
consequence, its reliability as an evidential tool” and expressed
himself “not satisfied that the publishing of two journal articles
describing a process invented by the authors can be regarded
without more as having “validated” that process for the purpose
of its being confidently used for evidential purposes.”31 These
27Ibid [60], [61].
28Ibid [62].
29Ibid [63].
30Ibid.
31Ibid [64]. Notice that “confident use for evidential purposes” parallels, in my
terminology, adequate epistemic warrant for (use in) criminal adjudication.
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remarks were left hanging within the context of an unresolved
broader discussion about enhancing procedural frameworks
for regulating the admission and uses of scientific evidence in
criminal trials. Weir J suggested that “the evidence given in this
case by the FSS witnesses reinforces in the clearest way possible
the need for urgent attention to this task.”32
Being a decision at first instance, R v Hoey did not create
a binding legal precedent (not even in Northern Ireland), and
Weir J’s remarks on LCN DNA profiling were strictly obiter
dicta, i.e., not part of the formal legal holding in the case. It
was nonetheless a widely reported judgment in a very high
profile trial, which sparked much agitated discussion amongst
forensic scientists and led the Association of Chief Police Officers
(ACPO), in consultation with the Crown Prosecution Service
(CPS), to recommend temporary suspension of LCN profiling
techniques in criminal investigations and prosecutions pending
further inquiry and review. The science of LTDNA analysis,
defined as “[a]n ultra-sensitive technique that has the potential
to yield a DNA profile from sub-optimal biological samples
e.g., Low Copy Number DNA analysis,”33 was subsequently
examined by an expert panel established by the Forensic Science
Regulator and chaired by Professor Brian Caddy. The Caddy
Review concluded that “the science supporting the delivery
of Low Template DNA (LTDNA) analysis is sound and that
the three companies... providing this service to the Criminal
Justice System have validated their processes in accord[ance] with
accepted scientific principles.”34 But it was noted that “regardless
of which signal enhancement method is selected, the problems
of allele drop out due to stochastic effects in the presence of low
quantities of template and that of increase[d] noise will occur
in sub-optimal DNA samples,”35 and the concerns expressed by
Weir J in Hoey regarding the absence of reliable validation were
characterized as “well-founded.”36 Furthermore:
Interpretation of the results is complex for two reasons: the
statistics are challenging and probably hard to comprehend by a
non-specialist and the decision how and when to apply certain
statistical methods has not yet reached a clear consensus... the
challenges in terms of statistical interpretation of the data and
in communicating them to a largely innumerate criminal justice
system should not be under-estimated, nor should the importance
of earning and maintaining public confidence in the system37.
These observations appropriately acknowledge the broader
institutional context and social expectations of evidential
(epistemic) warrant for criminal verdicts. The Caddy Review
recommended that “any LTDNA profile should always be
reported to the jury with the caveats: that the nature of the
original starting material is unknown; that the time at which
32Ibid.
33Brian Caddy, Graham R Taylor and Adrian M T Linacre, A Review of
Low Template DNA Analysis (2008) [1.8], www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/117556/Review_of_Low_Template_DNA_1.
pdf
34Ibid, Executive Summary.
35Ibid [3.11].
36Ibid [3.15].
37Ibid [9.3], [8.1].
the DNA was transferred cannot be inferred; and that the
opportunity for secondary transfer is increased in comparison
to standard DNA profiling.”38 Crucially, Caddy expressed the
opinion that matches for LCN DNA profiling should be reported
at the sub-source, genetic level only. Consequently, it would
be “inappropriate to comment upon the cellular material from
which the DNA arose or the activity by which the DNA was
transferred.”39
A follow-up report issued by the Forensic Science Regulator
concurred that “the science underpinning the LTDNA analytical
services, as provided to the CJS [criminal justice system], is sound
and that... suppliers offering such services have properly validated
their processes. There is no flaw inherent in the process which
prevents its use within the CJS.”40 Although there remained
“key areas where improvements can be made... probably most
importantly, the interpretation of the evidence,”41 the Regulator
stressed that scope for improvement “does not mean that the
approach should not be employed within the CJS”:
As long as the scientist reporting the results of LTDNA analysis
complies with the duties and obligations placed on expert
witnesses the CJS will appreciate the nature and value of the
evidence provided42.
This was the state of play, in technical and policy circles, when
the Court of Appeal in England and Wales came to consider the
status of LTDNA evidence in criminal trials in a clutch of criminal
appeals in 2009 and 2010, beginning with R v Reed43.
(b) Authoritative Rulings
The case popularly known as Reed and Reed actually comprised
two conjoined appeals arising from separate trials, both of
which involved challenges to LCN DNA profiling evidence.
In Reed itself, genetic material was recovered from pieces of
plastic which the prosecution contended had broken off from
a knife handle employed as the murder weapon. In Garmson,
the accused was identified as the rapist from small amounts
of DNA deposited on the victim’s lips, undergarments and
tampon. Primed by Weir J’s widely reported reservations in
Hoey and the Caddy Review’s findings, the Court of Appeal—
led by Thomas LJ, who has since been promoted to Lord Chief
Justice—embarked upon a thorough reconsideration of LCN and
LTDNA profiling evidence, and directed the parties to assist
the Court, within the framework of judicially managed pre-
trial case preparation implemented by the Criminal Procedure
Rules (CrimPR) since 2005 (and regularly updated). These
exchanges produced the following fixed points of agreement: (1)
38Ibid [7.4].
39Ibid [7.5].
40Forensic Science Regulator, Response to Professor Brian Caddy’s Review of the
Science of Low Template DNA Analysis (FSR, 2008) [4.1.1].
41Ibid [4.1.2]. Also now see Peter Gill, June Guiness and Simon Iveson, The
Interpretation of DNA Evidence (Including Low-Template DNA), FSR-G-202
(Forensic Science Regulator, 2012); Roberto Puch-Solis, Paul Roberts, Susan Pope
and Colin Aitken, Assessing the Probative Value of DNA Evidence (Royal Statistical
Society, 2012), www.rss.org.uk/statsandlaw.
42Forensic Science Regulator, Response to Professor Brian Caddy’s Review of the
Science of Low Template DNA Analysis, [4.1.3].
43R v Reed and Reed; R vGarmson [2010] 1 Cr App R 23, [2009] EWCACrim 2698.
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the “standard kit” employed in DNA profiling using the SGM+
system was “designed optimally to produce a full profile on 1
ng which is the approximate equivalent of 160 human somatic
cells which typically can be visualized in a tiny blood spot”44;
(2) “[P]articularly where no identifiable body fluid is present,
the amount of DNA present may be as low as the equivalent of
that contained in one body cell. Where a sample is measured
to be less than what is required to generate a profile using the
standard SGM+ test, then Low Template DNA analysis is often
undertaken;”45 (3) “[T]he stochastic effects may be such that no
reliable profile can be generated. The FSS had found that in a
very high proportion of profiles obtained using the LCN process
the profiles were not capable of robust and reliable interpretation
because of stochastic variations.”46
Drawing on the technical data and expert opinions canvassed
before it and adduced in evidence, the Court of Appeal noted
the importance of “the stochastic threshold” at which “the
profile is unlikely to suffer from stochastic effects (such as
allelic drop out...) which prevent proper interpretation of the
alleles.”47 Below the stochastic threshold, it is, at the very least,
debateable whether analytical results can support meaningful
findings, owing to the “noise” generated by uncontrolled random
effects. The question then becomes, how much DNA is required
to meet this stochastic threshold? The Court of Appeal had heard
differing expert views, but prevailing opinion (“in the absence
of new scientific evidence”) placed it within the range 100–
200 picograms48. In the light of this (albeit, possibly temporary
and unstable) scientific consensus, the Court of Appeal in Reed
announced the following principles of admissibility:
[A] challenge to the validity of the method of analysing Low
Template DNA by the LCN process should no longer be permitted
at trials where the quantity of DNA analysed is above the
stochastic threshold of 100–200 picograms.... There may be cases
where reliance is placed on a profile obtained where the quantity
of DNA analysed is within the range of 100–200 picograms where
there is disagreement on the stochastic threshold on the present
state of the science. We would anticipate that such cases would
be rare and that, in any event, the scientific disagreement will
be resolved as the science of DNA profiling develops. If such a
case arises, expert evidence must be given as to whether in the
particular case, a reliable interpretation can be made. We would
anticipate that such evidence would be given by persons who are
expert in the science of DNA and supported by the latest research
on the subject. We would not anticipate there being any attack on
the good faith of those who sought to adduce such evidence49.
Here we see the Court of Appeal (literally) laying down the law
in relation to the admissibility of LTDNA profiling evidence.
There is no general statutory test governing the admissibility
of expert evidence in England and Wales. Admissibility is
44Ibid [39].
45Ibid [45].
46Ibid [49].
47Ibid [74].
48Ibid.
49Ibid.
governed by common law principles,50 which the courts are
both entitled and duty-bound to develop51. Strictly speaking, the
Court’s remarks about evidence under the stochastic threshold
are obiter, because the DNA evidence in both appeals in Reed
was above the threshold, and the appeals were ultimately argued
and determined on issues of transference and persistence of DNA
traces, not on the validity of profiling techniques. However, this
(technical) legal objection would predictably fail to gain judicial
traction in subsequent cases, given the institutional status and
authority of the Reed judgment. It would be perfectly evident
to experienced lawyers that a senior court was deliberately
articulating guidance to be followed in future criminal trials and
appeals, with the firm expectation of compliance.
The admissibility principles propounded by the Court of
Appeal in Reed are interesting at a number of levels. They
are animated by the strong desirability of providing clear and
reasonably determinate guidance to prosecutors, defence lawyers
and trial judges in the conduct of criminal litigation. It would
hardly be efficient to try to re-litigate the existence and calibration
of stochastic thresholds in each and every criminal trial involving
LTDNA profiling evidence, and it would—to say the least—be
highly undesirable for individual courts to be improvising their
own, quite possibly discrepant, thresholds, depending partly on
which expert witnesses happened to testify in particular trials
and how their evidence was received and assessed by individual
trial judges in admissibility determinations (and hostage to
further contingencies, including whether admissibility was, in
fact, challenged in the instant case52). The problem is that there
is no readily available institutional mechanism for establishing
“legislative facts,” such as the nature of stochastic thresholds for
LTDNA profiling evidence, in English criminal proceedings. This
is not the sort of thing that could be included in a Code of
Criminal Procedure, even if we had one (which, if one has in
mind the standard continental model, we don’t). So the Court
of Appeal is obliged to step into the void and take responsibility
for standard-setting upon itself. However, this is slippery and
even perilous territory. Can the law plausibly dictate standards of
scientific validity, even for its own juridical purposes? The Court
of Appeal is primarily concerned with adjudicating questions of
law, not fact. There is some flexibility, inasmuch as the Court
of Appeal makes classificatory choices as the arbiter of what
qualifies, in law, as “questions of fact” and “questions of law.” But
scientific facts themselves, as opposed to the legitimacy of their
50The leading case remains R v Turner [1975] 1 QB 834 (CA), elucidating a
generic test of “helpfulness”; though this must now be read through the quasi-
legislative effect of Criminal Practice Directions 2015 [2015] EWCA Crim 1567,
CPD V Evidence 19A, propounding criteria of admissibility modeled on proposals
by the Law Commission. See further, Ian Dennis, “Editorial: Tightening the Law
on Expert Evidence” [2015] Criminal Law Review 1; TonyWard, “Expert Evidence
and the Law Commission: Implementation without Legislation?” [2013] Criminal
Law Review 561.
51See Paul Roberts, “Expert Evidence and Criminal Trial Procedure” in Gerben
Bruinsma and David Weisburd (eds.), Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal
Justice (Springer, 2013) 1480–1494; Paul Roberts and Adrian Zuckerman, Criminal
Evidence (OUP, 2/e 2010) ch 11.
52“[U]nless the admissibility is challenged, the judge will admit that evidence. That
is the only pragmatic way in which it is possible to conduct trials”: R v Reed and
Reed; R v Garmson [2010] 1 Cr App R 23, [2009] EWCA Crim 2698, [113].
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forensic uses, cannot be subjected to the normative dictates of
law, on pain of reversion to ideology and Lysenkoism.
The judgment in Reed makes extensive reference to the
Caddy Review53 and the input of the Forensic Science Regulator,
reflecting a notable emergent symbiosis. Systematic reviews
of scientific issues by expert practitioners and independent
regulators will almost certainly form sounder technical
conclusions, and supply superior epistemic warrant for
legal decision-making on scientific questions, than comparable
efforts by appellate courts (even those staffed by relatively
knowledgeable and scientifically literate judges), examining the
facts of particular cases within the constrained institutional
parameters of criminal litigation. Recognizing this, the Court of
Appeal in Reed lent its judicial authority to conclusions arrived at
extra-judicially which, in the absence of the Court’s imprimatur,
would have been relegated to the marginal jurisprudential
status of supporting material for expert witness testimony. In
this mutually obliging fashion, the Court of Appeal acquires
credibility for its scientific conclusions whilst simultaneously
conferring judicial kudos on the Regulator. Yet precisely because
we are dealing with scientific facts, forensic closure cannot be
permanent or complete. What happens if prevailing scientific
opinion shifts?54 This is hardly a remote possibility in rapidly
developing fields such as DNA profiling technology (does
anybody still remember “genetic fingerprinting,” southern
blotting and autoradiographs?55). Mindful of the risk of
petrifying the law’s approach to stochastic thresholds, the Court
of Appeal inserted the rider “in the absence of new scientific
evidence” into its admissibility principles. However, this is
effectively an invitation for trial counsel to argue that they
do, indeed, have new scientific evidence at their disposal; and
it would not be entirely surprising if time spent researching
the relevant academic journals reaped forensic rewards for
enterprising trial lawyers. Conversely, if the opportunity for
challenge in the light of new evidence had been closed down, later
shifts in scientific understandings of stochastic thresholds would
have resulted in appeals against conviction on the basis of “fresh
evidence.” It is bred into common lawyers that circumstances
alter cases and that each set of facts presents its own unique,
and eminently distinguishable, characteristics. The Court of
Appeal consequently never says “never” in relation to the scope
for challenging prevailing scientific wisdom; a caution entirely
vindicated by the fact that some very longstanding practices of
53For further critical discussion, see Christopher Lawless, Forensic Science: A
Sociological Introduction (Routledge, 2016), 107–114 and further sources cited
therein. As a legal scholar, I am patently unqualified to second-guess Caddy’s
evaluation of LTDNA profiling techniques, nor do I express any view on the
matter. My analysis relates only to English courts’ use of the Caddy Review as an
authoritative source of information and public endorsement of LTDNA’s scientific
credentials.
54Cf. R vHenderson; R v Butler; R v Oyediran [2010] 2 Cr App R 24, [2010] EWCA
Crim 1269, discussed in Paul Roberts, “Fue el Bebé Sacudido? Preuba, Pericia
y Epistemologia Juridica en el Proceso Penal Inglés” in Carmen Vázquez (ed.),
Estandares de prueba y prueba cientifica (Marcial Pons, 2013).
55On the evolution of DNAprofiling techniques, seeMichael Lynch, SimonACole,
Ruth McNally and Kathleen Jordan, Truth Machine: The Contentious History of
DNA Fingerprinting (Chicago UP, 2008).
forensic science (not to mention transient enthusiasms56) have
turned out to lack sound methodological foundations, and some
(like the old “points” system for declaring fingerprint matches)
have lately been abandoned57.
The Court of Appeal’s further “anticipation” (read: directive)
that evidence pertaining to stochastic thresholds “would be
given by persons who are expert in the science of DNA and
supported by the latest research on the subject” might sound like
no more than a reiteration of common sense legal orthodoxy,
extrapolating from the competency and domain components of
the standard authority paradigm for expertise outlined in the
previous section. In fact, these loaded remarks were intended to
signal the Court’s impatience with defence testimony challenging
the validity and inferential logic of DNA profiling evidence, based
not on direct practical experience in profiling, but on generic
principles of scientific validation, methodology and inferential
logic. Of one defence expert witness, the Court of Appeal
remarked:
He gives evidence with a degree of gravitas and fluency that is
impressive and is able to explain concepts clearly. However, his
expertise on the interpretation of DNA profiles is limited, without
any relevant first hand laboratory or research experience. He is
not qualified to make a scene of crime investigation... Whilst it
is impossible to understand how he had sufficient expertise to be
able to give evidence in R v Hoey, let alone to assist in the attack
made in that case on the LCN process, he has given evidence in
so many Low Template DNA cases since then on the strength of
the observations in R v Hoey that he has acquired a degree of
experience from these cases, his discussion with others and his
reading of papers. We retain clear reservations about the extent of
his expertise in relation to DNA profiles...58
In relation to a second defence expert, the Court complained that
“his experience is of a different jurisdiction where the scientist
who gives evidence may have a narrower type of expertise and the
scope of evidence an expert can give may not be the same as the
scope in this jurisdiction.... [H]is experience was not based on the
work of a forensic scientist in this jurisdiction who attends both
the scene of the crime and supervises the laboratory work.”59
These attempts to prioritize hands-on forensic experience over
academic research and theorizing are not entirely convincing.
Given that expertise is domain-specific, careful attention needs
56Cf. R v McIlkenny (1991) 93 Cr App R 287 (CA); R v Maguire (1992) 94 Cr
App R 133 (CA); Sir John May, Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the
Convictions Arising Out of the Bomb Attacks on Guildford and Woolwich in 1974,
HC Paper 556 (1990) and HC Paper 296 (1992); Mike Redmayne, “Expert Evidence
and Scientific Disagreement” (1997) 30 UC Davis Law Reviw 1027; Clive Walker
and Russell Stockdale, “Forensic Evidence and Terrorist Trials in the United
Kingdom” (1995) 54 Cambridge Law Journal 69.
57R v Smith (Peter) [2011] 2 Cr App R 16, [2011] EWCA Crim 1296. See
further, Simon A Cole and Andrew Roberts, “Certainty, Individualization and the
Subjective Nature of Expert Fingerprint Evidence” [2012] Criminal Law Review
824; Jennifer L. Mnookin, “The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification:
Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate” (2008) 7 Law, Probability and Risk 127;
Robert Epstein, “Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint “Science” is
Revealed” (2002) 75 Southern California Law Review 605.
58R v Reed and Reed; R vGarmson [2010] 1 Cr App R 23, [2009] EWCACrim 2698,
[107].
59Ibid [103].
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to be given to the grounds, parameters and content of any
particular expert’s evidence. Courts should certainly be chary
of receiving “expert” testimony about laboratory conduct and
protocols from somebody who has never worked in a laboratory.
By parity of reasoning, however, practitioners are not necessarily
good authorities on questions of policy or theory. An example
highly pertinent to the present discussion is that a geneticist could
be highly accomplished and very experienced in DNA profiling
techniques without necessarily having acquired a firm grasp of
the statistical foundations and probabilistic methods employed
in assessing likelihood ratios for complex mixtures or partial
profiles (or even, for that matter, in generating random match
probabilities for straightforward single profiles)60. Another
background consideration possibly at work here is English courts’
intuitive suspicion of expert testimony attempting to instruct
fact-finders in relation to general considerations of logic and
inferential reasoning. Such testimony is often viewed, not without
justification, as potentially trenching on the jury’s constitutional
prerogatives in fact-finding61. But the practitioner/theoretician
continuum is orthogonal to that concern; and expert competence
must always be assessed relative to domain and materiality. The
danger is that in ostentatiously rejecting one false proxy for
testimonial reliability (a witness’s gravitas and fluency), the Court
of Appeal in Reedmay have allowed itself to be gulled by another
(“local practitioners always know best”).
(c) After Reed
Lord Justice Thomas’ prediction, or pious hope, that cases
involving LTDNA profiles arguably under the stochastic
threshold “would be rare” was soon put to the test. In R v
Broughton62 an animal rights activist was convicted of planting
incendiary devices in buildings owned by two Oxford colleges.
It was common ground that the attacks were a protest against
animal experiments by university scientists. A central plank of the
prosecution’s (entirely circumstantial) case against Broughton
was an LTDNA profile derived from match stalks which had
formed part of the fuse mechanism of improvised incendiary
devices (bottles filled with petrol) used in one attack. The
amount of genetic material recovered from the crime scene was
<100 picograms. This was insufficient to generate any usable
results from standard profiling techniques. However, by running
multiple enhanced LTDNA analyses and combining their results
to produce a “cleaned up” profile, a forensic scientist was able
to identify 20 alleles shared in common with the accused. This
produced a random match probability, comparable to RMPs for
standard profiling, of <1 in 1 billion.
One argument advanced on appeal was that Reed had already
decided that profiles below the stochastic threshold range of 100–
200 picograms are inadmissible in English law. The Court of
Appeal in Broughton made short work of the faulty logic in this
submission:
60See the sources cited at n.41, above.
61This was the real issue in R v Adams [1996] 2 Cr App R 467 (CA); and R v Adams
(No 2) [1998] 1 Cr App R 377 (CA).
62R v Broughton [2010] EWCA Crim 549.
The appellant’s submission is... founded upon amisunderstanding
of the decision in Reed & Reed. This court recognised that in the
current state of technology there is a stochastic threshold between
100 and 200 picograms above which LTDNA techniques... can
be used to obtain profiles capable of reliable interpretation.
Specifically, the court observed that above this threshold a
challenge to the validity of the method of analysing LTDNA by
the LCN process should not be permitted in the absence of new
scientific evidence. However, the court did not hold or make any
observation to the effect that below the stochastic threshold DNA
evidence is not admissible63.
The defence argument that LTDNA profiles below the stochastic
threshold are automatically inadmissible resurfaced in a second
appeal heard later in the year, involving DNA mixtures from
more than one donor, and it was once more emphatically
rejected. The Court of Appeal reiterated that “what mattered was
the quality of the minor profiles and not the quantity.... [P]rofiles
obtained from <200 picograms can be reliable. It is reliability
that is the issue, not the quantity, though plainly the quantity is
relevant... to the consideration of stochastic effects.”64
Amore promising line of attack was to challenge the profiling
evidence on its own scientific merits. The Court of Appeal
recognized that the profiles adduced in Broughton “were derived
from unquantified samples of DNA of <100 picograms and that
this raised entirely legitimate grounds for scientific dispute which
the appellant was right in testing before the judge.”65 Prevailing
scientific understanding was summarized as follows:
[T]here is now a considerable body of opinion from respected
independent scientists and the Forensic Science Regulator that
LTDNA techniques, including those used to generate the profiles
relied upon by the Crown in this case, are well understood,
have been properly validated and are accepted to be capable of
generating reliable and valuable evidence. At these very low levels
of DNA, the dangers presented by the possibility of stochastic
effects, including allelic drop-out, drop-in and stutter are very real
and must be fully appreciated, but they may often be addressed by
repeating the process a number of times...66
Observe, again, the instrumental role of the Forensic Science
Regulator in authenticating the underpinning science and
validation processes. If—and for as long as—the Regulator is
satisfied on these technical questions, the courts are likely to
follow her67 lead. Having noted the potential shortcomings of
LTDNA profiles, however, the Court of Appeal was satisfied that
the pertinent issues had been fully ventilated in the trial and
that the evidence actually generated and adduced in the instant
case had been properly explained and vindicated by competent
experts:
63Ibid [31].
64R v C [2010] EWCA Crim 2578, [24], [27].
65R v Broughton [2010] EWCA Crim 549, [37].
66Ibid [34].
67The present incumbent is Dr Gillian Tully: “Appointment of New Forensic
Science Regulator Announced,” Home Office Press Release, 17 July 2014. Her
predecessor, in post when Broughton was decided, was Andrew Rennison.
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[A]ll of the consensus alleles match those in the appellant’s
profile. In other words, the consensus profiles do not suggest the
procedures suffered from drop-in or stutter such as to render
the results inherently unreliable. Indeed, this is reflected in the
statistics [sic] derived from the consensus profiles to which we
have referred and about which there was no dispute. At their most
powerful andwhen derived from all duplicated components, these
give rise to the match probability of <1 in 1 billion. We believe
that these were all matters properly admitted in evidence68.
It is important to appreciate that criminal appeals in England and
Wales are not re-trials, as they are in many continental European
jurisdictions. The Court of Appeal in England and Wales
performs an essentially reviewing function, and is primarily
concerned with the legality and fairness of trial proceedings,
not with the accuracy of their outcomes. Crucially, the Court
of Appeal does not second-guess jury verdicts. Once the Court
in Broughton had satisfied itself that the trial judge had adopted
the correct approach to assessing the admissibility of LTDNA
evidence, that question was settled for the purposes of this appeal.
But the Court still had something it wanted to get off its chest, and
the Judgment had a sting in the tail.
The Court signaled a general concern about defence tactics in
challenging the credibility and “integrity” of experts presenting
DNA profiling evidence:
Whatever may be the position in other jurisdictions, it is the duty
of an advocate and an expert in this jurisdiction not to embark
upon an attack on the integrity of other experts unless there is
an evidential basis for doing so. There was none in this case. The
attack made on the integrity of LGC Forensics and Cellmark was
without foundation and should never have been made... [T]here
can well be a difference of opinion between experts on LTDNA,
but there should be no question of the good faith of those involved
in LTDNA being put in issue. This is a case where there is a
proper disagreement between experts but the course taken by
those giving evidence on behalf of the appellant went into matters
for which there was no foundation. Not only was the attack
on the good faith of the Crown’s witness wholly deplorable and
unwarranted, but it also was a great disservice to the appellant’s
case69.
The Court is here saying that not only are such credibility attacks
contrary to ethical standards of advocacy, and therefore liable
to get counsel into hot water with their professional regulator70,
but also likely to back-fire by harming the defendant’s prospects
in the instant case. The threat is clear, but whether advocates
will pay any attention to it, less so. In Broughton, specifically,
“an attack was made... on the integrity of LGC Forensics; it was
alleged that their commercial interests and influence over their
case workers had tainted their professionalism and objectivity.
LGC Forensics were underestimating the problems which were
associated with LTDNA and promoting its viability for financial
68R v Broughton [2010] EWCA Crim 549, [37]. Note that RMPs are not themselves
“statistics,” but rather probabilistic extrapolations from allele frequency statistics
sampled from reference populations.
69Ibid [38].
70The Bar Council and Bar Standards Board for barristers; the Law Society and
Solicitors Regulation Authority for solicitor-advocates.
reasons.”71 Counsel presumably thought it legitimate to draw
the jury’s attention to possible conflicts of interest in the
production of expert evidence, which is now an embedded
structural feature of a marketplace dominated by commercial
providers following the demise of the FSS72. The Court of
Appeal’s message is that unfocused and entirely unsubstantiated
insinuations of commercial corruption will not be tolerated.
The situation would presumably be different if there were
material evidence that a particular expert’s objectivity or
impartiality might have been compromised by commercial
incentives. In relation to judicial impartiality, the court must
be manifestly, not merely actually, unbiased73, so that justice
is seen to be done. How much of this expectation carries
over to expert witnesses utilizing techniques from which their
employers derive a commercial advantage is a nicely balanced
question.
Once evidence has been ruled admissible, attention shifts
to its uses and probative value in the trial. An important
dimension of evidentiary regulation, and one which has been
assuming greater prominence in many common law jurisdictions
including England and Wales over the last several decades,
concerns judicial directions to the jury74. English law contains
an expanding corpus of “forensic reasoning rules”75 instructing
factfinders how they must, may or should not utilize particular
types and pieces of evidence, which inferences are rationally
available and which are legally forbidden. A number of these rules
or guidelines pertain to expert evidence in general76, and to DNA
evidence in particular77. This is where the case against Broughton
unraveled on appeal.
71R v Broughton [2010] EWCA Crim 549, [14].
72On structural features of “market forensics,” see Christopher J Lawless, “Policing
Markets: The Contested Shaping of Neo-Liberal Forensic Science” (2011) 51 British
Journal of Criminology 671; Paul Roberts, “What Price a Free Market in Forensic
Science Services? The Organization and Regulation of Science in the Criminal
Process” (1996) 36 British Journal of Criminology 37.
73Also now a requirement of ECHR Article 6: “According to the Court’s settled
case law, the existence of impartiality for the purposes of Article 6(1) must be
determined according to: (i) a subjective test, where regard must be had to the
personal conviction and behavior of a particular judge—that is, whether the judge
held any personal prejudice or bias in a given case; and (ii) an objective test, that
is to say by ascertaining whether the tribunal itself and, among other aspects,
its composition, offered sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in
respect of its impartiality.... What is at stake is the confidence which the courts in a
democratic society must inspire in the public”: Volkov v Ukraine (2013) 57 EHRR
1, [104], [106]; Borgers v Belgium (1993) 15 EHRR 92.
74Also see Paul Roberts, Colin Aitken and Graham Jackson, “From Admissibility
to Interpretation: New Guidance on Expert Evidence” (2015) 179 Criminal Law
and Justice Weekly 538 (Part I) and 564 (Part II).
75Roberts and Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence, ch 15.
76See e.g., R v Henderson [2010] 2 Cr App R 24, [2010] EWCA Crim 1269, [215]–
[220]; R v Flynn and St John [2008] 2 Cr App R 20, [2008] EWCA Crim 970;
R v Luttrell [2004] 2 Cr App R 31, [2004] EWCA Crim 1344, [42], [43]: “The
general principle... is that a “special warning” is necessary if experience, research
or common sense has indicated that there is a difficulty with a certain type of
evidence that requires giving the jury a warning of its dangers and the need for
caution, tailored to meet the needs of the case. This will often be the case where
jurors may be unaware of the difficulty, or may insufficiently understand it. The
strength of the warning and its terms will depend on the nature of the evidence, its
reliability or lack of it, and the potential problems it poses.”
77Notably, R v Doheny and Adams [1997] 1 Cr App R 369 (CA). In relation to
contested LTDNA profiling evidence, see R v Thomas [2011] EWCA Crim 1295.
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The trial judge in Broughton was faced with the task of
directing the jury in relation to a disagreement between the
expert witnesses regarding the possibility that the DNA sample in
questionmay have been amixed profile. The expert witness called
by the prosecution testified that she was satisfied, on the basis
of her experience, that rogue profiling results obtained during
the analytical process could be set aside as artefactual stochastic
effects. Expert evidence adduced by the defence challenged this
conclusion. It was argued that profiling results were consistent
with the presence of an unidentified donor, and since the
possibility of a mixed sample could not be ruled out, the match
probabilities quoted by the prosecution’s expert were invalid.
The trial judge in his summing-up reminded the jury of this
disagreement, which had been characterized as a legitimate
difference of opinion between genuine experts. “In other words,”
he explained, “there is no, as it were, answer at the back of the
book. There is no independent machine if people hold contrary
views to tell you in these circumstances who is right and who
is wrong. It is a question of expert evidence and scientific
judgment...”78 The judge added that, if the jury were not satisfied
by the prosecution expert’s expression of scientific judgment,
then her “statistics”79 could not be relied upon, and the jury
could not substitute its own calculations “because you are not
experts.”80 In that event, the jury would need to approach the
matter cautiously, assessing the probative value of DNA evidence
in the absence of any quantified RMP.
Readers of this scientific journal might well be thinking that
this direction was incoherent, as a DNA “match” may be close to
meaningless, or at least dangerously misleading, in the absence of
a valid RMP. The Court of Appeal thought so, too, and concluded
“with considerable regret”81 that the appeal must be allowed
and Broughton’s conviction quashed on this, relatively narrow,
ground:
[T]he judge... fell into error in directing the jury that, in those
circumstances, they could reach their own conclusions on the
DNA evidence. It is fair to say that the judge urged the jury to
exercise caution and be very careful in arriving at firm conclusions
because they were not experts in statistics. However, we believe
that only served to emphasise the void in which they were left.
They had no guidance from the experts and no guidance from the
court to enable them to conduct an evaluation of the evidence for
themselves.... [T]he judge ought to have directed the jury that if
[the prosecution’s expert] was wrong in her conclusion that the
DNA profiles were single rather than mixed, then on the only
evidence before the court at the trial the DNA evidence must be
disregarded. The judge having failed to do so, the jury may well
have embarked upon a task of evaluation for which they were not
equipped. This means their verdict cannot be regarded as safe82.
Broughton underlines the point that admissibility is not the
only important evidentiary issue raised by LTDNA profiles.
78Quoted in R v Broughton [2010] EWCA Crim 549, [41].
79i.e., RMP calculations, (mis)characterized by the trial judge as “the statistical
figure that has been given as a match probability”: ibid [43].
80Ibid.
81Ibid [49].
82Ibid [48], [49].
The way in which profiling evidence is communicated to lay
factfinders is also of fundamental importance if jury verdicts
are to secure adequate epistemic warrant and broader normative
legitimacy. In all other respects, the trial judge’s “admirable
summing up” in Broughton had “expertly addressed all the
evidence and the complex issues in clear terms about which
no complaint... could possibly be made.”83 A single slip
was fatal. Summing up in relation to relatively novel and
somewhat complex technologies like LTDNA profiling evidence
is evidently a minefield for trial judges. Without a firm grasp
of both the underlying science of profiling and the statistical
foundations and probabilistic logic of valid RMPs, trial judges
may inadvertently put a foot wrong, with potentially tragic
consequences.
This case history might be interpreted, especially by readers
more accustomed to inquisitorial procedures (scientists and
civilian jurists alike), as a cautionary tale about the hazards of
disaggregated tribunals in criminal adjudication and the perils
of fastidiously microscopic appellate scrutiny of the wording
of judicial directions to juries. These charges are not without
substance; but the common lawyer has this riposte. In the
absence of any parallel procedure in continental criminal trial
proceedings, wherein lies the assurance that judges have any
better understanding of the logical foundations of LTDNA
evidence and can competently assess its probative value?
Do reasoned judgments typically contain sufficiently detailed
“motivations” to enable such assessments to be made, by an
impartial observer or by the public at large? One could only
begin to answer such questions through sustained research and
on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis, but my own fragmentary
and partly anecdotal acquaintance with judicial practice in
continental Europe suggests that these are pertinent questions to
add to our shared research agenda.
CONCLUSION
Forensic DNA profiling demands cooperative interdisciplinary
expertise in forensic science, statistics and law. This article has
reviewed UK courts’ responses to LTDNA profiling, starting
with initial skepticism in R v Hoey,84 but—with the benefit
of more considered official review and expert input—quickly
producing authoritative statements endorsing admissibility.
English courts proceeded in accordance with their tried-and-
tested pragmatic method of ad hoc development of common law
tests, approaching LTDNA profiling evidence in much the same
way as DNA evidence itself was first addressed 30 years ago85.
Some loose ends left dangling by the Court of Appeal in Reed86
were tied up in Broughton, to produce the following doctrinal
83Ibid [49].
84R v Sean Hoey [2007] NICC 49.
85See e.g., R v Gordon [1995] 1 Cr App R 290 (CA). For historical discussion
going back to the first trial in which DNA profiling evidence was adduced in 1987,
see Paul Roberts, “Forensic Science and Criminal Justice” in Anthea Hucklesby
and Azrini Wahidin (eds), Criminal Justice (OUP, 2/e 2013); Peter Alldridge,
“Recognizing Novel Scientific Techniques: DNA as a Test Case” [1992] Criminal
Law Review 687.
86R v Reed and Reed; R vGarmson [2010] 1 Cr App R 23, [2009] EWCACrim 2698.
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conclusion (if it is possible to create a legal precedent in relation
to questions of fact, this is it):
[T]he science of LTDNA is sufficiently well-established to pass the
ordinary tests of reliability and relevance and it would be wrong
wholly to deprive the justice system of the benefits to be gained
from the new techniques and advances which it embodies, in cases
where there is clear evidence... that the profiles are sufficiently
reliable87.
Reliability, moreover, is primarily a function of the quality of
the profiling evidence in the instant case, as vouchsafed by
experienced experts. There is no arbitrary stochastic threshold
above which LTDNA evidence is admissible, and below which it
is automatically excluded.
There is, however, much more to be gleaned from English
jurisprudence on LTDNA profiling evidence than these
“headline” rationes decidendi (formal legal holdings). Judgments
rendered by common law courts are complex pieces of legal
literature that must be interpreted against a backdrop of “thick”
institutional practice and cultural meaning. Some of the factors
in play, including the structural logic of the argument from
authority sketched in the first part of this article and the
priority of normative over epistemic considerations in criminal
adjudication, are universal features of modern legal systems.
Other factors reflect more local dynamics pertaining to the
structural logic of criminal procedure, national legal traditions,
and broader features of culture and society (including those
features inflecting local apprehensions of adequate epistemic
warrant for criminal verdicts). The second half of the article
surveyed the principal arguments and judicial rationales that
have been deployed in English criminal appeals concerned
with LTDNA profiling evidence, pointing out their broader
institutional context and resonances and explaining why some
gained traction whilst others were rejected. The issues, we
saw, are not confined to considerations of scientific validity,
contamination risks and evidential integrity, and associated
judgments of legal admissibility or exclusion. They also crucially
concern the manner in which LTDNA profiling results are
presented and explained to lay factfinders in criminal trials.
87R v Broughton [2010] EWCA Crim 549, [36].
If opinions differ concerning the adequacy of English courts’
responses to LTDNA evidence, this may in part reflect divergent
understandings of the deeper structural logic and values of
criminal adjudication. These deeper structures are always
engaged, and ought to be elucidated and consciously considered,
whenever the admissibility and uses of expert evidence are placed
under the policy microscope or raise novel legal issues for
courts. Because policy questions are fundamentally normative
(within the domain of political morality) rather than factually
empirical or “scientific,” legal jurisdictions must, in the final
analysis, decide what is best for themselves, within the broad
parameters of international legal consensus on fundamental
rights and democratic values and in harmony with local juristic
traditions and cultures. But just as surely as the fact that technical
standards of DNA profiling or statistical science cannot dictate
the terms of criminal justice, modern legal systems committed to
post-Enlightenment conceptions of fact-finding and proof must
necessarily rely on the best available scientific and other technical
advice, communicated via competent, domain-specific expert
evidence, to underpin the rationality (qua epistemic warrant) of
criminal adjudication.
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When forensic scientists evaluate and report on the probative strength of single DNA
traces, they commonly rely on only one number, expressing the rarity of the DNA profile
in the population of interest. This is so because the focus is on propositions regarding
the source of the recovered trace material, such as “the person of interest is the source
of the crime stain.” In particular, when the alternative proposition is “an unknown person
is the source of the crime stain,” one is directed to think about the rarity of the profile.
However, in the era of DNA profiling technology capable of producing results from small
quantities of trace material (i.e., non-visible staining) that is subject to easy and ubiquitous
modes of transfer, the issue of source is becoming less central, to the point that it is
often not contested. There is now a shift from the question “whose DNA is this?” to the
question “how did it get there?” As a consequence, recipients of expert information are
now very much in need of assistance with the evaluation of the meaning and probative
strength of DNA profiling results when the competing propositions of interest refer to
different activities. This need is widely demonstrated in day-to-day forensic practice and
is also voiced in specialized literature. Yet many forensic scientists remain reluctant to
assess their results given propositions that relate to different activities. Some scientists
consider evaluations beyond the issue of source as being overly speculative, because
of the lack of relevant data and knowledge regarding phenomena and mechanisms of
transfer, persistence and background of DNA. Similarly, encouragements to deal with
these activity issues, expressed in a recently released European guideline on evaluative
reporting (Willis et al., 2015), which highlights the need for rethinking current practice, are
sometimes viewed skeptically or are not considered feasible. In this discussion paper, we
select and discuss recurrent skeptical views brought to our attention, as well as some of
23
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the alternative solutions that have been suggested. We will argue that the way forward is
to address now, rather than later, the challenges associated with the evaluation of DNA
results (from small quantities of trace material) in light of different activities to prevent them
being misrepresented in court.
Keywords: interpretation, probative value, hierarchy of propositions, probability assignment
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Topic of the Discussion
This paper deals with perceived obstacles and potential solutions
in the evaluation of the probative value of forensic biology results,
such as DNA profiles1, when the competing propositions of
interest relate to activities rather than the source of the recovered
trace material. So-called source level propositions deal with the
origin of traces, for example, “The bloodstain on the broken
window comes from Mr. A” vs. “The bloodstain comes from
an unknown person2.” In turn, examples of so-called activity
level propositions, as they are understood here, are “Mr. A
punched the victim” vs. “The person who punched the victim
shook hands with Mr. A,” or “Mr. A had sex with Ms. B”
vs. “Mr. A and Ms. B attended the same party, and they had
social interaction (i.e., shook hands) only3.” At first sight, the
evaluation of DNA results given (sub-) source level propositions
is often more straightforward because it requires little more
than a careful assessment of the rarity of the corresponding
analytical features in the relevant population, and because well
accepted models, data and software are available. This is different
in the context of activities, as can be shown through formal
analyses of expressions for probative strength (e.g., Evett, 1984;
Evett et al., 2002). These formulaic developments show that it
is necessary to extend the consideration to additional aspects,
such as background presence of DNA and phenomena of transfer
and persistence. Such additional factors are widely regarded as
challenging and difficult to overcome (see Meakin and Jamieson,
2013 for a review). In essence, the concern perceived among
practitioners is that the additional factors cannot be assessed
appropriately (e.g., because of a lack of data). Therefore, the
evaluation of DNA profiling results with respect to propositions
regarding activities is considered not feasible or robust enough,
and should be advised against. Clearly, following precepts and
ethical considerations stipulated by codes of conduct (e.g., ENFSI
Board, 2005; National Commission on Forensic Science, 2016),
scientists are driven by their intention to inform recipients of
expert information to the best of their knowledge so that no
unwarranted conclusions will be reached. Laudable though this
1DNA is chosen here because it is widely practiced. It goes without saying, however,
that our discussion is equally applicable to other types of transfer trace materials,
such as glass fragments, fibers or gunshot residues (GSR).
2Note that sub-source level propositions (Evett et al., 2002) are defined by replacing
the bodily tissue “trace” (e.g., bloodstain) in the proposition by “DNA.” For the
remainder of this paper, we will focus on activity level propositions so that the
distinction between source and sub-source levels is irrelevant. See also Cook et al.
(1998) on the concept of hierarchy of propositions.
3It is worth indicating here that case circumstances are as important as
propositions and that one will need indications such as alleged activities and
timing.
aim might be, there remains considerable diversity in opinions
about the extent to which such results may be used, and how to
report them.
Evaluation of scientific results with activity level propositions
represents an important topic for current forensic science
practice. Rather than dismissing the topic, we believe that it
is necessary for the field as a whole to engage actively and
submit the underlying issues to detailed analyses. The discussion
presented in this paper aims at promoting and facilitating mutual
understanding, which we hope will enable progress along new
and feasible avenues. Not pursuing this topic bears the risk
of leaving recipients of expert information without guidance.
Reliance on recipients’ own devices is prone to conclusions that
are based on (sub-) source level propositions being wrongly
carried over to conclusions about activity level propositions.
1.2. Objectives
The aim of this paper is twofold—firstly, to discuss recurrent
concerns and reservations about, and sometimes fear of,
evaluations of probative value with respect to propositions about
activities and, secondly, to discuss alternative “solutions” that
have been offered. Although we do not contest that challenges
can arise in practice, we will argue that the central claims of
the critiques cannot be sustained across the broad diversity
of aspects of interpretation with activity level propositions. In
particular, we will argue that some of the perceived drawbacks
are sometimes the result of misunderstanding about the role
of forensic scientists and forensic science in the legal process.
Further, we will stress that it does not follow from the perceived
deficits that evaluations given activity level propositions should
be abandoned altogether, but areas need to be defined where
additional research and support for practitioners is needed. The
main motivation for this perspective is that it is by helping
address activity level propositions that forensic science can offer
more value to the criminal justice process, in terms of more
focused and useful contributions. Moreover, this is a good way
to assess all the scientific results4 in any one case, ensuring that
conclusions given by scientists do not run the risk of misleading
at the evaluative stage5. The suggested framework provides a
transparent way for experts, whether they be appointed by the
court or hired by the prosecution or defense, to evaluate a case,
where differences of opinion may be discussed and resolved.
Courts need to provide a forum for such discussions to take place.
4By all results we mean not only the DNA profile, but also aspects such as the
quality and quantity of staining, and the position where it was found.
5Throughout this paper we will, at times, refer to the expression “evaluation in
court” even though we intend our arguments to apply to the evaluative stage at
large which, in some judicial systems, does not necessarily take place in court.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present
and discuss several recurrently expressed concerns. We broadly
group these discussion points in three subsections, dealing with
propositions (Section 2.1), data (Section 2.2) and aspects of
reporting (Section 2.3). These three themes often arise in a
hierarchy. Indeed, without propositions, it will be difficult for
scientists to know how forensic sciencemight help in a case. Next,
with no or limited data, scientists may be reluctant to evaluate
their findings. Finally, scientists may disagree about the form and
content of scientific reporting, i.e., what exactly—if anything—
should be reported. The issues and possible solutions explored
in the three subsections are intimately linked and cannot truly
be considered in isolation. Inevitably, there is some repetition
between the subsections. Conclusions are presented in Section 3.
2. DISCUSSION OF SELECTED ISSUES
2.1. Propositions: “We Don’t Know What
the Exact Activities Are”6
It is often the case that scientists will be informed about the
competing propositions regarding activities alleged by the parties
only at trial, if at all (Risinger, 2013). It is generally understood
that the propositions of interest are “(...) set by the specific
case circumstances or as indicated by the mandating authority”
(Willis et al., 2015, p. 6), but limited cooperation by the defense
often represents an obstacle in practice7. If propositions are not
available, or only one proposition is available, scientists should
make every effort to obtain relevant information8 regarding the
position of each party involved in the process (see Willis et al.,
2015 for complete guidance on how to deal with the absence of
propositions), because without at least a pair of propositions, it is
impossible to evaluate forensic observations in a balanced way.
It is a common misconception that the scientist who is
evaluating the observations in light of competing posited
activities needs to know every aspect of what has allegedly
happened. For example, if it is alleged that the suspect grabbed
the victim, aspects of DNA transfer will be important in
considering activities. Only rarely will the scientist be provided
with an exact recount of the position of grabbing, the force used
to grab, the exact length of time the struggle lasted, and so on,
to cover all aspects of the alleged encounter. However, there are
several aspects that should be considered. Firstly, the manner
in which the activities are, or have been, set up in controlled
experiments tomimic the activity of interest are likely also to have
similar aspects of uncertainty. Therefore, the uncertainty arising
from many of the unmeasurable (and unknowable) aspects of
the alleged activities will present themselves in the spread of the
obtained data. Secondly, controlled experiments can be set up to
6The titles throughout Section 2 reflect our perceptions and summaries of
recurrently encountered concerns. Specific references are cited within each
subsection.
7In all criminal justice systems that we know of, it is the right of defendants to
remain silent and not incriminate themselves. Also, it is often considered strategic
for the defense to make a statement as to the evidence only after the results of the
analyses are known.
8It is generally understood that scientists should concentrate on information that
is relevant for the task at hand (i.e., so-called task-relevant information), keeping
in mind challenges posed by human factors.
study the impact that different factors have on the transfer of
DNA during the activity in question. It may be that there is a
large enough amount of variation in one aspect of the activity,
such as the shedder status of the individual, that all others (such
as the length or vigor of contact or when the person of interest
last showered, etc.) have a negligible effect on the evaluations.
In that case, this level of activity resolution is not required.
Thirdly, if a number of aspects are found to have a considerable
impact, then they can be included in the logical framework used
to evaluate the findings. If the actual states of these important
factors are not known (or not provided) by either party then
they can be incorporated by considering all possible states within
the evaluation, weighted by probabilities informed either by
data from controlled experiments, supplemented by the analysts’
knowledge, which should be available for disclosure and auditing
(see also Section 2.2.2). If further information is provided later
on, then the evaluation can be updated accordingly. Alternatively,
sensitivity analyses can be used to determine how much of
an effect any one of the unknown factors of the activities has
on the value of the findings (Biedermann and Taroni, 2006).
If the strength of the observations is particularly sensitive to
some aspects then efforts should be made to find additional
information about those aspects rather than every aspect of
the activity. If scientists do not have such specialized scientific
knowledge, the court will be even less likely to have such
knowledge.
2.2. Data
2.2.1. “Because Each Case Has Its Own Features, the
Use of Numerical Values from Experimental Studies
Performed under Controlled (Laboratory) Conditions
Cannot Be Used for Evaluation in Real-Life Cases”
This is a general claim (e.g., Jamieson, 2011) that conflicts
with scientific practice. Throughout science, experiments are
conducted in trials that reflect not all, but the essential, features
of the problem at hand. Clearly, medical treatments administered
to patients have not previously been “tested” on those particular
individuals, but on other patients with the same disease.
Similarly, the safety of consumer products (e.g., cars) is carefully
assessed not by end-users but prior to marketing in a range
of situations reflecting end-user profiles. Turning to forensic
science, such as glass analysis, the phenomenon of transfer has
been studied for a variety of factors, such as the mode of breaking
(e.g., the number of blows), window dimension, etc. to build a
model usable for assigning transfer probabilities in cases with
features covered by this model (Curran et al., 1998, 2000). In
the context of DNA, studies have been conducted to examine
the rates of transfer, for example between shooters and guns
(Polley et al., 2006), but also in more general situations (e.g.,
Phipps and Petricevic, 2007; Daly et al., 2012; Jones et al., 2016;
Samie et al., 2016). So, when a scientist is faced with assigning
a probability for finding trace material given the proposition
of handling an object by a person of interest (e.g., the activity
of discharging a firearm), we do see no harm in referring to
studies that have focused on rates of transfer not exactly the
same in the alleged circumstances of the case. Although some
features of the individual case at hand may differ, nothing will
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prevent the scientist from also judging that some additional case-
tailored experiments should be conducted in order to extend their
knowledge and understanding, but case backlogs and limited
resources may render this difficult. Besides, if a scientist refuses
to assign a probability of observing some finding under a given
set of propositions, there is a risk that the fact-finder will
nonetheless assign such probabilities according to their own
unaided judgment which, as highly-publicized past cases suggest,
will often play out to the detriment of the defendant.
Contrary to a widely held view (e.g., Budowle et al., 2012),
the availability of “hard” (i.e., numerical) data is not a necessary
requirement for probability assignment. That is, the absence
of data does not mean that no probability can be assigned.
How is this possible? To understand this, it is important to
recall that scientists can also derive probability assignments
from their understanding of the principles of the process at
hand, formulated in terms of a model. For example, weather
forecasters cannot “play” the next day over and over again to
find the number of times there will be rain on exactly the next
day. This makes no sense, essentially because there is only one
tomorrow and its weather will be observable only once tomorrow
arrives. And yet, scientists are able to formulate previsions about
the state of the atmosphere based on related data (e.g., today’s
weather) and their understanding of the relevant science and
technology. Similarly, forensic scientists can make probability
statements for outcomes based on their general understanding
of a phenomenon. In genetics, for instance, there is knowledge
about population structure and the ways in which genetic traits
are passed on between generations. Take, for example, a crime
stain with a haplotype for which no other occurrence is found
in a relevant database: clearly, the observed relative frequency
(i.e., zero) in the database does not mean that we should retain
a zero probability for observing the same haplotype in another
person from the population of interest. Instead, a value for
the haplotype population proportion can be obtained using
reasonable assumptions (Brenner, 2010).
In reply to the above, it may be suggested that forensic
genetics is not an insightful example because of the sophisticated
mathematical models available in this area, so let us consider
the case of DNA transfer phenomena. Here, many studies have
found, for example, that the quantity of DNA recovered after
touching (i.e., primary transfer) a surface with bare hands varies
approximately between zero and more than 150 ng, depending
on the experimental conditions (e.g., Daly et al., 2012). But can
such knowledge help formulate probabilities of finding DNA
under the assumption of secondary transfer? We contend that
it can, by constructing an argument. It is known, for example,
that secondary transfer is conditioned on the amount of DNA
transferred initially. Hence, when a quantity above, say, 200 ng
is found—something not typically expected when touching with
bare hands (i.e., primary transfer)—it can be argued that this
should be considered an even less probable event assuming
secondary transfer. Thus, despite the fact that explicit data for
a particular secondary transfer scenario may not be available,
forensic scientists can still convey domain-relevant knowledge
intelligibly in probabilistic terms. It is important, however, to
ensure that the data are relevant to the analytical methods used
in the case of interest, because detected quantities after secondary
transfer will be sensitive to the method used to collect material
and to detect DNA. It will also be necessary to ensure that
probabilistic models, such as Bayesian networks (see also below),
used to interpret findings, are informed by such relevant data and
available for auditing.
There remain, however, justified questions as to where and
how to obtain data. Currently, results from empirical research
are mainly published in peer reviewed scientific journals, but
there is no systematically organized body of research. The idea
of developing a knowledge base (Evett, 2015), to be shared
among scientists who all contribute to the system, would thus
represent a major contribution to strengthen the data-supported
evaluations.
In summary, probability assignment is feasible and justifiable
evenwith limited data, butmust be amenable to a critical analysis.
Further, despite the fact that data are collected under conditions
that do not exactly reflect all the features of the case at hand,
this does not preclude, in principle, these data from being used
at least to some extent9. Of course, this does not mean that
any data are acceptable to support any claim, but—as noted
above—data that the scientist regards pertinent.Moreover, expert
assessment is not exclusively given by data alone; in fact, it never
is because, while reference data have been collected in controlled
studies, the probabilities we assign relate to one-off individual
incidents. Instead, scientists use data to inform their judgment,
by constructing an argument, explaining what data they have
used, to what extent and why.
A topic related to the above viewpoint is the question of how
to conduct assessments, i.e., reasoning in the face of uncertainty,
whatever the data may be and the extent to which they are
available. Often, one can note that scientists shy away from
seeking support from conceptual devices that could help them
structure their reasoning and, thus, avoid the impression of being
overwhelmed by the inferential complexity of the evaluative task.
It is thus worthy to mention one common method, known as
Bayesian networks (BNs) (Evett et al., 2002; Biedermann and
Taroni, 2012; Fenton and Neil, 2013; Taroni et al., 2014), for
pulling together many aspects of information that need to be
considered when activity level propositions are of interest. BNs
are a graphical tool in which the problem can be constructed
in a framework of logical inference10. The formulation of such
a framework does not rely on having any data, it will in fact
inform the analyst of what data is required in the evaluation of
the findings. The formulation of a framework of inference should
be the first step in any evaluation given activity level propositions.
Sometimes, however, analysts claim that an insufficient amount
of data exists, and they do so even before they know what data is
9On this point, see also Casey et al. (2016), who argue “(...) not evaluating DNA
evidence in case work is potentially more dangerous and reckless than carrying
out an evaluation based on limited datasets.” We concede that this topic is delicate
and it is important not to suggest that scientists allow themselves to suggest an
answer as they please and hide behind statements such as “I am an expert.”
10While there is substantial literature available on BNs for evaluating forensic DNA
results (e.g., Biedermann and Taroni, 2012), BNs remain inaccessible to many
biologists, mainly because of lack of training. An easily accessible repository with
freely available examples that can be utilized with open-source software would be
an asset to complement the idea of a knowledge base, as mentioned above.
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actually required to help address the issues that are of interest
in the case. Also, once constructed, and lack of data is found
to be an issue for some aspects of the evaluation, there are still
several avenues open to the scientists. These include the weighing
of the various states that potential factors may take in terms of
probabilities, informed by the scientist’s documented knowledge
and experience, and then conducting sensitivity analyses to
determine how the evaluation changes as those probabilities vary
over plausible ranges.
Reluctance to such introspective thinking, and expert
probability elicitation in general, is surprising and odd to see
among those scientists who would find no objection to be
asked and to give opinions in court about the probabilities of
various competing activities, regardless of whether relevant data
exists, and regardless of whether they have undertaken some
activity level consideration. In this situation, analysts are likely
to express themselves non-numerically in the form of an answer
such as “that is improbable,” “I don’t believe that is likely to
have happened,” “I think that sort of transfer is barely feasible,”
etc. So, analysts who would be willing to express themselves
in such probabilistic terms about propositions, but refuse to
provide probabilities for findings given propositions, exhibit
an inherently contradictory position. We thus maintain that
analysts who have considered their findings in a framework of
logical inference, using experimentally derived data to assign
probabilities and varying assignments for influencing factors
will be in a much better position to usefully inform the court.
This will include any limitations that characterize the data
actually used (as well as detailing the information available
to the scientist at the time of writing the report, see also
Section 2.3.3).
2.2.2. “Expert Professional Experience Is Not Enough
(Data) To Safely Assign Probabilities”
A recent exchange (Casey et al., 2016; Meakin and Jamieson,
2016) raised the latent issue of whether, and to what extent,
expert experience forms an acceptable basis for assigning
probabilities. As asserted in Champod (2014), and reiterated
recently in Meakin and Jamieson (2016), the critical issue is
disclosure of data and making it available early enough in
the process in order to allow for a proper consideration by
the defense. The deeper issue, however, appears to lie in the
notions of expert experience and so-called “personal” probability
assignments. The ENFSI Guideline, for example, mentions expert
experience as one possible source for informing the process
of probability assignment: “Such data can take, for example,
the structured form of scientific publications, databases or
internal reports or, in addition to or in the absence of the
above, be part of the expert knowledge built upon experiments
conducted under controlled conditions (including case-specific
experiments), training and experience” (Willis et al., 2015, p.
19). This should not be read as meaning that a vague reference
to personal experience is on a par with other, more structured
data. This would amount to misconceiving the fact that there
is actually a hierarchy in the data, with a clear preference
given to scientific publications and otherwise widely accessible
scrutinized data.
2.2.3. “Evaluations Given Activity Level Propositions
Are Massively Vague and Hence Cannot Be Trusted”
This objection may be the result of the discomfort that can
be experienced when faced with incomplete knowledge about
factors that influence the assessment of the probative value of
scientific observations. However, incomplete knowledge, and
hence uncertainty, do not per se prevent the conduct of science
and its operational use in legal proceedings. What is more, in
all parts of legal and everyday practice, one needs—inevitably—
to act despite knowledge being incomplete. It is the very task of
science, thus, to quantify the extent of available knowledge so
that it can be used in an informed way. The reply “it’s possible”11
when confronted with the event of transfer or contamination,
as scientists still often do in criminal proceedings, is a vague
statement and is not a quantification of knowledge as we
understand it in the discussion here.
The view that partial knowledge can be used is challenged,
for example, when outcomes are subject to variation and
scientists refrain from addressing them, equating variation with
“no knowledge” about the topic. Forensic examination of glass
provides a telling illustration for this. Research has shown that
the quantities of glass fragments transferred to the surfaces of the
clothing of the breaker vary considerably even for experiments
with the “same” controlled conditions (e.g., regarding mode of
breaking, distance between the breaker and the window, etc.).
But does this mean that we “know nothing”? Clearly, scientists
have knowledge about the phenomenon of glass transfer12 in the
sense that they won’t expect to encounter all possible numbers
of fragments with the same probability. For example, depending
on factors such as the distance between the breaker and the
window, the mode of breaking, the time since window-breaking
and seizing a suspect’s clothing etc., scientists may consider it
more probable to recover less than, say, five glass fragments,
rather than more than five. It is the scientists’ core task to elicit
and convey such expressions of expert knowledge, because no
one else in the proceedings is in a better position to do this. It may
be a challenge for scientists to provide probabilities for recovering
exactly 0, 1, 2, ... fragments (although simulation approaches exist
e.g., Curran et al., 1998), but it is feasible also to choose a strategy
going from the general to the particular, starting with probability
assignments for apportionments of fragments such as “none,”
“few,” “some,” and “many.” This helps break down the difficulty
of probability assignment and make particular assignments more
intersubjectively acceptable.
What is important is not the variation per se but how different
the expected outcomes are given both propositions. Imagine that
2min after a window is broken, a person is arrested and his
sweater searched for glass. More than 80 fragments (sharing the
same physical properties as the broken window) are recovered.
Is this result more probable given that he broke the window
or given that he had nothing to do with breaking incidents? In
11The same applies to “could have”; and there have been several notable judgments
where courts have ruled against the unqualified use of such phrases.
12A further relevant factor is background presence. Regarding DNA, there is
limited knowledge about naturally present DNA in the environment, which is
especially important in cases where the defendant and victim cohabit (as in the
Amanda Knox case, for example Gill, 2016).
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some breaking experiments, it was observed that the number of
fragments transferred was between 44 and 241 (with a mean of
127, see Hicks et al., 1996). So, there is variation, but when one
looks at persons who have not broken windows and searches their
garments, one finds that, in general, on sweaters, there are only
between 0 and 2 fragments (sharing the same characteristics, see
Coulson et al., 2001). Thus, clearly, finding 80 fragments is much
more probable given one proposition than the other, despite the
variation observed. Using the data from both surveys, one can
assign a probability to the results given each proposition. In cases
involving DNA, most studies focus on one activity only, but what
is important is the comparison of the probability of the outcomes
given both the alleged activity and at least one alternative. This
comparison will then enable us to see if the variation that we have
observed has an impact or not on our conclusions.
One further point that warrants a comment is “vagueness.”
We would strongly advise against the use of this term as a
qualifier for a forensic evaluation if that evaluation has been
conducted thoroughly. Let us recall again the undisputed starting
point: there is variation in findings. What scientists do is to
accommodate this through probability. What does this mean?
It means that scientists will assign probabilities to the various
outcomes depending on the extent to which they expect them to
occur. For example, consider a case in which a victim has been
punched several times to the head, resulting in profuse bleeding.
Given the proposition that the suspect (arrested immediately
after the assault) is the assailant, we can postulate one main,
potential outcome: finding, on the suspect’s fist, blood with a
DNA profile corresponding to that of the victim. A fairly high
probability (i.e., toward the upper end of the range between 0
and 1) may be assigned for this particular finding. By coherence,
other findings such as no blood at all, or blood with a profile
different from that of the victim will thus be assigned lower
probabilities (i.e., toward the lower end of the range between 0
and 1). So, there is variation in the potential findings but there is
a major finding that dominates our expectations. Consider now a
different version of this case, in which the assault was less violent,
did not result in the bleeding of any protagonist, but involved
several victims. In such a case, it may be necessary to specify a
broader range of potential findings, possibly including mixtures.
In the event that the person of interest is the assailant, there may
not be one outcome that stands out over all the others. Instead,
one’s probabilities for several of these potential outcomes may be
quite similar. Thus, probability will be distributed over several
outcomes, with no outcome receiving a probability assignment
close 1. The assigned probabilities will express less strong beliefs
(in the various outcomes) but—and this is the important point—
this does not mean that the assignment as such is vague. Less
strong beliefs simply reflect the fact that one is less affirmative.
Every statement of probability expresses a particular state of
uncertainty, that is a well defined opinion, but none of these
expressions are deficient if they are derived properly to reflect the
expert’s current state of knowledge.
So, even if the scientist may report a neutral finding13,
due to limited expert knowledge (to enable the assignment
13In more technical language, this would correspond to a likelihood ratio of 1.
of probabilities that are different in the numerator and the
denominator), this is still an important evaluation to present to
the fact-finder. If nothing else, it will inform the decision-maker
that they need rely on non-DNA evidence to decide the case.
2.3. Reporting
2.3.1. “It Is Impossible to Know from the Quantity of
DNA Obtained, and the Quality of the Profile,
Whether the DNA Was Deposited by Direct Contact
or Indirect Transfer.”
The concern expressed in the section title is also sometimes seen
as the problem of whether we can determine or, as noted by
some discussants, “deduce” whether a given finding is the result
of primary or secondary transfer. The misconception here is not
to understand that the process is not deductive14, but remains
inductive. Hence one cannot “know for sure”—but one can offer
guidance, in the form of probabilities for the results, to help
fact-finders decide on the truth of the propositions of interest.
More generally, the claim that particular observations do not
allow one to draw categorical conclusions about a particular
activity is uncontested and also holds for many, if not all, types of
forensic traces. Taking glass as an example, no proficient forensic
scientist would conclude that finding a number x fragments is
the result (or the probable result) of smashing a given window.
Similarly, finding a number y particles of gunshot residue does
not allow one to say that the person of interest discharged a
firearm, to the exclusion of other propositions. The impossibility
of such direct “jumps” from observations to conclusions in
these examples does not derive, however, from the fact that the
trace material is present in small quantities. The shortcoming
in the reasoning also holds for the so-called macro-traces. To
illustrate this point, imagine that large quantities of fresh blood
are observed on the hands of a person of interest. Such a result
does not entitle one to argue that the exclusive or probable cause
is stabbing the victim. Depending on the case circumstances,
trying to help the victim may also be a viable proposition.
As discussed, the scientists’ task, when operating in evaluative
mode, is not to “infer activities” but to provide expressions
of probative strength to help the court discriminate between
competing propositions regarding activities. This requires the
scientist to assign probabilities for the DNA results as obtained
in the case at hand given each of the propositions of interest.
The fundamental question associated with probative value then
is: “Under which of the competing propositions regarding
activities do we consider the findings more probable?” It may
be that scientists think that they have no reason to consider the
observations more probable in one version of the events than
another. But this will not be a defect of reporting given activity
level propositions, nor of the framework of evaluation. It only
means that, in the current state of knowledge, the findings do
not have any discriminative capacity (in a technical sense, such
results would have a likelihood ratio of 1). As discussed, this is a
well-defined result and should be reported, so that people are not
prosecuted on the basis of forensic results that are not probative
at this stage. As much as it is useful for a recipient of expert
14On the notion of deductive logic, see also Jackson et al. (2013), for example.
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information to hear when observations support one proposition
rather than another, and (if possible) to what extent, it is useful
for them to know when findings do not allow them to alter their
beliefs in the propositions of interest.
In other terms, it is not a matter for the scientist to say
whether a proposition, such as “Mr. A stabbed the victim (i.e.,
the DNA is from primary transfer),” is true, given the forensic
observations, but the extent to which she expects to see these
observations, given the proposition “Mr. A stabbed the victim.”
The scientist should be assessing the probability that DNA would
be transferred, that it would persist and that a matching profile
would be obtained, given the truth of this proposition. But there
is one more dimension to the latter question. In order to be
balanced, scientists must not only think about their results, given
one activity, but also given at least one alternative activity (for
example, that the suspect handled the knife innocently after
the incident), and assess whether, and if so to what extent, the
observations are more probable given one activity rather than
another. It is therefore of paramount importance that scientists
do not confuse the probability of primary transfer with the
probability of observing the results if Mr. A stabbed the victim.
We agree that the difference is very subtle and this is a reason
why, in the propositions, one ought to describe activities and
not use the terms “primary/secondary transfer15.” This allows
one to distinguish, on the one hand, what the court will assess
(i.e., activities), and on the other hand, what the scientist will
assess, that is the probability of observing the results given the
activities. One of the terms used to assign the latter probability
is commonly known in the literature as the “transfer probability”
(Evett, 1984; Evett and Buckleton, 1989)16. We thus stress that a
transfer probability focuses on the findings, given propositions,
not the reverse.
2.3.2. “You Cannot Say That He Stabbed the Victim!
The Only Thing That DNA Allows You to Say Is That
He Had Recent Direct Contact”
This objection is often heard from recipients of expert
information when the propositions of interest in the scientist’s
report are formulated closely to the specific actions that define
the crime. For example, propositions such as “he handled the
knife,” “he punched the victim,” “he fired the gun,” may provoke
such objections. It is often felt that less specific formulations
such as “he is in contact with” are more appropriate. However,
this objection stems from a misconception about the role of
the scientist with respect to the propositions. As noted at the
end of the previous Section, by writing down propositions in
their report, scientists are only “setting the context” in which the
findings will be assessed. That context is given to the scientists
by the court and/or the parties and this context naturally relates
to the alleged actions. Hence, scientists do not express any
opinion directly on those propositions, notably regarding their
truthfulness, adequacy or otherwise. The scientist’s reporting only
focuses on the weight to be assigned to the DNA findings in light
of these propositions. Scientists should not suggest in any way
15For more on this topic, we refer the reader to Hicks et al. (2015).
16Note that there are also phenomena of persistence and detection/recovery to be
taken into account.
that they are in a position to say, for example, that “he handled
the knife,” or that “he was in direct contact with the knife.” If
they do, they fall for the same fallacious thinking explained above.
The only opinion they are allowed to express is in relation to the
probability of the DNA findings if one or the other proposition
is true. Specifically, when the scientist writes that “this amount of
DNA is what we expect if Mr. A. stabbed the victim,” the scientist
is reporting only about the DNA results, and is not taking any
stance on whether or not Mr. A. stabbed the victim. The latter is
simply what is alleged by the parties in their own terms.
2.3.3. “Because Many Lawyers May Lack Awareness
as to the Problem of Transfers, Analysts Should Flag
the Issue in Their Reports Whenever the Analysis
Process Suggests That Various Transfer Mechanisms
May Explain the Findings”
Explaining the observations is a procedure that would be
acceptable for the scientist to perform if they were at the
investigative phase and not being asked to evaluate the forensic
biological results in the context of the case, at court. To clarify
this point, it is useful to recall the following two fundamentally
different perspectives. In the investigative phase, observations
are taken as a starting point. They are used to suggest what
happened (i.e., activities). For example, one takes the finding of
small quantities of DNA on the suspect’s shoe as a starting point
to suggest that the suspect was the person who kicked the victim.
The other perspective takes propositions as a given (as it would
be the case in court), to reason about the findings. One assumes
that the suspect is the person who kicked the victim, and then
one reasons about the kind of trace pattern one would expect
to observe on the suspect’s shoes. In evaluation, it is the latter
perspective that is appropriate for forensic scientists. As noted
by Margot, “[w]hether these results could be observed if one
proposition for the event is true rather than another proposition
is the central relevant matter on which the forensic scientist may
comment” (Margot, 2011, p. 796). Note however that there may
also be more than two propositions of interest.
At this juncture we would like to include a brief note
on the distinction between explaining the observations17 and
evaluating them, as well as the difference between explanations
and propositions (Evett et al., 2000a). We often hear that,
after scientists do all the complex evaluations that activity level
propositions may require, and provide their results on the
stand, the defense are just going to suggest an explanation. For
example, the defendant may argue that he spat on his hand
as he was walking down the street and touched a bench on
which the victim later sat, or some other explanation. It is
worth stating that this is explaining the results, and that the
defense18 provides such explanations once the results are known.
Therefore, such explanations are generally based on the results
and may not be based on the relevant circumstantial information
in the case. Such explanations do not count as acceptable,
17While technically the word “observations” is to be preferred, we will be using the
more colloquial word “results” to refer to the outcome of the scientist’s analyses.
18The problem of post-hoc rationalizations is not restricted to the defense as
explanations can also be brought up by the prosecution. See, for example, the
bleach cleaning hypothesis in the Amanda Knox case (Gill, 2016).
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formal propositions, because one cannot meaningfully assess
the probability of the results given explanations that themselves
are merged with the results (i.e., this would constitute circular
thinking). Explanations are generated post-hoc in order to
account for the results. They can be statements of the blindingly
obvious, they can be speculative or they can be fanciful, having
no logical connection with the circumstances of the case, even
to the point of having no grounding in reality (see in particular
Evett et al., 2000a and more recently Jackson et al., 2013 for
examples and detailed discussion). In contrast, propositions are
formal statements of competing allegations or suggestions that
are dictated by the relevant circumstances of the case and not
by the results themselves. So if changes are suddenly brought
up at trial, scientists need to be careful not to give ad-hoc
assessments where evaluation would require detailed checks with
relevant literature and specialized knowledge. This is also why,
for example, the ENFSI Guideline (Willis et al., 2015) emphasizes
that scientists shouldmention in their report that their evaluation
is based on their understanding of the relevant circumstances
at the time of writing the report and that if any assumptions
or information is incomplete or incorrect, they will have to
re-evaluate their findings19.
The above distinction between explanations and propositions
is crucial and it is worth to summarize and relate it to standard
notions from other inferential disciplines. Characteristically,
explanations account for—or are made to “fit around”—the
findings that have been made in a case. Explanations entail a
deductive mode of reasoning as they seek to explain existing
results, typically in causal terms. As such, forensic explanations
are generated and considered after relevant observations are
known. Often, the generating process for explanations results
from abductive reasoning not limited to the forensic scientist,
but may also extend to case investigators. As such explanations
are theoretically open-ended, with no limit on their number
though some of the explanations may be more or less fanciful
(e.g., not testable in a logical sense), implausible or even
speculative than others, to the point that no meaningful
probability may be assigned to them. Unlike explanations,
propositions are formal statements that can be clearly related to
the case context and subjected to a proper inductive mode of
reasoning.
We would suggest that consideration and proposal by a
scientist of the various possible modes of transfer to account for
DNA findings may be of use in the investigative phase of a case.
But scientists should not systematically explore and comment on
all conceivable mechanisms of transfer (so-called caveats) in their
statements (but may do so within the lab-file, or in a “Technical
Issues” section of the report Evett et al., 2000b). Moreover, when
a case enters the evaluative phase, and particularly when in
court, a scientist should resist offering a view on explanations for
transfer but concentrate on evaluating probabilities for the results
given formal propositions based on the circumstances of the
case. Advancing explanations at the evaluative stage amounts to
19Interruptions in the proceedings can be granted by the court both in inquisitorial
and adversarial proceedings, and will usually be granted if the question is of
importance to the court.
treating transfer dismissively, rather than considering its impact
on probative value in a formal and explicit way.
2.3.4. “The Safest Course Is for an Analyst Simply to
Report the Results of the DNA Test, Alert Both
Counsel and the Jury to the Possibility of Transfer,
and Leave the Jury or Factfinder to Assess Their
Implications”
This argument is a similar to the previous one, about caveats,
but here the burden of how to assess the implications of
transfer is left to the factfinder. We are of the opinion that
leaving the factfinder to assess implications of transfer threatens
the appropriate conduct of the forensic findings: if scientists
do not—or cannot—evaluate their results, then how could the
factfinder do so? Hence we find this position problematic.
Clearly, proceeding in this way is an easy course for scientists,
because it reduces their task to technical reporting, but it could
be very misleading for innocent defendants because findings will
be left uninterpreted at the propositional level that really matters
(i.e., activity level). Forensic scientists have (or should have)
specialized knowledge on transfer and persistence, as shown by
publications in forensic journals, and they therefore have the duty
to report the value of their results at that level. If the knowledge is
not sufficient, then scientists must tell the instructing magistrate
or the court (or preferably even before, earlier in the process)
that, as a consequence, their results do not help discriminate
between the propositions at hand. We do not believe that—
in the evaluative phase—scientists should provide a list of all
theoretically possible modes of transfer of DNA (see also Section
2.3.3). If the scientist were to provide such a list, how does the
court choose which is the most likely mode of transfer? This
would leave the court in the difficult position of having to choose
which of a potentially large number of possibilities (that are not
necessarily exhaustive) is the most likely, without being able to
rely on any specialized knowledge to do so. However, we do
believe that it is the proper role of the scientist to talk generally
about transfer and persistence of DNA (see also Section 2.3.3).
An intricacy related to the above is the use of the term
“possible.” As human beings, we refer to a lot of events as being
“possible” (i.e., the probability of the event is not 0), but forensic
scientists should be more informative than this: they should
assess how probable their results are given the propositions at
hand, just like they do when they assess the probability of
observing a given DNA profile if it came from some unknown
person. If a scientist were to be asked “what is the probability of
obtaining a matching DNA profile if it came from Mr. A or if it
came from someone else who happens to have, by coincidence,
the same profile,” which is an explanation, the scientist would
have to answer that those two probabilities would be the same
(i.e., approaching 1). Therein lies the problem for the scientist
and the court, generating explanations leads to probabilities for
the results of a value approaching 1. Provision of explanations
is deeply rooted in general forensic science thinking and we
regularly see reports in which the scientist writes “It is possible
that this DNA comes from Mr. A. But, it is also possible that it
comes from his brother or an unknown person.” This sort of
explanation-based answer is unsatisfactory because it leads the
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scientist to opine directly on a proposition (see also Section 2.3.2
regarding the role of the forensic scientist).
2.3.5. “When Scientists Are Unable to Evaluate Their
Observations Given Activity Level Propositions, Then
They Should Retreat to Evaluations Given Source or
Sub-source Propositions”
This claim rejoins Section 2.3.4, which refers to the claim that
an evaluation given source level propositions is a “safe course”
for forensic scientists, when they cannot help address activity
level propositions. However, what a safe course of proceeding
is for the scientist may again not be so for other participants
in the process20. The problem is that the “safe course” for the
scientist inevitably restricts the evaluation to the (sub-) source
level. Consequently, the court is given no guidance about how to
evaluate with respect to activity level propositions. If the court
confuses the scientist’s (sub-) source evaluation with the activity
level evaluation, then there is a risk that this may lead to a
miscarriage of justice21.
For the above reason, recent recommendations by ENFSI
specify that the choice of source level propositions is limited to
well defined situations, that is “(...) cases where there is no risk
that the court will misinterpret [the findings] (...) in the context
of the alleged activities in the case” (Willis et al., 2015, p. 12)22.
But for small quantities of trace material, this is rarely if ever
the case, because such traces require expert knowledge “(...) to
consider factors such as transfer mechanisms, persistence and
background levels of the material which could have an impact
on the understanding of scientific findings relative to the alleged
activities” (Willis et al., 2015, p. 11). For all of these reasons, the
ENFSI guideline concludes that “(...) the choice between (sub-)
source and activity should not be influenced by the availability
of data or expert knowledge but solely from the consideration
of factors such as transfer, persistence and background levels
that could crucially affect the strength of the findings within the
context of the case circumstances” (Willis et al., 2015, p. 13).
This includes a statement of limitations as to the data and the
individual expert knowledge (see also Section 2.2.1).
An objection that may be raised against the position
outlined above is its feasibility. That is, although activity level
propositions may be recognized as the relevant propositional
level, specialized knowledge necessary for evaluation given this
20See for example cases such as Jama (Gill, 2014, p. 27) or the Ruelas Case (Murphy,
2015, p. 56) which illustrate that the sole consideration of sub-source issues does
not accommodate and represent an evaluation of the joint probative value of the
results from different swabs, the quantities of DNA found, nor the presence or
absence of other trace materials. When considering activity level propositions, all
observations should be assessed, which is what is needed.
21See http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/when-dna-implicates-the-inno
cent/ for recent case involving a stupefying situation in which a forensic DNA
report found a correspondence between the DNA profile of a hospitalized person
and DNA found on a murder scene. It appeared that the same paramedics treated
the hospitalized person but also worked on the crime scene a few hours later
(see also https://californiainnocenceproject.org/2013/06/how-an-innocent-mans-
dna-was-found-at-a-crime-scene/).
22This may be the case, for example, when there is a large and fresh bloodstain
at the point of entry (e.g., broken window) and it is not contested that the blood
stain is relevant to the case (i.e., the trace is a direct consequence of committing the
burglary).
level of propositions may be unavailable. A natural consequence
of this starting point would be not to introduce the results
at trial, in order to protect defendants against unwarranted
interpretations in such cases. However, there appears to be no
consensus among scientists on how to proceed in such situations.
Some scientists maintain their intention to report findings given
source level propositions although they are clearly unable to
help with the issue of activities. As a consequence, we do not
subscribe to this view of retreating to evaluation given (sub)source
level propositions, and neither does the ENFSI Guideline, which
requires scientists to clearly acknowledge that their evaluation
falls short of the real needs. In Guidance note 2, the Guideline
states that “(...) if the examiner chooses (...) to report the findings
at source level (...), the examiner shall explicitly state that the
rarity of the profile does not address the question of the relevance
of the findings in relation to the alleged activity” (Willis et al.,
2015, p. 14).
Proponents of the view according to which uninterpretable
results should be mentioned at trial appear to misconceive the
fact that different stages in the forensic process have different
requirements (Jackson et al., 2006, 2013). It is beyond dispute
that, at an investigative stage, scientists can help the process
move on when they factually report about the observation that
a defendant’s traits are also observed in trace material (e.g., in
the case of mixtures). This is useful information for selecting
possible candidates on whom to focus further investigations.
At trial, however, the requirements are different. At trial, the
defendant has already been selected, and if DNA is to play
any further role, it must be given a weight (Evett, 2015)—
not against any propositions, but propositions at the relevant
level.
2.3.6. “When Evaluating Forensic DNA Traces Given
Activity Level Propositions, the Scientist Infringes on
the Duties of the Court”
A perception encountered among legal practitioners, as noted
earlier in Section 2.3.2, is that when evaluating DNA traces given
postulated activities, scientists take on the role of the fact-finder.
This observation is a cause of concern because it does not reflect
the scientist’s intention and laying bare this misconception is
challenging. We think that there is merit in reiterating that it is
not for the scientist to give an opinion on whether the transfer
is primary or secondary (or the probability that the transfer is
primary or secondary) because giving such an opinion would
amount to giving an opinion on the propositions of interest,
for example whether “Mr. A had sex with Ms. A” (transfer was
primary) or “Mr. A and Ms. A attended the same party, but had
no particular interaction” (transfer was secondary). Clearly, this
is a question for the court.
The above distinction is very subtle, for all discussants,
including scientists. It comes down, in one way or another,
to the problem of the transposed conditional. Many authors
have formally described the contribution of the scientist and the
nature of expert opinion in the criminal justice system, with the
one key aspect being that the scientists’ role is to evaluate their
results given the competing propositions regarding activities,
and that it is for the court itself to assess the truth of the
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propositions. Unless scientists are operating at the investigative
stage, they should express probabilities only for their results
given propositions, but not the reverse. An example of a relevant
statement would be: “The probability of observing this quantity
of DNA if Mr. A had sex with Ms. A as alleged by the prosecution
is in the order of 0.6, whereas the probability of observing this
quantity of DNA if Mr. A had social interactions as alleged
by the defense is in the order of 0.01. This means that it is
about 60 times more probable to observe this DNA result if
the prosecution’s case is true rather than if the case of the
defense is true.” However, there is the risk that the receiver
of this information will interpret the low probability for the
findings, given the alternative proposition, as meaning there
is a low probability for the proposition, given the findings—a
reasoning error that is known as “transposing the conditional,”
and which was not intended by the scientist. This is why
some reporting agencies explicitly mention, in their written
reports, examples of sentences of what their conclusions do not
mean.
3. CONCLUSIONS
From the discussion presented throughout Section 2, three main
points emerge:
First and foremost, forensic interpretation, as conducted
by the scientist, focuses on the observations, not on the
propositions. Stated otherwise, the question for the scientist
is “What is the strength of these findings with regards to the
propositions of interest?” The scientist should not attempt
to answer the question “How probable are the propositions
given the findings?” Scientists do not evaluate and provide
an assessment of the probative strength of scientific findings
when they express opinions on propositions. Hence—for the
scientist—evaluation given activity level propositions does
not mean to opine, probabilistically, on competing activities
that may have “caused” the findings. Evaluating forensic
results means to provide information that helps the recipient
of expert information discriminate between propositions,
whatever their belief in those propositions is prior to hearing
the scientific findings.
Second, reporting on the probability of the observations given
competing versions of the case, regarding activities, does not
exclusively depend on numerical data, but is also informed
by expert knowledge and experience, for which scientists can
provide appropriate documentation and demonstrate how it
shapes their opinion. What is more, the scientist invokes
information that is available for disclosure and auditing. An
important corollary of this is that even though task specific
data may be unavailable or scarce, it does not mean that
no probability can be assigned. In particular, this is not
to suggest that any opinion, or mere guesswork, is a valid
substitute for thorough scientific assessment. It highlights the
need for the elicitation of expert probabilities and knowledge
through formal methods and techniques, known also in other
areas of specialization, such as risk and safety assessments
(e.g., O’Hagan et al., 2006; Aven and Reniers, 2013). There
is merit in further developing these approaches for forensic
science applications, as well as strengthening the body of
structured knowledge (i.e., relevant data on phenomena such
as transfer and persistence) for various types of forensic traces
(Evett, 2015). This rejoins the idea of developing a knowledge
base system that would include experiments and exemplar
probabilistic models for evaluation (e.g., BNs). This is widely
considered a critical step that the field needs to take now.
Third, variability in the observations (e.g., with respect to
quality and quantity of transferred material) observed in
experiments under controlled conditions, is both natural and
expected. It does not mean that such data cannot be used for
evaluation in actual cases, nor does it mean that no conclusion
may be drawn. This view is also supported by professionally
organized forensic caseworkers (Casey et al., 2016). Variability
is an inevitable feature of scientific experiments, observations
and measurements, and produces uncertainty. The scientific
approach to such uncertainty is to capture it by probability
and to take it into account in the scientist’s evaluation (e.g.,
it will be ensured that the data used come from experiments
that relate directly to the analytical methods used in the case
of interest). Therefore, variation per se is not a primary matter
of concern; what does matter for the scientist is to see whether
the probability of the outcomes given different propositions
varies. That is, for the results to be useful, the outcomes
need to be more probable given one version of the case (i.e.,
proposition) than given an alternative version of the case. It
is on this latter issue that the scientists need to focus their
attention.
The above observations diffuse the call for so-called
“unpredictable” forensic DNA traces, in particular low
quantities, to be withheld from being used in the process.
This is so because the perceived drawbacks, although inspired
by known difficulties, do not properly acknowledge additional
levels of scientific observations (e.g., extrinsic features such as the
quality and the quantity of recovered material, and the position
in which it was found) that may be available and that characterize
a comprehensive evaluation of forensic results. This perspective
goes beyond the mere assessment of the rarity of the analytical
features (i.e., the genetic profile). Indeed, for decades, forensic
scientists and recipients of expert information have found
comfort in seeing forensic DNA analyses provide “constant”
and “stable” results in the sense that the DNA profile observed
for a sample from a person of interest will, broadly speaking, be
observed to be the same for a stain left by that person - as long
as quality and quantity of the staining are appropriate, and the
chain of custody is impeccable. To a large extent, this has led to
technical efforts and investments being spent on ensuring that
analyses will reveal the same profile for materials that come from
the same source. This is, undoubtedly, an important preliminary
requirement for use in forensic science. Unfortunately, however,
this perspective was accompanied by the idea that all that is
necessary to assess the strength of the findings is an assignment
for the probability of observing the profile of interest for an
unknown person. This focus on analytical accuracy and rarity
of features conflicts with the intricacy of additional dimensions
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that DNA profiling entails, such as the very fact of finding
DNA at a particular place on a receptor surface (i.e., extrinsic
aspects). Stated otherwise, what we have come to see now are
conventional interpretation schemes conditioned mainly on
source (or sub-source, e.g., in the UK) level propositions being
applied to questions, issues and challenges for which these
schemes have not been designed, and this has the potential
to create stupefying situations in which reports on forensic
DNA results are at odds with the case as a whole23. Worse
still, evaluation given sub-source and source propositions alone
can lead to an over-valuing of the scientific evidence, risking
miscarriages of justice (Gill, 2014; Jackson, 2014).
The above calls for a readjustment of perspective. To ensure
that forensic DNA results are meaningfully used in the legal
process, scientists must work on improving their knowledge
and understanding about additional factors that characterize
not only intrinsic features (e.g., DNA profile) but also extrinsic
features (e.g., location where DNA was found). This call is not
new (e.g., Evett and Weir, 1998; Taroni et al., 2013; Champod,
2014), but we see that the field is rather reluctant and awareness
increases only slowly. At the same time, reports accumulate
on real cases (e.g., Gill, 2016) where DNA turned out to be a
source of conflict essentially because the key issues for the court
related to activities whereas the scientist evaluated the findings
in light of questions of source. Thus, evaluation given activity
level propositions corresponds to a real need and we foresee
that both prosecution and defense counsels will intensify their
probing of forensic science regarding this propositional level,
not least because recently issued guidelines (i.e., Willis et al.,
2015) on evaluation and reporting explicitly set this forth as the
standard of interpretation. Achieving this standard is a delicate
and challenging endeavor because it operates at the frontiers
of current knowledge. However, by gathering, sharing and
organizing specialized knowledge in a structured and systematic
23See also the case mentioned in footnote 21.
way (i.e., a shared knowledge base), the forensic community
as a whole has the potential to work toward (i) increasing the
number of cases in which findings can be assessed given activity
level propositions, and (ii) rendering activity level evaluations
more trustworthy in those cases where such evaluations are
feasible.
In this paper, a discussion format has intentionally been
chosen. The aim was to concentrate and restate replies to
recurrent objections to emphasize on the need to pursue
this topic from a broad perspective, associating both forensic
scientists and lawyers. In view of all the arguments presented, our
view is that evaluation given activity level propositions represents
a main point of the agenda of future research. Besides the justified
calls for more structured expert knowledge, we also recognize the
need to report on more practical case examples that demonstrate
the feasibility of this perspective in a way that practitioners can
understand. Such reports on practical examples exceed the space
available in this communication, but is the object of ongoing
collaborative work between the authors.
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A commentary on
A “Source” of Error: Computer Code, Criminal Defendants, and the Constitution
by Chessman, C. (2017). Calif. Law Rev. 105, 101–193.
Chessman (2017) warns of the current trend to admit into court unchallenged the results of
complex computerized calculations. He provides a number of examples and arguments claimed
to demonstrate the need for open source software to remove the “black box” element. We agree
with parts of this sentiment, and the topic of this special issue, that there is a danger with those
using and receiving information from black box systems.
Some care however is needed with simple diagnoses and prescriptions such as these.
Modern probabilistic genotyping software are replacing methods previously applied manually.
We have great confidence in the forensic community with regard to both integrity and dedication.
The previously applied processes are usually a composite of standard operating procedure and
human judgment. The difference between these and probabilistic software is largely that the
processes in the software are encoded.
Many disciplines are sufficiently broad that practitioners need to rely, in part, on the work of
others. This is not new (for a discussion on this point see Taylor, 2016). The risk to which Chessman
refers arises when the individual using the system has so little understanding that they do not know
how to use the system, or when it has not worked1. Chessman provides some helpful suggestions
for how breaking down black box barriers can be addressed on an individual and systemic scale.
As developers of expert system STRmixTM2 (Taylor et al., 2013), we wish to address some of the
alarmist points in Chessman (and echoed by others3) that gives the impression that producers of
expert systems are all either incompetent or corrupt.
We first wish to correct a couple of points in (Chessman, 2017). Regarding the “erroneous
assumption” referenced by footnotes 49–51: This miscode, and indeed any miscode found that has
been identified in STRmixTM development or use, was identified by examination of the program’s
output and not the source code. It would be nearly impossible to identify subtle errors in code
by viewing the code. The identification has always been a result of comparison of the results
produced by a program to some known control4. The results of these comparisons then trigger
the examination of a specific section of the code in order to discover the source of the discrepancy.
1Note that this is not an issue with just computer programs, recent history has numerous examples within forensic biology
showing that a misunderstanding of the way a systemworks at a fundamental level can cause issues even when the calculations
themselves are relatively simple and able to be done by hand (Budowle and Bieber, 2015).
2An expert system that analyses STR DNA profile data.
3For example see EPIC (https://epic.org/state-policy/foia/dna-software/).
4Commonly a “by-hand” recreation of the expected value(s).
35
Taylor et al. Commentary: A “Source” of Error
Even as developers, during the developmental validation of new
versions of STRmixTM, we utilize the extended outputs of the
software to validate, and do not validate by examination of
code. A further reference (footnote 98) makes the same incorrect
assumption that it was code review that lead to the discovery of
a programming error. Our experience has been that even more
crucial than a review of source code, is the ability to have access
to outputs that demonstrate each step of a calculation. We should
also note that our ongoing evaluation and testing of the software
is a marker of continuous validation and refinement, rather than
just fixing “errors” and “blunders.”
The second point we wish to make is that the type and
magnitude of miscodes are important to consider. The majority
of programming errors will lead to instances of a program
“crashing” or failing to produce an answer. These types of
errors are arguably inconsequential as they will not lead to any
erroneous results being produced. More serious are miscodes
where no errors are identified or displayed by the software.
These can be split into those that will be clearly identifiable5
and those that are more subtle and may go initially unnoticed.
Even in this latter category, the question should be asked “What
effect does this error have?” If the magnitude of the difference
in the result caused by the miscode is small compared with the
natural variability in the results being produced6 then arguably
the consequences are minimal. We are by no means suggesting
that that these types of errors are acceptable, they should be
rectified as soon as found. We simply suggest that they tend
to be used for scaremongering in a manner disproportionate
to their impact. Case in point is the oft quoted article (David
Murray, 2015), which contains the never quoted sentence “The
DNA likelihood ratios in both the new and original statements
appear to be the same.”
We agree with the suggestion of Chessman that source code
should be available for scrutiny. STRmixTM abides by one of the
mechanisms that Chessman suggests, namely the ability for code
to be disclosed under confidentiality agreements7. We note that
running of STRmixTM is just the final step in a long journey
of computerized activities that ultimately lead to an answer.
5Such as value of a probability greater than one, or a negative amount of some
substance.
6This may either be in the raw results due to inherent variability in the laboratory
process or it may be variability in the statistical result due to an evaluation method
that utilizes random number generation (Bright et al., 2015).
7The code of STRmixTM has been viewed under such conditions in the past.
A true challenge of all steps in the process would require the
examination of the source code underlying the Java programming
language in which STRmixTM is written, the WindowsTM
operating system on which it is run, the software used to process
the raw electrophoretic data, the software used to collect the
raw electrophoretic data from the electrophoresis instrument,
the code used to run the electrophoresis instrument, the PCR
thermocycler, the quantification instrument and a myriad of
no doubt thousands of blocks of code that sit within the
numerous Peripheral Interface Controllers that control hardware
components.
With the advent of complex computerized evaluation of
evidence, there is a shift from a time where an expert can
testify to all aspects of the evaluation, to one where, at some
level, the workings of an expert system are accepted without
absolute understanding. This may initially seem frightening,
but an examination of the bigger picture suggests otherwise.
It would be difficult to argue that the use of computerized
breathalyzers is a backwards step from the reliability of the
Field Sobriety Test. Similarly, virtually all senior advisory
bodies relating to DNA profile evaluation recognize the
clear benefits of the probabilistic interpretation systems
(which by nature of their complexity require computerized
implementation) over the preceding manual or binary
interpretation methods (Coble et al., 2015; SWGDAM, 2015).
In our efforts to ensure that software is not the “source”
of errors, it is important to recognize that even with the
noted occurrences of these errors, the current computerized
solutions, when used by trained experts, represent a vast
improvement to the quality and reliability of evidence presented
in court.
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A commentary on 
Federal labour court [2009] – 8 AZR 1012/08
For Silke K., it must have been one of these days that define someone’s story beyond her life. After 
years of suffering gender discrimination and mobbing at work, the Berlin-Brandenburg’s Labour 
Court (LAG) had just issued a game-changing decision in her favor. The question before the court 
essentially boiled down to whether the claimant had discharged her burden of proof simply by 
employing formal statistical methods. LAG’s answer was positive. It awarded damages that included 
the difference (€1.468) between Silke K.’s monthly salary and a director’s one, damages for sex dis-
crimination (€28.214,66), and damages for violating rights of personality (€20.000) (Second Instance 
Land Labour Court, 2008).
The decision did not only implement the new policy enshrined in the General Equal Treatment 
Act 2006 (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz)—whose purpose was to put an end to discrimina-
tion against vulnerable social groups of workers and vertical segregation in labor market creating 
steep asymmetries between the percentage of women in higher positions and the total labor force 
(ILO Director-General, 2011)—but also most importantly constituted a paradigm shift regarding 
the legal protection of female employees. More specifically, whereas women were making up at that 
time the majority (69%) of the defendant’s workforce (Second Instance Land Labour Court, 2008, 
para 23), not a single one of them was in the board of directors (Second Instance Land Labour 
Court, 2008, para 14), exemplifying thus in a clear way that women are “widely underrepresented” 
in decision-making positions in the private sector of Germany (EU Document of the Directorate 
General for Internal Policies, 2015). But what exactly propelled this long expected success and 
engineered the closing of the persistent gender pay gap?1 Silke K.’s team of lawyers had hired a 
mathematician to calculate the probability that it is not random that the board of directors includes 
no women. The probability, the statistical analysis (Monte–Carlo simulation) showed, was between 
98.7% and 100% (Second Instance Land Labour Court, 2008, para 34). Therefore, it was formal 
statistical calculations that gave thrust to the gender equality machinery, since the LAG explicitly 
equated this statistical result with the probability of discrimination against the claimant (Second 
Instance Land Labour Court, 2008). By employing a rigorous framework to draw inferences from 
data, courts broke the “glass ceiling”, i.e., the “unseen, yet unbreakable barrier that keeps minorities 
and women from rising to the upper rungs of the corporate ladder, regardless of their qualifications 
or achievements” (Federal Glass Ceiling Commission, 1995).
Alas all good things come to an end. The Federal Labour Court (BAG) quashed the decision as it 
held that statistics are not conclusive for the individual case (Federal Labour Court [2009]). Although 
there was no explicit mention of the reference class problem in the decision, the Federal Court raised 
once again questions of sufficiency of proof by making clear that proof of unlawful behavior hinges 
1 According to the EU report (EU Document of the Directorate General for Internal Policies, 2015, p. 15): “In general, Germany 
is ranked by the European Gender Equality Index (GEI) lower than the EU average; its performance in achieving gender 
equality is ‘mediocre’.”
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on “statistical data being conclusive for the employer in question”, 
to wit, on specific evidence (Federal Labour Court [2009], para 
68): proof of membership to a reference group is inconclusive.
This brings us to our main issue, the meaning of “specific 
evidence” and the renowned reference class problem (Colyvan 
et al., 2001). Can statistical information—accurate as they may 
be—motivate action? The question is at its kernel whether an 
epistemic inference from a relevant population—which serves 
as a basis for calculating and assigning probabilities—to an 
individual is valid—given that we only have information about 
the reference class. Since we deal with the problem of factual 
generalization and individualization, we rather unwillingly have 
to raise fundamental questions about the nature of our reasoning 
processes, in both law and elsewhere. Unsurprisingly, these issues 
have spawned an extensive debate Allen and Roberts (2007). For 
very good reasons, since legal adjudication aspires to be rational. 
However, there is no consensus on what lessons to draw. The 
debate between the opposing parties has stalled. It would not be 
exaggerating to say that we have reached the point “where one 
would like just to emit an inarticulate sound” (Wittgenstein, 1958, 
§ 261).
This short commentary suggests that we should not be so 
pessimistic. From Aristotle who observes that “it is evidently 
equally foolish to […] demand from a rhetorician scientific 
proofs” (Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, Ch. 3) to 
modern forensic scientists who are at pains to stress that the idea 
“of a frequency being attached to an outcome for a single event 
is ridiculous” (Lucy, 2006, 5), scholars have continuously rejected 
(bogus) aspirations of generality when it comes to (judicial) deci-
sions. True, statistics enable us to validate knowledge-claims 
about the world; but at the same time, we resort to quantitative 
evidence in order to gain an understanding of a population in 
its entirety. This simple expression—“in its entirety”—destroys 
the riddle. Courts and decision makers do not formulate general 
rules. They give answers to questions such as “Is the defendant 
guilty?” to which we do not have scientific answers, not because 
they are intractable, profound mysteries, but simply because 
decision-making is not a scientific process yielding a generally 
valid solution. Of course, statistics should inform the evidential 
basis of decisions and help settle arguments. However, judges do 
have discretion when they apply the law, so that we have to willy-
nilly reject the idea(l) of a mechanical jurisprudence. Extending 
statistical ideas and methods to procedural and forensic contexts 
can broadly be classified as scientism.
The Federal Labour Court made a move in the right direc-
tion. It criticized the transgression of the bound of “specific 
evidence” and reaffirmed the individualistic character of legal 
adjudica tion by authoritatively cutting the Gordian knot (refer-
ence class problem). The academic community has to deliver 
ex post facto the theoretical framework that (dis-)solves this 
problem.
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IntroDUCtIon
On 15 July 1971, Deborah Leach was found dead on the beach. Dr. Manock, the State forensic 
pathologist, used stomach content analysis to determine the time of Leach’s death. Manock con-
cluded that death was between 4:00 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. Only Mr. Van Beelen had been witnessed 
on the beach during this time. Van Beelen was convicted of Leach’s murder in 1973.1 His conviction 
was upheld on appeal.2
In 2013, South Australian appellate law was amended to permit second and subsequent appeals if 
there was “fresh” and “compelling” evidence.3 This reversed the common law position that allowed 
for only a single, perfected appeal.4 Van Beelen’s case was subsequently appealed in 2016.5 The 
defense argued that scientific development concerning stomach content analysis constituted fresh 
and compelling evidence. The Appeal Court rejected that argument by majority.
StomaCH Content analySIS at tHe 1973 trIal
Manock relied on Leach’s schoolmates for the content and timing of her last meal: a pasty, a glass of 
milk, and a slice of pie between 12:15 p.m. and 12:30 p.m. Manock found that Leach’s stomach was 
three-quarters empty at death. He concluded that death could not have occurred before 3:30 p.m. 
or after 4:30 p.m. Dr. Pocock testified, for the defense, that it would “indeed be a rash, irresponsible 
man, who would dare pronounce the exact time of death in the witness-box; or for that matter, be 
ready to estimate the time even to within an hour on either side of the actual time.”6
SCIentIFIC DeVeloPmentS In tHe 2016 aPPeal
In 2016, Professor Horowitz testified that stomach content analysis was now considered to be an 
unreliable way to accurately measure the time of death. This was due to the enormous variations 
in digestion between individuals. Horowitz testified that gastric emptying rates cannot (now) be 
estimated to within an hour.7 He said that even in the 1970s, it was completely unreliable science to 
provide an estimate of time of death once gastric emptying had commenced.8
1 See R v Van Beelen (1973) 4 SASR 353.
2 R v Van Beelen (No 3) (1973) 7 SASR 125.
3 Statutes Amendment (Appeals) Act 2013 (SA) (No 9 of 2013) section 7.
4 R v Edwards (No 2) (1931) SASR 376; Grierson v The King (1938) 60 CLR 431.
5 R v Van Beelen (2016) 125 SASR 253.
6 R v Van Beelen (2016) SASCFC 71 (129) Vanstone and Kelly JJ.
7 R v Van Beelen (2016) SASCFC 71 (50) Kourakis CJ.
8 R v Van Beelen (2016) SASCFC 71 (31) Kourakis CJ.
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CoUrt’S reaSonInG
Kourakis CJ, Vanstone and Kelly JJ comprised the secondary 
appeal court. They agreed that the evidence of Horowitz was 
“fresh” within the meaning of the legislation. The point of dif-
ference was that the Majority (Vanstone and Kelly JJ) did not 
consider the evidence “compelling”; the Chief Justice did.
“Fresh” and “compelling” are defined. Evidence relating to an 
offense is “fresh” if: (i) it was not adduced at the trial of the offense; 
and (ii) it could not, even with the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
have been adduced at the trial. That same evidence is “compelling” 
if: (i) it is reliable; and (ii) it is substantial; and (iii) it is highly proba-
tive in the context of the issues in dispute at the trial of the offense.9
The Majority held that the evidence was not “compelling” 
because Horowitz’s evidence was not “substantial.”10 This was due 
to the doubt already placed on Manock’s evidence by Pocock in 
the original trial.11 The Majority did not consider the prosecution 
case turned on the expert evidence regarding time of death. The 
Majority gave particular attention to the civilian evidence at the 
1973 trial that set the parameters for Leach’s death as occurring 
between 4:00 p.m. and 4:40 p.m., or at the latest 4:50 p.m. The 
fresh evidence was only capable of showing that time of death 
could have been a mere 10 or 20 min later. The Majority consid-
ered that, as a result, the evidence of Horowitz was not substantial 
and, therefore, not compelling.12
oPInIon
Common law courts vested with secondary appeal powers are 
obliged to review scientific advance within the confines of its 
possible meaning and interpretation in an historic trial. Appellate 
rights must be constrained by the trial issues to realize the utility 
in litigation ending. That is a narrow lens for what may be wide-
ranging gains in scientific knowledge. The purpose of secondary 
appellate legislation should be to permit scientific advancement 
to expose errors of fact-finding at trial. The conclusion of the 
Majority requires the relevant evidence to be substantial in light 
of the trial as a whole. The provisions of section 353A, however, do 
not require the evidence to be considered in light of the trial holis-
tically. The fresh evidence itself must be substantial. Kourakis CJ 
identified why the evidence was substantial: its reputable source 
and basis in current science.
Compelling evidence under the legislative regime is “highly 
probative in the context of the issues” at the trial. Scientific 
9 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), section 353A (6).
10 R v Van Beelen (2016) SASCFC 71 (159) Vanstone and Kelly JJ.
11 R v Van Beelen (2016) SASCFC 71 (162) Vanstone and Kelly JJ.
12 R v Van Beelen (2016) SASCFC 71 (164) Vanstone and Kelly JJ.
advance is almost ubiquitously probative with respect to evolu-
tion of human knowledge, but the courts are concerned with a 
more restricted notion of probity. The “probative value” of expert 
evidence to the law concerns the effect that evidence would have 
on the rational assessment of issues before the court. In the case of 
secondary appeals, the probative value lies in the extent to which 
the expert evidence would compel re-assessment of the original 
trial issues. This symbiotic relationship between the probative 
value of expert evidence and the disputed issues reveals why the 
reasoning of Kourakis CJ is to be preferred.
Probative value is to be assessed in the context of the issues, 
not the evidence, in dispute. The Majority rejected Horowitz’s 
evidence as compelling because there was other lay evidence, 
which diminished the import of stomach contents emptying 
regarding time of death. The legislation does not invite the appel-
late court to examine the issues in dispute having regard to the 
evidence in the trial court. The requirement that evidence justify-
ing a secondary appeal must be “fresh” guards against evidence 
being re-litigated or agitated on secondary appeal. If evidence 
adduced on secondary appeal relates to an issue in the trial below 
which the context of the trial reveals to be an important issue in 
the dispute at trial, then, the definition of “compelling” indicates 
that the subject evidence should be regarded as highly probative 
in the context of the issues in dispute. The time of death was a key 
element in the prosecution case and, without its certainty, a pos-
sibility arose that someone other than Van Beelen committed the 
offense.13 The Chief Justice found the relationship of Horowitz’s 
evidence to the time of death was highly probative as the timing 
of death was an issue central to the context of the dispute at the 
1973 trial.
In a trial where time of death is in issue and the context of 
the trial places emphasis on the timing of death, fresh evidence 
concerning errors in that timing should satisfy the criterion of 
“compelling.” Secondary appellate legislation should be, unless 
a contrary parliamentary intention can be clearly shown, read 
with a view to assess whether the fresh evidence is compelling 
given the issues in the court below, not the evidence in the court 
below.
Van Beelen appealed the split decision to the High Court of 
Australia and the matter was heard in June 201714; final judgment 
is pending.
aUtHor ContrIBUtIonS
This commentary was jointly written with a 80/20 division of 
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13 R v Van Beelen (2016) SASCFC 71 (72) Kourakis CJ.
14 R v Van Beelen (2017) HCATrans 19.
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Bayesian Hierarchical Random
Effects Models in Forensic Science
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Statistical modeling of the evaluation of evidence with the use of the likelihood ratio
has a long history. It dates from the Dreyfus case at the end of the nineteenth century
through the work at Bletchley Park in the Second World War to the present day. The
development received a significant boost in 1977 with a seminal work by Dennis Lindley
which introduced a Bayesian hierarchical random effects model for the evaluation of
evidence with an example of refractive index measurements on fragments of glass.
Many models have been developed since then. The methods have now been sufficiently
well-developed and have become so widespread that it is timely to try and provide a
software package to assist in their implementation. With that in mind, a project (SAILR:
Software for the Analysis and Implementation of Likelihood Ratios ) was funded by the
European Network of Forensic Science Institutes through their Monopoly programme to
develop a software package for use by forensic scientists world-wide that would assist
in the statistical analysis and implementation of the approach based on likelihood ratios.
It is the purpose of this document to provide a short review of a small part of this history.
The review also provides a background, or landscape, for the development of some of
the models within the SAILR package and references to SAILR as made as appropriate.
Keywords: Bayes’ Theorem, evidence evaluation, forensic science, hierarchical models, likelihood ratios, random
effects, SAILR, statistics
1. INTRODUCTION
Statistical analyses for the evaluation of evidence have a considerable history. It is the purpose of
this document to provide a short review of a small part of this history. It brings together ideas
from the last forty years for statistical models when the evidence is in the form of measurements
and thus of continuous data. The data are also hierarchical with two levels. The first level is that
of source, the origin of the data. The second level is of items within a source. The models used
to represent the variability in the data are random effects models. The models are chosen from
analyses of samples of sources from some relevant population. Finally, the analysis is Bayesian in
nature with prior distributions for the parameters of the within-source distributions. The nature
of the prior distributions is informed from training data based on the samples from the relevant
population.
The remainder of the document is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a general
introduction to the likelihood ratio as a measure of the value of evidence. Section 3 provides a
framework for models for comparison and discrimination. Section 4 discusses the assessment of
model performance. An Appendix gives formulae for some of the more commonly used models.
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2. THE VALUE OF EVIDENCE
Part of the role of a forensic scientist is to interpret evidence
found at a crime scene in order to aid fact-finders in a criminal
case (e.g., the judge or jury) in their decisionmaking. The forensic
scientist may be asked to comment on the value of the evidence in
the context of various competing statements about the evidence,
each of which may be true or false.Generally, a forensic scientist
must consider two competing statements relating to the evidence,
one put forward by the prosecution in a criminal case, and one
put forward by the defense (Cook et al., 1998b). These statements
are known as propositions1. They generally come in pairs that
are mutually exclusive, though not necessarily exhaustive. For a
debate about the requirement, or otherwise, for the propositions
to be exhaustive (see Biedermann et al., 2014; Fenton et al.,
2014a,b).
One member of the pair is associated with the prosecution
and conventionally denoted Hp. The other member of the pair
is associated with the defense and conventionally denoted Hd.
The evidence to be evaluated is denoted E2. The value of
evidence is taken to be the relative values of the probability of
the evidence if a proposition put forward by the prosecution
is true and the probability of the evidence if a proposition
put forward by the defense is true. However, evidence is
not evaluated in isolation. There is always other information
to be taken into account, including, for example, personal
knowledge of the fact-finder. Denote this information by I.
The value of the evidence, denoted V say, can then be written
formulaically as
V =
Pr(E | Hp, I)
Pr(E | Hd, I)
,
where Pr denotes Probability. This ratio is known as the likelihood
ratio.
The likelihood ratio is the method used by SAILR to evaluate
evidence. SAILR (Software for the Analysis and Implementation
of Likelihood Ratios) is a user-friendly Graphical Interface (GUI)
to calculate numerical likelihood ratios in forensic statistics and
its development under the direction of the Netherlands Forensic
Institute (NFI) was funded by the European Network of Forensic
Science Institutes through their Monopoly programme. The
likelihood ratio is a generally accepted measure for the value of
evidence in much forensic case-work.
This representation of the value of evidence has a very
good intuitive interpretation. Consider the odds form of Bayes’
Theorem in the forensic context of the evaluation of evidence.
The odds form of Bayes’ Theorem then enables the prior
1Other writers use the term hypothesis (see section 2.7). The term proposition will
he used except when there is an explicit need for the term hypothesis; see, for
example, section 3.1
2In ENFSI guidelines ENFSI (2015) “findings” are distinguished from “evidence.”
“Findings are the result of observations, measurements and classification that
are made on items of interest.” “[E]vidence refers to outcomes of forensic
examinations (findings) that, at a later point, may be used by legal decision-makers
in a court of law to reach a reasoned belief about a proposition.” However, the
word “evidence” will be used in this document to refer to both situations for ease
of nomenclature.
odds(i.e., prior to the presentation of E) in favor of the
prosecution proposition Hp relative to the defense proposition
Hd to be updated to posterior odds given E, the evidence under
consideration. This is done by multiplying the prior odds by the
likelihood ratio. The odds form of Bayes’ Theorem may then be
written as
Pr(Hp | E, I)
Pr(Hd | E, I)
=
Pr(E | Hp, I)
Pr(E | Hd, I)
×
Pr(Hp | I)
Pr(Hd | I)
. (1)
The likelihood ratio (LR) is the ratio
Pr(Hp | E, I)/Pr(Hd | E, I)
Pr(Hp | I)/Pr(Hd | I)
(2)
of posterior odds to prior odds. It is the factor which converts the
prior odds in favor of the prosecution proposition to the posterior
odds in favor of the prosecution proposition. The representation
in Equation (1) also emphasizes the dependence of the prior odds
on other information I. Values of the LR > 1 are supportive of
Hp, the proposition put forward by the prosecution. Values of the
LR < 1 are supportive of Hd, the proposition put forward by the
defense. The word “odds” should be used advisedly. IfHp andHd
are not exhaustive then the component probabilities Pr(Hp | E, I)
and Pr(Hd | E, I) cannot be derived from this ratio. All that can
be said is that the posterior ratio is different from the prior ratio
by a factor V .
An advantage of this formulation of evidence evaluation is the
ease with which the effect of the addition of new evidence can be
determined. The posterior odds for one piece of evidence, E1 say,
can be the prior odds for a second piece of evidence, E2 say. Then
Equation (1) may be rewritten as
Pr(Hp | E1,E2, I)
Pr(Hd | E1,E2, I)
=
Pr(E2 | Hp,E1, I)
Pr(E2 | Hd,E1, I)
×
Pr(Hp | E1, I)
Pr(Hd | E1, I)
, (3)
where the conditioning of the evaluation of E2 on E1 is made
explicit.
An illustration of the effect of evidence with a value V of 1,000
on the odds in favor of Hp relative to Hd is given in Table 1.
The following quote is very pertinent.
‘That approach does not ask the jurors to produce any number, let
alone one that can qualify as a probability. It merely shows them
TABLE 1 | Effect on prior odds in favor of Hp relative to Hd of evidence E with
value V of 1,000.
Prior odds V Posterior odds
Pr(Hp)/Pr(Hd ) Pr(Hp | E)/Pr(Hd | E)
1/10,000 1,000 1/10
1/100 1,000 10
1 (evens) 1,000 1,000
100 1,000 100,000
Reference to background information I is omitted.
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how a “true” prior probability would be altered, if one were in fact
available. It thus supplies the jurors with as precise and accurate
an illustration of the probative force of the quantitative data as
the mathematical theory of probability can provide. Such a chart,
it can be maintained, should have pedagogical value for the juror
who evaluates the entire package of evidence solely by intuitive
methods, and who does not himself attempt to assign a probability
to the “soft” evidence.’ Kaye (1979).
The “it” in this context is a chart depicting, in numerical terms,
how much the prior odds in favor of a proposition is enhanced
by the evidence being evaluated. This is a graphical equivalent
of Table 1. The mathematical tool for devising such a chart is
Bayes’ Theorem. These remarks of Kaye’s refer to characteristics
of the general method for the evaluation of evidence that is
the likelihood ratio. They do not refer to a particular case. For
example, it is not possible to comment on the accuracy of a
likelihood ratio estimation in a particular case because the true
value of the likelihood ratio is not known nor can it be known.
It is, however, possible to refer to the accuracy of a method and
performance assessment in general is discussed in section 4.
The use of a likelihood ratio for the evaluation of evidence is
not a new idea. In the Dreyfus case (Champod et al., 1999), it was
argued that
. . . since it is absolutely impossible for us [the experts] to know
the a priori probability, we cannot say: this coincidence proves
that the ratio of the forgery’s probability to the inverse probability
is a real value. We can only say: following the observation of this
coincidence, this ratio becomes X times greater than before the
observation (Darboux et al., 1908).
The “ratio” in this quotation is the odds in favor of one
proposition over another, The X refers to the likelihood ratio.
The posterior odds in favor of the proposition is then X times
the prior odds.
The ideas were also used in the work of I.J. Good and A.M.
Turing as code-breakers at Bletchley Park during World War II
(Good, 1979).
2.1. Background Information
The likelihood ratio updates the prior odds, those before
consideration of evidence E, to posterior odds, which take E into
account. The posterior odds are the odds with which, ultimately,
the fact-finder is concerned. If the likelihood ratio multiplied by
the prior odds is larger than one, then the probability ofHp given
the evidence is larger than that of Hd given the evidence. As
these propositions may not be exhaustive their explicit values,
rather than their relative value, may not be known. It is the
responsibility of the fact-finder to determine a value for the prior
odds. The prior odds can then be combined with the likelihood
ratio to obtain posterior odds. A forensic scientist is concerned
only with the value of the evidence as expressed by the likelihood
ratio so cannot usually comment on the value of the posterior
odds. The likelihood ratio is considered as the strength of support
of the evidence for one of the two propositions Hp or Hd.
The application of this form to a specific case is crucially
dependent on the background information I. However, the
background information available to each person is different. In
part, this is because each person is different. In part it is because of
professional differences. The information that a forensic scientist
should use for their determination of the likelihood ratio is
different from that which a fact-finder, such as judge or jury
member, should use for their determination of the odds in
favor of the prosecution proposition. There are differences in
the background information available to these participants in
the judicial process but these differences have no effect on the
posterior odds in favor of the prosecution proposition.
Let I = Ia∪Ib where Ia is background information available to
the forensic scientist and Ib is background information available
to the fact-finder. There will be information available to both, the
intersection Ia ∩ Ib is not empty. It can then be shown (Aitken
and Nordgaard, 2017) that the posterior odds may be written in
the form
Pr(Hp | E, I)
Pr(Hd | E, I)
=
Pr(E | Hp, Ib)
Pr(E | Hd, Ib)
×
Pr(Hp | Ia)
Pr(Hd | Ia)
.
The fact-finder and the forensic scientist have to treat the
common information (Ia ∩ Ib) with appropriate discretion.
2.2. Uniqueness of the Likelihood Ratio
The role of the likelihood ratio as the factor that updates the prior
odds to the posterior odds has a very intuitive interpretation.
There is also a mathematical derivation that shows it, or a
function of it such as the logarithm, is the only way to update
evidence. It was shown many years ago by I.J.Good in two brief
notes in the Journal of Statistical Computation and Simulation
(Good, 1989a,b) repeated in Good (1991) and in Aitken and
Taroni (2004) that, with some very reasonable assumptions, the
assessment of uncertainty inherent in the evaluation of evidence
leads inevitably to the likelihood ratio as the only way in which
this can be done.
Consider evidence E which it is desired to evaluate in the
context of two mutually exclusive propositions Hp and Hd.
Denote the value of the evidence by V . As always, the value
will depend on background information I but this will not be
stated explicitly. There are other assumptions implicit in this
approach, namely that there is a probability that can be associated
with evidence and one that is dependent on propositions and
only on propositions (and background information). Another
assumption is that V is a function only of the probability of E,
given Hp to be true, and of the probability of E, given Hd to be
true.
Let x = Pr(E | Hp) and y = Pr(E | Hd) where I is omitted
for ease of notation. The assumption that V is a function only of
these probabilities can be represented mathematically as
V = f (x, y)
for some function f .
Now, consider another piece of evidence T which is irrelevant
to E, to Hp and to Hd. Irrelevance is taken in the probabilistic
context to be equivalent to independence so that T may be taken
to be independent of E, ofHp and ofHd. It is then permissible for
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Pr(T) to be given notation which does not refer to any of E,Hp or
Hd. Thus, let Pr(T) be denoted by θ . Then
Pr(E,T | Hp) = Pr(E | Hp) Pr(T | Hp) by the independence of E and T
= Pr(E | Hp) Pr(T) by the independence of Tand Hp
= x θ .
Similarly,
Pr(E,T | Hd) = y θ .
The value of (E,T) is f (θx, θy) by the definition of f . However,
evidence T is irrelevant and has no effect on the value of evidence
E. Thus, the value of the combined evidence (E,T), f (θx, θy), is
equal to the value V of E, f (x, y), and
V = f (x, y) = f (θx, θy)
for all θ in the interval [0,1] of possible values of Pr(T).
The only class of functions of (x, y) for which this can be said
to be the case is the class which are functions of x/y or
Pr(E | Hp)/Pr(E | Hd)
which is the likelihood ratio. Hence the value V of evidence has
to be a function of the likelihood ratio. It has been argued (Lund
and Iyer, 2017) that the forensic community view the likelihood
ratio as only one possible tool for communication with decision
makers. The argument of Good shows that it is the only logically
admissible form of evaluation.
2.3. Weight of Evidence
An interesting note of terminology can be mentioned here. It is
common in some legal circles to talk of theweight of evidence. The
concept of weight of evidence is an old idea. The term weight of
evidence should be used for the logarithm of the likelihood ratio.
The terminology was first used by Peirce (1878). The likelihood
ratio is the value of the evidence and its logarithm is the weight
of the evidence. The logarithm of the likelihood ratio has the
pleasingly intuitive operation of additivity when converting the
logarithm of the prior odds in favor of a proposition to the
logarithm of the posterior odds in favor of the proposition.
log
{
Pr(Hp | E)
Pr(Hd | E)
}
= log
{
Pr(E | Hp)
Pr(E | Hd)
}
+ log
{
Pr(Hp)
Pr(Hd)
}
, (4)
with I omitted. When considering the scales of justice it is the
logarithm of the probabilities of the evidence given each of the
two competing propositions that should be put in the scales, not
the probabilities.
2.4. Terminology for Evidence
The evidence under consideration in this document and within
the SAILR project is evidence that could have been transferred
either from the crime scene to the criminal or from the criminal
to the crime scene. Evidence that could have been so transferred
is in the form of traces. Thus it has two names transfer or
trace evidence. The evidential material discussed here is in the
form of individual items. Thus, there may be a finite number of
items, such as tablets or sachets of drugs or fragments of glass.
Alternatively, the evidence may be a single measurement such as
that of a DNA profile.
Consider the situation in which a crime has been committed,
there is a crime scene and the investigation has reached the stage
where a suspect has been identified. Trace evidence, denoted
E, of a particular type has been found at the crime scene and
on the suspect and its value is of interest. The evidence E may
be partitioned into two parts, that found at the crime scene
and that found in association with the suspect. In practice, the
terminology takes a different form which depends on whether
the source of the evidence is known or not known. A distinction
is also drawn between evidential material and the evidence for
evaluation. Evidence for evaluation is the observations made on
thematerial. Only evidence which is in the form ofmeasurements
and thus represented by continuous data is considered here.
Other factors such as the locations in which the material was
found and the quantity of the material are not considered.
Evidence of a discrete nature such as binary data as in the
presence or absence of striation marks is also not considered.
Evidence whose source is known is called control evidence Ec.
Evidence whose source is not known is called recovered evidence
Er . Measurements on Ec are conventionally denoted x where
x = (x1, . . . , xm) are m sets of measurements and where xi, i =
1, . . . ,mmay be univariate or multivariate. Measurements on Er
are conventionally denoted y where y = (y1, . . . , yn) are n sets
of measurements and where yj, j = 1, . . . , nmay be univariate or
multivariate 3.
For an evaluative comparison of x and y, background data z
are needed. These background data should be a representative
sample of all possible sources from the population of interest,
known as the relevant population. Ideally, the sample should be
a random sample but this is rarely possible for practical reasons.
The sample is often what might be called a convenience sample.
If the convenience sample can be demonstrated to be composed
of sources chosen in a manner independent of the case under
investigation then the inference based on the comparison of x and
y informed on z should be valid. Computation of the likelihood
ratio requires data files from x, y and z.
One example of evidence in the form of multivariate data
relates to glass elemental content. Such data are often subjected
to a logarithmic transformation after taking the ratios of a
particular elemental content to the oxygen content, for example,
log10(NaO) = log10(Na/O). These measurements can be for
each of m fragments of control evidence and for each of n
fragments of recovered evidence (Zadora et al., 2014). This
evidence can be multivariate as there can be several ratios
measured for each fragment, e.g., log10(NaO), log10(MgO) and
log10(AlO). The control evidence is the measurements from a
number m of fragments of glass from a broken window at a
crime scene; the source of the fragments is known to be the
window, items within source are the fragments. The recovered
3The use of x and y here is not to be confused with the use of x = Pr(E | Hp) and
y = Pr(E | Hd) in section 2.2.
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evidence is the measurements from a number n of fragments of
glass found in association with a suspect, for example on clothing
identified as theirs. The source of the fragments of glass from
the suspect is unknown. It may or may not have come from
the window at the crime scene. A second example could be the
measurements of color chromaticity coordinates on fibers and
the evidence is bivariate (Martyna et al., 2013). There are three
color chromaticity coordinates. The sum of their values is fixed
so given the values of any two, the third is known. Control
evidence is the measurements of color chromaticity coordinates
from a number m of fibers from an article of clothing belonging
to a suspect; the source is the article, the items are the fibers.
Recovered evidence is the measurements of color chromaticity
coordinates from a number n of fibers found at a crime scene.
Thus control evidence may be found at a crime scene or in
association with a suspect. Similarly, recovered evidence may be
found at a crime scene or in association with a suspect.
Often the number m of control items can be chosen by
the investigator. The number n of recovered items may be
determined by what is available and the investigator has little
choice in the selection of this number. If the number of recovered
items is large, in some sense, and perhaps so large as for it to be
impractical to count or analyse them, then the investigator may
decide to select n items where n is less than the number available.
Procedures for the choice of n and the manner of selection of the
items are not discussed in this document or SAILR other than
to note that the evidence selected should be representative of the
total evidence available as far as is possible. Further information
is available in Aitken and Taroni (2004) and references therein.
The likelihood ratio V for the comparison of {x, y} where E is
replaced by {x, y} is then
V =
Pr(x, y | Hp)
Pr(x, y | Hd)
, (5)
where again the conditioning on I, the background information,
has been omitted for clarity of notation.
Often, the propositions being considered are Hp that the
control and recovered evidence are from the same source and
Hd that the control and recovered evidence are from different
sources. In such a circumstance, x and y may be assumed
independent if Hd is true as they come from different sources.
Then Equation (5) may be written as
V =
Pr(x, y | Hp)
Pr(x | Hd) Pr(y | Hd)
. (6)
If x and y are continuous data, as is the case when the evidence is
in the form of measurements rather than counts, the probabilities
in the numerator and denominator are replaced by probability
density functions, denoted say f (x, y) for the joint density and
f (x) and f (y) for the marginal distributions. The continuous
analog of Equation (6) can then be written as
V =
f (x, y | Hp)
f (x | Hd)f (y | Hd)
. (7)
In most cases, the full specification of the probability density
function is unknown. The form of the distribution may be
known or a reasonable assumption of its form may be made. For
example, it may be known or can be assumed that the appropriate
distribution is a Normal distribution. This assumption may be
based on the unimodal, symmetric nature of the distribution.
If the distribution has a positive skew then a transformation to
normality with a logarithmic transformation of the data may be
possible before consideration of the likelihood ratio. However,
the parameters may neither be known nor able to be assumed
known.
The numerator of Equation (7) may be written as f (x, y |
Hp) = f (y | x) | Hp)f (x | Hp). Since the distribution of x is
independent of whether Hp or Hd is true, f (x | Hp) = f (x | Hd)
and Equation (7) may be written as
f (y | x,Hp)/f (y | Hd).
See Equation (18) in Appendix for an example.
2.5. Training Data
When parameters are not known, information about their
possible values may be obtained from data independent of
the crime but thought to be relevant for consideration of the
variability in the measurements of the data comprising the
evidence. These data are the training data or background data
and are conventionally denoted z. These data are considered to
be a sample from a population, known as a relevant population.
There is considerable continuing debate as to how to choose
a population that is relevant for a particular crime and,
once chosen, how a sample may be chosen from it to be a
representative sample of the population. See, for example, R. v.
T [2010] EWCA 2439, where the debate related to the choice of
populations of shoes relevant for the consideration of evidence
of shoeprints. Often the sample is a convenience sample; see
section 2.4.
An alternative procedure would be to sample anew
each time from a population deemed relevant to the case
under investigation. A relatively early example of this is the
investigation of a murder in Biggar, a town near Edinburgh,
in 1967. A bite mark found on the breast of a young girl who
had been murdered had certain characteristic marks, indicative
of the conformation of the teeth of the person who had bitten
her. A 17-year-old boy was found with this conformation and
he became a suspect. Examination of 90 other boys of the
suspect’s age showed that the particular conformation was
not at all common. The 90 other boys could be considered
as a sample from a relevant population. Further details are
available in Harvey et al. (1968). However, in most individual
investigations it is not practical to obtain such a bespoke relevant
population.
2.6. Hierarchy of Evidence
Often, with measurements, the training data can be thought of
as a set of sources of items. Measurements are made of one or
more characteristics of the items. For example, consider again
the composition of the elemental ratio of various elements of
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glass to oxygen for glass fragments from a set of windows. The
items are glass fragments. A source would be a window. The
training set is a set of windows. The set of windows is a sample
from some population of windows, deemed relevant for crimes
involving windows. The measurements are said to be hierarchical
with two levels. One level is the fragment of glass within a
window. Variation amongst measurements of fragments within a
window is known as within-group or within-source variation. The
second level is the window. Variation amongst measurements
between windows is known as between-group or between-source
variation. Measurements are taken from an item (fragments of
glass) within a source (window). Notationally, the training data
z has two indices, one for each level and may be represented as
z = {zkℓ; k = 1, . . . , g, ℓ = 1, . . . , h} where g is the number of
sources in the training set and h is the number of measurements
within sources. The number of measurements within sources
need not necessarily be constant though it is computationally
convenient if this can be arranged during the compilation of the
training set. Occasionally there may be further levels, for example
measurement error.
2.7. Propositions
As well as evidence (E) and background information I, evidence
evaluation depends on propositions Hp and Hd. There are
different types of propositions, also known as levels. Both
propositions (Hp and Hd) in any particular situation for the
evaluation of evidence are at the same level. There are four
different levels of propositions, known respectively as offense
level, activity level, source level and sub-source level (Cook et al.,
1998a; Evett et al., 2000).
The levels, with examples, are described as follows.
• Offense level: the propositions may be that the defendant is
guilty of an offense (truly guilty, not just declared guilty)
and that the defendant is innocent (truly innocent, not just
declared not guilty).
• Activity level: the propositions concern an activity by the
defendant which may or may not be a criminal act. An
example of a pair of activity level propositions could be that
the defendant hit the victim and that the defendant did not hit
the victim.
• Source level: the propositions concern the source of evidential
material. There is no consideration of the activity that may
have led to the material being where it was found. An example
of a pair of source level propositions could be that blood
found at the scene of a crime came from the defendant and
that the blood found at the scene of the crime came from
some other source, unrelated to the defendant. Note that
this example is one in which the two propositions are not
exhaustive; relatives of the defendant are not included. SAILR
can only be used for likelihood ratio computation on source
level.
• Sub-source level: the propositions concern material for which
it is not possible to identify a source. An example of a pair of
sub-source level propositions could be that DNA found at a
crime scene came from the defendant and that DNA found at
the crime scene came from some other source, unrelated to
the defendant. The quantity of material found is insufficient to
identify its source, e.g., whether it came from blood or semen.
3. FRAMEWORK FOR MODELS
The likelihood ratio may be used in the context of forensic
science in two different ways, that of comparison and that
of discrimination. For comparison, two pieces of evidence
found in different places are compared to see if they had a
common source. For discrimination, one piece of evidence is
compared with several sets of training or background data from
different sources to see from which source the evidence may
have come.
Most of the models described here are so-called feature-based
models. These are models developed from the measurements
(features) on the evidential material. Other models described
are so-called score-based models. There may be occasions with
multivariate data when a feature-based model is not tractable,
e.g., multidimensional binary data where the number of possible
models is unmanageable. On such occasions, the distance,
denoted d(x, y), between control (x) and recovered (y) data can
be used instead.
3.1. Comparison for Feature-Based Models
3.1.1. The Likelihood Ratio Approach for Continuous
Univariate Evidential Data With Normal Distributions
for the Means and Known Variances
A common problem occurs in forensic science when the
prosecution and defense propositions concern whether two
objects are from the same source or from different sources.
For example, if a glass fragment is found on a suspect and
there is a broken window at the crime scene, one proposition
might be that the glass fragment found on the suspect came
from the window at the crime scene, and the other proposition
might be that the glass fragment came from some other window.
The evidence is given by a set of measurements from the glass
fragment found on the suspect (the recovered sample) and a
set of measurements from one or more glass fragments from
the crime scene (the control sample). The problem is one of
comparison.
The structure of these models reflects the hierarchical nature
of the underlying data (measurements and variation within a
source and then variation between sources). Using a distribution
for the means θ1 and θ2 in this way accounts for variance within
source (σ 2) and variance between sources (τ 2).
The problem for the fact-finder is to determine which
of the two propositions (Hp or Hd) is more likely, given
all of the evidence in the case. Denote the other evidence
and background information by I as before. The fact-finder
can consider which proposition is more likely by considering
the relative size of the two probabilities Pr(Hp | x̄, ȳ, I) and
Pr(Hd | x̄, ȳ, I) (technically, in cases where the statistical
assumptions include knowledge of the variances σ 2 and τ 2
and of a Normal distribution for the measurements, the means
of the control and recovered samples are sufficient statistics
so can be used in place of the measurements x and y). Let
f (x̄, ȳ | Hp, I) be the joint probability density function of x̄
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and ȳ, given proposition Hp and I and let f (x̄, ȳ | Hd, I)
be the joint probability density function of x̄ and ȳ given
proposition Hd and I. In this context Equation (1) may be
represented as
P(Hp | x̄, ȳ, I)
P(Hd | x̄, ȳ, I)
=
f (x̄, ȳ | Hp, I)
f (x̄, ȳ | Hd, I)
×
P(Hp | I)
P(Hd | I)
, (8)
where E is replaced by (x̄, ȳ). For examples where the within-
source variance is not known, the sample variances of x and y
will also be included in the representation.
Denote the common mean of the measurements under the
prosecution proposition by θ1 = θ2 = θ . The likelihood ratio
V is given by Equation (7). This may be rewritten as
V =
∫
f (x̄ | θ)f (ȳ | θ)f (θ)dθ
∫
f (x̄ | θ1)f (θ1)dθ1
∫
f (ȳ | θ2)f (θ2)dθ2
, (9)
where the dependence on I has been suppressed for ease of
notation. The analytical form of this likelihood ratio, given
the independence and Normality assumptions detailed above,
is given by Lindley (1977). The density functions f (x̄ | θ) and
f (ȳ | θ) are taken to be density functions of a Normal distribution.
Note that when the prosecution proposition is chosen the
random variables X̄ and Ȳ , of which x̄ and ȳ are realizations,
are conditionally independent, conditional on θ . They are
independent if it is known they are from the same source.
The distributions associated with these density functions are
termed the within-source distributions, because they account
for the within-source variability. The distribution associated
with the density function f (θ) is termed the between-source
distribution because it accounts for between-source variability,
and it is a prior distribution for θ . The use of a between-source
distribution allows the rarity of the data x and y to be taken
into account when assessing the strength of the evidence; see
Equation (13) in the Appendix for an example. Information to
assist with the estimation of the prior distribution is contained
in the training set. If the control and recovered samples have
similar means, and the mean is unusual, then the strength of
evidence supporting the proposition that the samples are from
the same source should be stronger than if the mean is relatively
common.
A solution to this problem of the comparison of sources in
the case where the measurements are univariate and are assumed
to be independent and Normally distributed was developed
by Lindley (1977). Some details are given in the Appendix;
see Equations (12) and (13) in the Appendix. Denote the m
measurements on the control sample by x = (x1, . . . , xm) and
the nmeasurements on the recovered sample by y = (y1, . . . yn).
The corresponding means of each of these samples are denoted
x̄ and ȳ. The two propositions to be considered are at the source
level and are:
• Hp: the control and recovered sample are from the same
source.
• Hd: the control and recovered sample are from different
sources.
Lindley’s solution assumes that the means x̄ and ȳ of the
control and recovered samples are sample means of data, whose
corresponding random variables have Normal distributions with
means θ1 (control) and θ2 (recovered), respectively, and variances
σ 2/m (control) and σ 2/n (recovered). The variance σ 2 is a
within-group (e.g., within window) variance. The means θ1 and
θ2 are the means of the groups associated with x and y in the
terminology of hierarchical data. Variability between groups has
also to be considered. This is done with consideration of the
variation in the group means. The two means θ1 and θ2 are
also assumed to be realizations of a random variable which
is Normally distributed, this time with mean µ and variance
τ 2. At present the variances σ 2 and τ 2 are assumed known.
Also, the within-group variance σ 2 is assumed constant within
groups. An expression for the likelihood ratio if the between-
group distribution is not Normal but is represented with a
general distribution p(·), with second derivative p′′(·) is given by
Equation (14) in Appendix.
An extension using kernel density estimation has been derived
to allow for a general non-Normal between-group distribution
Equation (15) in Appendix. Checks of the distributional
assumptions and estimation of hyperparameters aremade using a
training set of groups which are assumed to be a random sample
of groups (sources) from some relevant population. Later work
(e.g., Bozza et al., 2008 with an extension to multivariate data,
Equation 24 in Appendix) relaxes the assumption that σ 2 and τ 2
are known.
The likelihood ratio can be used to assess evidence in a
criminal trial and hence is a solution to the comparison of sources
problem; Lindley (1977).
This approach for evidence evaluation based on the likelihood
ratio is different from an approach based on hypothesis testing.
The likelihood ratio approach has many advantages; a discussion
of these can be seen in Aitken and Stoney (1991) and Aitken
and Taroni (2004). One such advantage is that the likelihood
ratio has no dependence on an arbitrary cut off point ( e.g., 5%
significance). Another advantage is that the use of a likelihood
ratio reduces the risk that a transposition of the conditional
probabilities (also known as the prosecutor’s fallacy) occurs,
a transposition which confuses the probability of finding the
evidence on an innocent person with the probability of the
innocence of a person on whom the evidence has been found.
In addition, the likelihood ratio provides a method of comparing
the likelihood of the evidence under the propositions of both
the prosecution and the defense. This guards against potentially
misleading situations when the likelihood under only one of
these propositions is considered. Finally, an approach based
on the likelihood ratio ensures equality of treatment of both
propositions. In a procedure based on hypothesis testing, a null
hypothesis is assumed true unless sufficient evidence is found
to reject it at a pre-specified significance level. Often, the null
hypothesis is that of a common source, θ1 = θ2 in Lindley’s
example. This is the prosecution proposition. Thus the burden of
proof is placed on the defense to put forward sufficient evidence
to enable rejection of the prosecution proposition, contrary to
the dictum of “proof beyond reasonable doubt.” The prosecution
need prove nothing.
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3.1.2. The Likelihood Ratio Approach for Other Forms
of Continuous Evidential Data, Including Multivariate
Data
Later work on evidence evaluation has extended the work done
in Lindley (1977) to cover other data types, allowing for different
forms of the within and between source distributions (Aitken and
Lucy, 2004; Aitken et al., 2006, 2007a). In Bozza et al. (2008) and
Alberink et al. (2013), extensions are given so that the between-
source distribution in Equation (9) becomes a function of both
the mean and the variance. This allows for variation in the
variance of samples from different sources. All of these extensions
assume that themmeasurements x are independent and that the
n measurements y are independent. Methods for autocorrelated
data types, such as measurements associated with drug traces on
banknotes are described in Wilson et al. (2014, 2015).
For multivariate measurements which are independent and
which have a multivariate Normal distribution the analytical
form is derived in Aitken and Lucy (2004). The likelihood ratio
is given for two forms of the distribution of the mean between
sources. The first form assumes multivariate Normality, and the
second form uses nonparametric kernel density estimation. The
within-source variance is assumed constant over all sources.
When there are several variables graphical models may be
used to reduce the number of parameters needing to be estimated.
The kernel density approach given in Aitken and Lucy (2004)
can then be used to calculate likelihood ratios for the subsets
of variables as indicated by the graphical models. The graphical
model considers partial correlations amongst the variables and
partitions these variables into overlapping subsets known as
cliques. The overall distribution may then be represented as
a function of the distributions over the cliques. These clique
distributions have very few variables each (e.g., one, two or three;
and the overall likelihood ratio is then a product of likelihood
ratios which are based on one-, two- or three-dimensional data
Aitken et al., 2007). Such a process for the reduction of dimension
is necessary to avoid the curse of dimensionality whereby very
large data sets are needed for the estimation of parameters in a
multi-dimensional parameter set.
In Aitken et al. (2006) themultivariatemethods used in Aitken
and Lucy (2004) assuming Normality are extended further to
allow for another level of variance (e.g., measurement error) to be
taken into account, giving a three-level model. Amodel assuming
an exponential distribution for between-sources in a three-level
model is assumed in Aitken et al. (2007a) and the analytical form
of the likelihood ratio is derived. Variation between the means
of samples from different sources, variation between the means
of different samples taken from the same source and variation
within repeatedmeasurements on the same sample are taken into
account.
Relaxation of the assumption that samples from different
sources will have the same variance means that an analytical
solution is not available. Measurements are assumed multivariate
and independently Normally distributed as before but the
between-source (prior) distribution is taken to be the product of
a multivariate Normal distribution (for the mean of the between-
source distribution) and an inverse Wishart distribution (for
the covariance of the between-source distribution). In this way,
variation of covariances, as well as means, between different
sources is taken into account. An analytical form of the likelihood
ratio is not available so Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
methods are used to estimate it (Bozza et al., 2008) (Equation 24
in the Appendix).
A similar approach to Bozza et al. (2008) for the evaluation
of the likelihood ratio for the comparison of sources problem is
used by Alberink et al. (2013) in that variation in the variance
parameter between sources is modeled as well as variation in
the mean parameter, although in Alberink et al. (2013) the data
are univariate. As with all of the other approaches discussed, the
within-source distribution is Normal, and the data are assumed
independent. There are two main extensions seen in Alberink
et al. (2013). The first is that three different distributions are
used for the between-source distribution. One is the univariate
equivalent of the between-source distribution used in Bozza
et al. (2008) (a semi-conjugate prior), one is a non-informative
prior, proportional to the inverse of the variance, and one is
the conjugate prior distribution seen on p. 74 of Gelman et al.
(2004). This conjugate prior distribution gives a between-source
distribution for the parameter (µ, σ 2), denoting group mean and
variance, of
µ ∼ N(µ0, σ
2/κ0)
σ 2 ∼ Inv-χ2(ν0, σ
2
0 )
where µ0, κ0, ν0 and σ
2
0 are hyperparameters to be estimated and
the notation Inv-χ2 corresponds to a scaled inverse chi-squared
distribution. The difference between this and the univariate
equivalent of the between-source distribution used in Bozza et al.
(2008) is that the variance of the parameter µ is proportional
to σ 2. An analytical form of the likelihood ratio for the two
cases when the between-source distribution is given by the non-
informative prior and when the between-source distribution is
given by the conjugate prior (Alberink et al., 2013) who also show
that no analytic solution exists if a semi-conjugate prior is used.
(See Equations (16,17) in the Appendix.)
As in Bozza et al. (2008), Alberink et al. (2013) use MCMC
methods to evaluate the likelihood ratio when the between-
source distribution is given by the semi-conjugate prior, although
there are differences in the implementation, leading to the second
main extension. Alberink et al. (2013) use prior distributions on
the hyperparameters of the between-source distribution and then
combine these prior distributions with training data to obtain a
posterior distribution for the hyperparameters, conditional on
the training data. All of the other methods discussed estimate
the parameters of the between-source distribution directly from
the training data using summary statistics. The methods used
in Alberink et al. (2013) allow for a Bayesian approach for the
estimation of the between-source distribution. One disadvantage
of this approach is that the method for estimating the likelihood
ratio used in Bozza et al. (2008) is no longer feasible because,
instead of having a known analytic form for the between-source
density function, draws from the between-source distribution are
obtained usingMCMCmethods. Monte Carlo integration is used
by Alberink et al. (2013) to estimate the likelihood ratio.
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All of the literature discussed in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2
evaluates likelihood ratios for continuous evidential data. There
are some common assumptions. All assume that measurements
are independent and that the within-source distribution is
Normal (univariate or multivariate). Constant variation between
sources of the within-source distribution is assumed by Lindley
(1977), Aitken and Lucy (2004), Aitken et al. (2007) and Aitken
et al. (2006). This assumption is relaxed by Bozza et al. (2008)
and Alberink et al. (2013), allowing the variance to vary between
sources. A Bayesian approach is used by Alberink et al. (2013) to
obtain the parameters of the between-source distribution.
Methods for the evaluation of continuous, autocorrelated
data are described in Wilson et al. (2014) and Wilson et al.
(2015). The data used for illustration are the quantities of drugs
on banknotes where quantities on adjacent notes cannot be
considered independent. Some work has also been done on the
evaluation of evidence for discrete data, particularly in the field
of DNA profiling (Buckleton et al., 2005) and more recently
on data relating to clicks in speech (Aitken and Gold, 2013)
and the presence or absence (binary data) of striation marks for
screwdrivers (Aitken and Huang, 2015).
3.2. Discrimination
Forensic scientists are not only interested in comparisons of two
pieces of evidence, such as control and recovered evidence, under
different propositions, that of same source vs. that of different
source, without attention being paid to the identity of the source.
There is also interest in the source of one piece of evidence.
The support of the evidence for a proposition of source is of
interest. The problem concerns the determination of whether a
sample of data is more likely to be from one population (source)
or another. Of course, such a determination is the concern of
the fact-finder. The scientist is concerned with the probability
of the measurements on the evidential material if the material
came from one source or if it came from another. If there are
more than two possible sources, then prior probabilities, that
is, probabilities for each source under consideration before the
material is examined, are needed in order to obtain a likelihood
ratio. In this problem there is only one set of evidential data
compared with the two sets (control and recovered) in the
comparison problem. The aim is to assist the decision-maker
as to the population of origin of the evidential data. This is
a problem of discrimination, as distinct from a problem of
comparison.
An example of the use of likelihood ratios in a problem of
this sort can be seen in Zadora et al. (2010) which looks at the
discrimination of glass samples and in Wilson et al. (2014, 2015)
which considers discrimination between banknotes assocated
with a person associated with criminal activity and banknotes
associated with a person not associated with criminal activity. As
with the problem of comparison of sources, the likelihood ratio
alone cannot determine whether a set of data is more likely from
one population or another; it must be considered in conjunction
with the prior odds. The derivation of the likelihood ratio for
such discrimination problems is discussed in Taroni et al. (2010)
(Chapter 8). The likelihood ratio for a set of evidence consisting
of nmeasurements, z = (z1, . . . , zn), under two propositions, Hp
and Hd, is considered.
4 The two propositions are given by
• Hp : data z are from population 1, and
• Hd : data z are from population 2.
The likelihood ratio V for the discrimination problem, where
I is the background information as usual, is given in Taroni et al.
(2010) by
V =
f (z | Hp, I)
f (z | Hd, I)
. (10)
This expression can be compared with Equation (7) and the
comparison problem. In the comparison context, the joint
density function of control and recovered data is considered.
In the discrimination problem, two (or more) possible sources
(populations) are identified.
Assume as for the comparison problem that the data are
hierarchical and that there are two possible sources. The
probability density function of groups of data from source i is
parameterized by θi, i = 1, 2 (possibly multivariate). If the value
of θi (for i ∈ {1, 2}) varies between different groups in population
i then by conditioning on θ1 in the numerator and θ2 in the
denominator, the likelihood ratio V can be written
V =
∫
f (z | θ1)f (θ1)dθ1
∫
f (z | θ2)f (θ2)dθ2
. (11)
The probability density function f (θi) models the variability of
the parameter θi between groups in population i, and is termed
the between-group density function (the associated distribution
function will be termed the between-group distribution
function). This is analogous to the between-source distribution
used to model variability between sources in the comparison
of sources problem. Similarly, the density function f (z | θi) is
termed the within-group density function (with the associated
distribution function termed the within-group distribution
function).
Using this formulation for the likelihood ratio, the methods
discussed previously for the evaluation of the likelihood ratio for
the comparison of sources problem can be adapted to evaluate the
value of evidence for discrimination problems. The limitations
and assumptions of these methods still apply.
In the context of discrimination, training data are a random
sample of groups from each or both of the sources. Variation
is between groups within each of the sources. There is an
abuse of terminology here. In the comparison problem with
the proposition of common source, the control and recovered
evidence are deemed to be from the same source but without
specification of the source. The source is a member of a
population of sources. In the discrimination problem, support
for a particular source is assessed. The distinction between
comparison and discrimination problems is emphasized in
Zadora et al. (2014) where the two problems are discussed in
4Note the change of use of notation. In this section, z refers to evidential data and
not to training data.
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different chapters (and note that discrimination is there noted as
classification).
3.3. Score-Based Models
Return now to consideration of the problem of comparison
of sources with a p-dimensional control measurement x =
(x1, . . . , xp) and a p-dimensional recovered measurement y =
(y1, . . . , yp). For those occasions when a feature-based model is
not tractable (e.g., multidimensional binary data), the distance
d(x, y), known as a score can be used instead. The value of the
evidence is then
V =
f (d(x, y) | Hp, I)
f (d(x, y) | Hd, I)
.
Rarity is not considered. Inference may then continue as before
but using the score, which is univariate, as the statistic of interest.
Score-based approaches estimate the probability distribution
function of a calculated score. Score-based approaches have
been used for handwriting (Hepler et al., 2012) and speech
recognition (Brümmer and Du Preez, 2006; Gonzalez-Rodriguez
et al., 2006; Morrison, 2011). Score-basedmethods do not require
the distributional assumptions (such as within-source Normality)
needed to fit the models described above but do still require
a function to be chosen to model the probability distribution
function of the score.
There are various distance measures that may be used. Three
examples are
• Euclidean: d =
√
∑p
i=1(xi − yi)
2;
• Manhattan: d =
∑p
i=1 | xi − yi |;
• Pearson correlation distance: 100(1− r)/2 with
r =
∑p
i=1(xi − x̄)(yi − ȳ)
√
∑p
i=1(xi − x̄)
2
∑p
i=1(yi − ȳ)
2
.
Other examples are available in SAILR. For multiple control and
recovered data xi, i = 1, . . . ,m and yi, i = 1, . . . , n, respectively,
pairwise score measurements or means can be used.
For the calculation of score-based likelihood ratios,
distributions of scores of same-source comparisons and of
different-source comparisons are required. Determination of
the same-source distribution can be made by comparing every
measurement in a training set z with every other measurement
within its own source except with itself for which the distance is
zero. For the different-source distribution, every measurement
is compared with all measurements from other sources. These
results may then be used to estimate the distributions of same-
source and between-source comparisons. The distributions
can be represented initially by histograms. They may then be
smoothed with a kernel density estimation or an appropriate
parametric distribution. The current choice of parametric
distribution in SAILR is a Gamma distribution or a Weibull
distribution. The chosen distribution functions, one for same-
source comparisons and one for different-source comparisons,
then can be used to determine the density calculation of the
evidence score for both distributions and hence calculate a
likelihood ratio.
3.4. Comparison of Feature-Based and
Score-Based Models
Models for discrimination and for comparison that use
the original data are feature-based models. The models
discussed in sections 3.1 and 3.2 are all feature-based. Feature-
based multivariate Normal models compare the probability of
observing the evidence given that the evidential samples (control
and recovered) measured, and compared, come from the same
source or come from different sources. In contrast, the score-
based model compares the probability of observing the pairwise
similarity between two samples (control and recovered) given
that they come from the same source with the probability
of the pairwise similarity given that the samples come from
different sources. A comparison of the performances of score-
based and frequency-based likelihood ratios for forensic MDMA
comparisons is given in Bolck et al. (2015).
The benefits and shortcomings of both methods are given by
Bolck et al. (2015) as:
• Feature-based benefits:
– Original data dimensionality preserved; no information
loss.
– Rarity and similarity of the features relate directly to the
magnitude of the likelihood ratio.
• Feature-based shortcomings:
– Covariance estimation is difficult when limited data are
available relative to the dimensionality of the variables.
– The feature-based method is often less robust than the
score-based model when there are limited population
samples.
• Score-based benefits:
– Covariance estimation between sources is possible with few
samples available.
– The method is robust and able to be generalized to new
samples.
• Score-based shortcomings:
– There is a loss of information because of a reduction of
dimensionality.
– The value of the likelihood ratio is based on the similarity
of pairwise scores rather than the similarity and rarity of
features.
3.5. Summary of Feature-Based Models
References for details of a selection of feature-based two-
level models with within-group measurements independent and
Normally distributed are listed here. Equation numbers are given
for models for which further details are given in the Appendix.
• Univariate:
– Within-group Normal,
Between-group Normal for between-group mean (assume
within-group variance known)
(Lindley, 1977, see Equations 12, 13 in the Appendix).
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– Within-group Normal,
Between-group Taylor expansion for between-group mean
(assume within-group variance known)
(Lindley, 1977, see Equation 14 in the Appendix).
– Within-group Normal,
Between-group kernel for between-group mean (assume
within-group variance known),
(Aitken and Taroni, 2004, see Equation 14 in the Appendix).
– Within-group Normal,
Between-group distribution:
(a) Normal distribution - semi-conjugate prior,
(b) Non-informative prior, proportional to the inverse of
the variance,
(c) Conjugate prior - Normal, scaled inverse chi-squared
(Alberink et al., 2013, see Equations 15, 16 in the Appendix).
• Bivariate:
Numerator (predictive distribution) (Bernardo and Smith,
1994),
Denominator (kernel),
(Evett et al., 1987, see Equation 18 in the Appendix).
• Multivariate, within-group measurements independent and
Normally distributed
– Within-group Normal,
Between-group kernel for distribution of group means,
Within-group variance assumed common and estimated
from training data, (Aitken and Lucy, 2004, 4.1, see
Equation 19 in the Appendix).
– Within-group Normal
Between-group Normal for distribution of group means,
Inverse Wishart for the covariance of within-source
distribution, (Bozza et al., 2008, see Equation 24 in the
Appendix).
– With graphical models:
See section 3.1.1; Aitken et al. (2007).
– In the presence of zeros, that is when no measurement of a
specific characteristic has been made on certain members
of the control data set, the recovered data set or the
training data set: both Normal and kernel between-group
distributions considered. Estimation of covariance matrices
by imputation and by available cases (Zadora et al., 2010).
– In addition, when within-group measurements are
autocorrelated and Normally distributed (see Wilson et al.,
2014, 2015).
4. MODEL PERFORMANCE
Model performance for the comparison problem is assessed with
a training set and associated data z as discussed in section 2.6.
If possible, another set, known as a validation set could be
used. The training set and validation set should both comprise
several sources of data from a relevant population. Within each
source, measurements are taken on each of several items. The
source of each member of the two sets is known. Models and
parameters can be fitted using the training set. The performance
can be assessed using the validation set. Thus when a method for
comparison or discrimination is tested usingmembers of the data
set it is known if the correct answer is given. In the absence of a
validation set, the performance can be assessed through a second
use of the training set (e.g., with a leaving-one-out method).
Validation enables the provision of measures of performance
based on calculated likelihood ratios.
For a comparison of two members of the validation (or
training) set a likelihood ratio is calculated. There are two
conclusions that may be drawn by the fact-finder: they are from
the same source or they are not from the same source. If the
likelihood ratio is greater than 1, then this is support for the
proposition of a common source for the two members of the
validation (training) set being compared. If they are truly from
the same source then this is counted as a correct result. Similarly,
if its value is less than 1, then this is support for the proposition of
different sources for the two members of the validation (training)
set being compared. If they are truly from different sources then
this is counted as a correct result. However, if the two members
have a value for the likelihood ratio of greater than 1 when they
are from different sources, this is an incorrect result and the result
is known as a false positive. Similarly, if the two members have a
value for the likelihood ratio of less than 1 when they are from the
same source, this is an incorrect result and the result is known as
a false negative.
For discrimination with two groups, say A and B, the member
of the data set may be classified by the fact-finder as belonging
to group A or to group B. False positives and false negatives
can be defined in a manner analogous to that of the comparison
procedure. A likelihood ratio is calculated. If its value is greater
than 1, then this is support for the proposition that the member
of the training set belongs to group A, say. If the member is truly
from group A then this is counted as a correct result. Similarly, if
its value is less than 1, then this is support for the proposition that
the member is from group B. If it is truly from group B, then this
is counted as a correct result. However, if the member has a value
for the likelihood ratio of greater than 1 when it is from group
B, this is an incorrect result and the result is a false positive, say.
Similarly, if the member has a value for the likelihood ratio of less
than 1 when it is from group A, this is an incorrect result and the
result is a false negative.
For both comparison and discrimination problems, the
strength of the support is measured by the value of the likelihood
ratio. As noted in section 2.3 if the logarithm is taken this
is known as the weight of evidence. Given the existence of a
validation (training) set it is possible to measure the performance
of a method for comparison or discrimination as the correct
answer is known. It is not possible to assess the result in an
individual case; the correct answer in an individual case is not
known.
The likelihood ratio, or a function of it such as the logarithm,
has been shown byGood, 1989a,b (section 2.2) to provide the best
(only) value of the evidence. Attempts to express the uncertainty
associated with this assessment (e.g. with a confidence interval)
are attempts to put a probability on a probability and should
not be done (Taroni et al., 2016). This view is not universally
agreed, see discussion issues of Law, Probability and Risk (2016,
volume 15, issue 1) and Science and Justice (2017, volume 56).
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Note also the quote from Kaye (1979) in section 2: “It thus
supplies the jurors with as precise and accurate an illustration of
the probative force of the quantitative data as the mathematical
theory of probability can provide”. It is not necessary to provide
an interval estimate.
There are several measures of performance.
• The percentage of false positives and of false negatives amongst
all the comparisons or discriminations tested. Often, in a
criminal case, one of the propositions is associated with the
prosecution, hence the notation Hp, and other is associated
with the defense, with the notationHd. In such a circumstance,
the burden of proof lies with the prosecution. It is a more
serious error to support the prosecution proposition wrongly
than to support the defense proposition wrongly. Let support
for the prosecution proposition be known as a positive result.
Thus, when considering the performance of a test, it is better
to choose a test in which there is a low false positive rate and
a high false negative rate rather than one in which there is a
high false positive rate and low false negative rate. Ideally, zero
false positive and zero false negative results are best but such
an ideal is rarely achieved.
• A Tippett plot. See Evett and Buckleton (1996) and Tippett
et al. (1968). This is a graphical measure of rates of
misleading evidence for comparisons. It is the complement of
empirical cumulative distribution functions for same-source
and different-source comparisons. The plots come in pairs,
one for same-source comparisons and one for different-source
comparisons. The log(LR) is plotted on the x-axis and, for a
particular value x0 of the log(LR), the y-axis is the relative
frequency of the number of comparisons greater than x0. For
same-source comparisons, it is to be hoped that all log(LR)
values are greater than 0. Thus for x < 0, it is hoped
the corresponding value on the y-axis will be 1 (or 100%).
Similarly, for different-source comparisons, it is to be hoped
that all log(LR) values are less than 0. Thus for x > 0, it is
hoped the corresponding value on the y-axis will be 0 (or 0%).
The vertical distance from the intersection of the same-
source plot with the line log(LR) = 0 and the line y =
1(100%) is the rate of misleading evidence for same-source
comparisons, the proportion of same-source comparisons that
have a value of log(LR) < 0 (LR = 1). The vertical distance
from the intersection of the different-source plot with the line
log(LR) = 0 and the line y = 0(0%) is the rate of misleading
evidence for different-source comparisons, the proportion of
different-source comparisons that have a value of log(LR) >
0 (LR = 1).
• Detection error trade-off (DET) curves. See Meuwly et al.
(2017). A detection error trade-off (DET) plot is a 2-
dimensional graphical representation in which the proportion
of false positives is plotted as a function of the proportion of
false negatives. The closer the curves to the coordinate origin,
the better are the discriminating capabilities of the method.
The intersection of a DET curve with the main diagonal of the
DET plot marks the Equal Error Rate (EER) which is the point
when the proportions of false positives and false negatives are
equal.
• Empirical cross-entropy. See Meuwly et al. (2017), Ramos et al.
(2013) and Ramos and Gonzalez-Rodriguez (2013).
The performance of probabilistic assessments has been
addressed by strictly proper scoring rules (SPSR). Consider two
propositions about a parameter θ , one that θ = θp and one
that θ = θd, with Pr(θ = θp) = 1 − Pr(θ = θd) For evidence
evaluation, the logarithmic SPSR is used and defined as
C(Pr(θp | I), θ) = − log2(Pr(θp | I)) if θ = θp,
= − log2(1− Pr(θd | I)) if θ = θd,
The measure of accuracy for evidence evaluation based on the
SPSR is a weighted average value of the logarithmic scoring
rule, and is known as the empirical cross-entropy (ECE):
ECE = −
Pr(θp | I)
Np
∑
θ(i)=θp
log2 Pr(θp | Ei, I)
−
Pr(θd | I)
Nd
∑
θ(j)=θd
log2 Pr(θd | Ej, I)
=
Pr(θp | I)
Np
∑
θ(i)=θp
log2
(
1+
1
LRi × O(θp)
)
+
Pr(θd | I)
Nd
∑
θ(j)=θd
log2
(
1+ LRj × O(θp)
)
,
where LRi(LRj) is the likelihood ratio for the i-th (j-th)Ei (Ej)
piece of evidence where θ = θi(θj), respectively, and O(θp)
denotes the prior odds Pr(Hp)/Pr(Hd). For the discrimination
problem with two sources, the parameters θp and θd represent
the parameters of the two sources. For the comparison
problem θp represents same-source comparisons and θd
represents different-source comparisons in the validation
dataset.
This measure tends to indicate better performance when
the likelihood ratio leads to the correct decision. The
numerical value will be lower as the performance increases.
The ECE can be represented as an ECE-plot, showing its value
for a certain range of priors.
4.1. Conclusion
The development of methods for the evaluation of evidence
for frequency-based continuous two-level models is described
from the hierarchical model for univariate continuous data
developed by Lindley (1977) to multivariate models with
unknown means and covariances (Bozza et al., 2008). This
development is of interest in its own right as a compilation
of some thirty years of development. However, it also provides
a background to the development of the SAILR package,
a package which extends these ideas to include score-based
models.
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Formulae for many of these are given in the Appendix and
may also be found in many books on the subject (e.g., Aitken and
Taroni, 2004; Zadora et al., 2014).
There is muchmore that can be reviewed. References for some
of the omissions of this paper are given here. It is hoped they
are useful. There have been few papers on models for discrete
data; see Aitken and Gold (2013) for an example. Score-based
models have received a lot of attention recently and are included
in SAILR; see Bolck et al. (2015) for examples. Graphical models
provide an approach for a reduction in the dimensionality
of multivariate problems; see Zadora et al. (2014) for
examples.
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A commentary on
Likelihood Ratio as Weight of Forensic Evidence: A Closer Look
by Lund, S. P., and Iyer, H. (2017). J. Res. Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. 122:27. doi: 10.6028/jres.122.027
A recent article (Lund and Iyer, 2017) provides, in the words of its title, a closer look at the
likelihood ratio as the weight of forensic evidence. This note comments critically on two aspects
of the article.
The first aspect concerns two related statements. In the abstract the statement is made that “[W]e
find the likelihood ratio paradigm to be unsupported by arguments of Bayesian decision theory,
which applies only to personal decision making and not to the transport of information from an
expert to a separate decision maker.” The idea presented in this statement of lack of support for
the likelihood ratio as a means of transport of information is repeated in the conclusion where it is
stated that “. . . we hope the forensic science community comes to view the LR as one possible, not
normative or necessarily optimum, tool for communicating to DMs (decision makers)” (Lund and
Iyer’s emphasis). Despite this opinion of these authors, it was shown many years ago by I.J.Good in
two brief notes in the Journal of Statistical Computation and Simulation (Good, 1989a,b) repeated
in Good (1991) and in Aitken and Taroni (2004) that, with some very reasonable assumptions, the
assessment of uncertainty inherent in the evaluation of evidence leads inevitably to the likelihood
ratio as the only way in which this can be done.
In order to show that the likelihood ratio is the only way to evaluate evidence, it is necessary
to introduce some mathematical notation. This is a device to ease the presentation of the
argument. The argument could be made verbally but would be lengthy and more difficult to
follow. Consider evidence E which it is desired to evaluate in the context of two mutually
exclusive propositions Hp and Hd. Denote the value of the evidence by V . Of course, this
statement makes the implicit assumption that evidence has a value that can be measured. The
value will depend on background information I. Four and only four factors have been introduced,
E,Hp,Hd and I. Thus, V is a function of these four factors, V = f (E,Hp,Hd, I). There is
uncertainty about E, so it should be analyzed probabilistically. Use of the argument of conditional
probability leads to f (E | Hp,Hd, I)f (Hp,Hd, I), rather than forms such as f (Hp | Hd,E, I)
or variants of it. The expression f (Hp,Hd, I) does not involve the evidence, which reduces
considerations further to f (E | Hp,Hd, I). Propositions Hp and Hd are mutually exclusive so
if E is to be a function of both Hp and Hd then f (E | Hp,Hd, I) is a combination of two
functions, one that involves Hp and not Hd and one that involves Hd and not Hp. Value may
thus be expressed as a function of the probabilities of E given Hp (and I) and of E given Hd
(and I). Again, this makes implicit assumptions, namely that there is a probability that can be
associated with evidence and that is dependent on a proposition and background information.
For ease of notation explicit mention of I will be omitted from notation in what follows.
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Let x = Pr(E | Hp) and y = Pr(E | Hd). The assumption
that V is a function only of these probabilities can be represented
mathematically as
V = f (x, y)
for some function f .
Now, consider another piece of evidence T which is irrelevant
to E, to Hp and to Hd. Irrelevance is taken in the probabilistic
context to be equivalent to independence so that T may be taken
to be independent of E, ofHp and ofHd. It is then permissible for
Pr(T) to be given notation which does not refer to any of E,Hp or
Hd. Thus, let Pr(T) be denoted by θ . Then
Pr(E,T | Hp)
= Pr(E | Hp) Pr(T | Hp) by the independence of E and T
= Pr(E | Hp) Pr(T) by the independence of Tand Hp
= x θ .
Similarly,
Pr(E,T | Hd) = y θ .
The value of (E,T) is f (θx, θy) by the definition of f . However,
evidence T is irrelevant and has no effect on the value of evidence
E. Thus, the value of the combined evidence (E,T), f (θx, θy), is
equal to the value V of E, f (x, y), and
V = f (x, y) = f (θx, θy)
for all θ in the interval [0,1] of possible values of Pr(T).
The only class of functions of (x, y) for which this can be said
to be the case is the class which are functions of x/y or
Pr(E | Hp)/Pr(E | Hd)
which is the likelihood ratio. Hence the value V of evidence has
to be a function of the likelihood ratio. Lund and Iyer wish the
forensic community to view the likelihood ratio as one possible
tool for communication with decision makers. We hope that we
have shown here through the argument of Good that it is the only
logically admissible form of evaluation. Incidentally, note that
no recourse has been made to arguments of Bayesian decision
theory. The support of these arguments for the likelihood ratio
paradigm, as suggested in the abstract, is not necessary.
The second aspect is minor and concerns a definition. The
concept of weight of evidence is an old idea. The term weight
of evidence for the logarithm of the likelihood ratio was given by
Charles Sanders Peirce (Peirce, 1878). It is not the likelihood ratio
that should be referred to as the weight of evidence as is done in
the title of the article. It is better to refer to the likelihood ratio
as the value of the evidence and its logarithm as the weight of the
evidence. The logarithm of the likelihood ratio has the pleasingly
intuitive operation of additivity when converting the logarithm
of the prior odds in favor of a proposition to the logarithm of the
posterior odds in favor of the proposition.
log
{
Pr(Hp | E)
Pr(Hd | E)
}
= log
{
Pr(E | Hp)
Pr(E | Hd)
}
+ log
{
Pr(Hp)
Pr(Hd)
}
. (1)
When considering the scales of justice it is the logarithm of the
probabilities of the evidence given each of the two competing
propositions that should be put in the scales, not the probabilities.
Equation (1) can be rewritten as
log{Pr(Hp | E)} − log{Pr(Hd | E)} =
log{Pr(E | Hp)} − log{Pr(E | Hd)} + log{Pr(Hp)} − log{Pr(Hd)}
= [log{Pr(E | Hp)} + log{Pr(Hp)}]− [log{Pr(E | Hd)} + log{Pr(Hd)}]
Expressions to the left of the negative sign in the last line are
associated with one pan in the scales, expressions to the right
with the other pan. Thus log(Pr(E | Hp)) is added to the prior log
probability forHp in one scale and log(Pr(E | Hd)) is added to the
prior log probability for Hd in the other scale. The difference in
the sums of the two pairs of log probabilities is a more intuitive
characteristic of the evidence to which the term weight may be
applied than the ratio of the probabilities of the evidence given
the respective propositions.
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Scientific literature and practice, notably expert reports, commonly involve misinterpretations
of standard statistics, such as the p-value, or the calculation of so-called “3-standard deviation
intervals,” elements upon which decisions in medicine, physics, or legal matters are based1. Such
instances of expert reporting reflect a misreading of the way in which scientists should assist the
judiciary in assessing results coming from analytical laboratories. A recent example of such a
practice are the conclusions of the international report on urine specimens collected among athletes
participating in the Vancouver and Sochi Winter Olympic Games (report dated 5th October,
2017)2,3.
Uncertainty is a complication that accompanies participants of the justice system who face
inference and decision-making as core aspects of their activities. Inference relates to the use of
incomplete information, as given by scientific findings, in order to reason about propositions of
interest, such as whether the quantity of a given substance in some bodily fluid is larger than a
legal threshold. In turn, decision-makers, notably judges, are required to make practical decisions,
such as declaring whether or not an athlete has used a performance-enhancing substance. Inference
and decisions of this kind abound in the legal field. Toxicology laboratories, across jurisdictional
systems, are regularly asked to quantify the amount of target substances (e.g., alcohol, illegal drugs,
biological markers) detected in, for example, blood samples taken from persons of interest (e.g.,
Karkazis and Jordan-Young, 2015).
Inference and decision require logical assistance because unaided human reasoning is liable to
bias and misinterpretation. These represent causes of concern because fallacious reasoning and
erroneous conclusions in legal proceedings risk endangering the fairness of the proceedings and can
lead to miscarriages of justice. Statistical approaches are often used to support expert conclusions
1Hence the use of “adhockeries” in the title. The term adhockery was introduced by I. J. Good, and used also by de Finetti
(e.g., de Finetti, 1993a,b), to denote the use of improvised measures rather than a robust and logic methodology.
2Report available at https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/IOC/Who-We-Are/
Commissions/Disciplinary-Commission/IOC-DC-Schmid/Appendix-VIII-CHUV-Report-Prof-Burnier-06-10-2017.
pdf. Hereafter, the Report.
3For a previous example of the use of statistics in a case of alleged doping see, e.g., the Andrus Veerpalu case (Fischer and
Berry, 2014)
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but inferential misunderstandings regrettably plague disciplines
such as forensic science and medicine when scientists report
on statistical analyses conducted as part of their casework or
research.
The case on which we intend to comment can be briefly
summarized as follows. The International Olympic Committee
requested statistical analyses on results of urine examinations
performed on samples coming from the XXII Olympic Winter
Games in Sochi, with the aim of identifying athletes who had
used prohibited substances. Specifically, the question was “[t]o
determine [. . . ] if the values are within the reference values
obtained from the control population at the XXII Olympic
Winter Games and in agreement with data published.” (Report
at p. 3). A potentially doped athlete, called in the Report “true
outlier,” was defined as a person having a given bio-chemical
parameter value—for example, urinary sodium concentration—
greater than a reference mean plus three standard deviations.
The reference mean and standard deviation were calculated
using data from reference athletes, considered not doped, of the
Vancouver Olympic Winter Games.
As an illustration, consider a measured target substance (e.g.,
urinary sodium concentration), where the experimental unit is a
urine sample from a person under investigation. Themean values
reported for the sodium concentration in urines in the reference
male (female) population of athletes are 95.4 (67.39)mmol/l. The
reported standard deviation values are 49.37 and 40.88 mmol/l,
respectively (see Report at p. 6). According to the “three standard
deviation rule,” athletes with values greater than 243.51 (or 190,
for women) are considered to be outliers. Thus, the measurement
would be said to meet the requirement for establishing the
presence of an unrealistic level of a target substance in urine if
the measurement for the investigated sample were larger than the
upper value of the bound in a reference population. It was noted
in the report that “[w]ith this approach, we identify 13 samples
(of 5 men and 8 women) which are definitively out of the range.”
(Report at p. 2).
As a preliminary, it is worth noting that such an approach
for the treatment and reporting of experimental results does not
address the inferential and decisional issues at stake. Instead,
it is merely descriptive. This does not mean, though, that it is
intrinsically wrong: scientists widely rely on effective descriptive
methods of exploratory data analysis to illustrate, for example,
how population data are distributed, where given sample data are
located and how they spread. However, such a description does
not fully address the questions of interest for the decision-maker,
which are: How can we use data (or a summary of them) on the
Vancouver Olympic athletes to infer something about the value
of the urinary sodium concentration in the reference population?
and: How can we conclude that a new measurement from a given
athlete is in fact an outlier (or an anomalous value) with reference
to this population? These are intrinsically inferential questions,
not descriptive ones, and remain unresolved with the approach
taken in the report, as we explain below.
It is commonly understood, and unquestioned, that
measurements on urinary samples taken from individuals
of a given population will show some variation. Stated otherwise,
the results will, in some sense, distribute. Basic statistics such
as the mean and the standard deviation of a quantity of interest
(e.g., the sodium concentration) used to describe the reference
samples from the Vancouver Olympic athletes represent indeed
succinct and informative summaries. The mean provides a
measure of location and the standard deviation provides a
measure of dispersion (spread) of the available measurements.
In this context, the “three standard deviation rule” may have
some appeal. Provided that data distribute symmetrically
around the mean, at least approximately, then values within one
standard deviation of the mean account for about 68% of the
observations, while two standard deviations account for about
95% and three standard deviations account for about 99.7% of
the values. The 68-95-99.7 rule is a shorthand used to remember
the approximate percentage of values that lie within a band
around the mean with a width of two, four and six standard
deviations, respectively. It is a rule to describe the available data
(i.e., measurements from Vancouver athletes), but not to infer
something about a new value coming from a new athlete, as
emphasized also in Berry (2008).
However, does this rule allow one to conclude that values
outside this range are necessarily “outliers”—lying at an
abnormal distance from other values? Obviously, any set of
observations contains extremes: theminimum and themaximum
value are extremes. Notwithstanding, it is understandable to
express concerns in situations, such as the case discussed
here, where the highlighted extremes are not only the largest
(or, in other cases, the smallest) observation, but are actually
“extremely extreme”: they are apparently inconsistent with
the reference observations and therefore candidates for being
considered “outliers.” It is no accident to term these values
“candidates.” Several reasons can, in isolation or combined,
account for extreme observations: first, natural variation, beyond
the currently known bands, but also laboratory measurement
or recording errors, or even intentional tampering, such as
the addition of a target substance (here salt). Since these are
potential accounts for the observations, it is—by definition—
a matter of a personal judgment on the part of the scientist
to decide when a given observation appears to be inconsistent
with the remainder set of data. One way to avoid a rigid
and intrinsically arbitrary threshold is to consider at least
one explicit alternative account for the findings: the scientist
could then provide a statistical measure called a “likelihood
ratio” that represents an expression of how the measurements,
whatever their value, extreme or otherwise, are capable of
discriminating amongst competing propositions of interest.
When no discernible alternative hypothesis can be specified (as
in the case of interest) several ways of categorizing suspicious
observations are available (see, e.g., Barnett and Lewis, 1994).
It is common to distinguish between frequentist (or classical)
and Bayesian approaches. Statistical data analyses in the forensic
and medical contexts commonly rely on a so-called “frequentist”
perspective, associated with the idea that statistical conclusions
could be entirely objective, with known error rates. Consider,
for instance, the problem of hypothesis testing, where attempts
at drawing conclusions about competing propositions often rely
on a comparison between the significance level of the test and
the observed significance level, i.e., p-value. A large majority of
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papers published nowadays still propose statistical treatments
based on this quantity. Controversial discussion was initiated by
an editorial of Basic and Applied Social Psychology (Trafimow
and Marks, 2015), expressing the intention to ban from
publication in their journal any paper containing procedures
advocating p-values. This announcement has echoed widely,
from general weekly science journals (e.g., Nuzzo, 2014; Leek
and Peng, 2015) to specialist groups such as the International
Society for Bayesian Analysis (Schmidt et al., 2015). The main
concern expressed in these reactions is not the correctness or
usefulness of frequentist statistical procedures, but rather the
misinterpretations surrounding the use of such procedures and
their consequences. There is a need to emphasize what exactly
the various approaches allow scientists to draw as a conclusion,
and what they do not allow them to say.
One of the major misunderstandings found in the reporting
on significance testing through a p-value consists in interpreting
this value as the probability that the null hypothesis (e.g.,
as previously stated a difference between populations mean
values) is true. This fallacious conclusion is also known as
the fallacy of the transposed conditional. The temptation to
believe that, if an observation is rare under a given hypothesis
it can be regarded as evidence against that hypothesis, must
be resisted4. Bayesian approaches avoid these intricacies by
relying on the fundamental tenet of capturing, using probability,
all uncertainties characterizing a problem. According to these
approaches, discordancy can be assessed by means of a predictive
4“Researchers often rely on the seeming objectivity of the p<0.05 criterion without
realizing that theory behind the p-value is invalidated when analysis is contingent
on data.” (Gelman and Hennig, 2017).
probability to observe a value greater than the particular
(suspicious) observation given the rest of the reference sample,
which allows one to restrict attention to manifestly extreme
(unlikely) observations (Geisser, 1998).
Despite struggles over philosophical stances regarding
statistical inference and decision-making, the restriction of
attention to the sole question of outliers still falls short of the
fundamental problem that the case in question poses. Among
the ultimately disputed questions is the issue of whether there
is sufficient evidence to conclude that a given urine value is an
outlier. The answer to this question cannot rely on scientific
findings only, because it requires the assessment of all available
information, scientific, and other, in a given case. What is more,
it cannot be reduced to a descriptive (statistical) account of
scientific findings, but extends to inference and decision-making,
and associated decision criteria. The latter are not given by
ad-hoc statistical thresholds, but are intimately related to the
decision-maker’s preferences and policy values, which are even
further beyond the scientist’s area of competence.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
All authors listed have made a substantial, direct and intellectual
contribution to the work, and approved it for publication.
FUNDING
AB acknowledges the support provided by the Swiss National
Science Foundation through Grant No. BSSGI0_155809 and the
University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, MI (Michigan
Grotius Research Fellowship).
REFERENCES
Barnett, V., and Lewis, T. (1994). Outliers in Statistical Data, ed. 3. Chichester:
Wiley.
Berry, D. (2008). The science of doping.Nature 454, 692–693. doi: 10.1038/454692a
de Finetti, B. (1993a). “The role of probability in the different attitudes of scientific
thinking,” in Probabilità e induzione – Induction and probability, eds P. Monari
and D. Cocchi (Bologna: Editrice Clueb), 491–511.
de Finetti, B. (1993b). “Bayesian statistical inference” in Probabilità e Induzione
– Induction and Probability, eds P. Monari and D. Cocchi (Bologna: Editrice
Clueb), 513–524.
Fischer, K., and Berry, D. A. (2014). Statisticians introduce science to
international doping agency: the Andrus Veerpalu case. Chance 27, 10–16.
doi: 10.1080/09332480.2014.965625
Geisser, S. (1998). “Some uses of order statistics in Bayesian analysis,” inHandbook
of Statistics 17 - Order Statistics, eds N. Balakrishnan and C.R. Rao (Amsterdam:
Elsevier), 379–399.
Gelman, A., and Hennig, C. (2017). Beyond subjective and objective in statistics. J.
R. Stat. Soc. A 180, 967–1033. doi: 10.1111/rssa.12276
Karkazis, K., and Jordan-Young, R. (2015). Debating a testosterone ‘sex gap’.
Science 348, 858–860. doi: 10.1126/science.aab1057
Leek, J. T., and Peng, R. D. (2015). Statistics: P-values are just the tip of the iceberg.
Nature 520, 612. doi: 10.1038/520612a
Nuzzo, R. (2014). Scientific method: statistical errors. Nature 506, 150–152.
doi: 10.1038/506150a
Schmidt, A., Berger, J., David, P., Kadane, J., O’Hagan, T., and Pericchi, L. (2015).
Banning null hypothesis significance testing. ISBA Bull. 22, 5–9. Available
Online at: https://bayesian.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/1503.pdf
Trafimow, D., and Marks, M. (2015). Editorial. Basic Appl. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1–2.
doi: 10.1080/01973533.2015.1012991
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2018 Taroni, Biedermann, Vuille and Bozza. This is an open-access
article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC
BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided
the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original
publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice.
No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Sociology | www.frontiersin.org 3 August 2018 | Volume 3 | Article 2560
GENERAL COMMENTARY
published: 20 December 2019
doi: 10.3389/fsoc.2019.00085
Frontiers in Sociology | www.frontiersin.org 1 December 2019 | Volume 4 | Article 85
Edited by:
Sue Pope,
Principal Forensic Services,
United Kingdom
Reviewed by:
Perikles Simon,
Johannes Gutenberg University
Mainz, Germany
*Correspondence:
Michel Burnier
Michel.Burnier@chuv.ch
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
ELSI in Science and Genetics,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Sociology
Received: 22 October 2018
Accepted: 05 December 2019
Published: 20 December 2019
Citation:
Burnier M (2019) Commentary:
Statistical Adhockeries Are No Criteria
for Legal Decisions—The Case of the
Expert Medical Report on the
Assessment of Urine Specimens
Collected Among Athletes Having
Participated to the Vancouver and
Sochi Winter Olympic Games.
Front. Sociol. 4:85.
doi: 10.3389/fsoc.2019.00085
Commentary: Statistical Adhockeries
Are No Criteria for Legal
Decisions—The Case of the Expert
Medical Report on the Assessment
of Urine Specimens Collected Among
Athletes Having Participated to the
Vancouver and Sochi Winter Olympic
Games
Michel Burnier*
Faculty of Biology and Medicine, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
Keywords: expertise, statistical approach, plausibility, Bayesian (subjective) probability, coherence
A Commentary on
Statistical Adhockeries Are No Criteria for Legal Decisions—The Case of the Expert Medical
Report on the Assessment of Urine Specimens Collected Among Athletes Having Participated
to the Vancouver and Sochi Winter Olympic Games
by Taroni, F., Biedermann, A., Vuille, J., and Bozza, S. (2018). Front. Sociol. 3:25.
doi: 10.3389/fsoc.2018.00025
As cited by Gelman and Hennig, “Decisions in statistical data analysis are often justified, criticized
or avoided by using concepts of objectivity and subjectivity” (Gelman and Hennig, 2017).
The paper by Taroni et al. (2018), that I have read with interest and some surprise, does not
escape this principle. Indeed, it heavily and namely criticizes the statistical approach that was used
in a recent expertise that I performed on behalf of the Medical and Scientific Department of the
International Olympic Committee (Taroni et al., 2018). The authors indirectly suggest that the
analysis could provide “erroneous conclusions in legal proceedings risk endangering the fairness of the
proceedings and can lead to miscarriages of justice” (Taroni et al., 2018). I understand the worry of
the authors who belong to a School of Criminal Justice, to provide as much as possible reliable and
unbiased expert conclusions to assist judiciary in their decision-making processes, and I do have
the same preoccupation. I do not want to debate on whether a purely statistical approach is more
or less appropriate than another statistical method using a Bayesian approach and the calculation
of a probability to make an odd observation. Indeed, it is well possible that a Bayesian approach
could be superior and more useful for the judges although this remains to be demonstrated in the
particular case. The main reason why I would like to react on the content of Taroni’s publication
is because it seems obvious that the authors have not read the expertise completely and have not
clearly understood its purpose and its analysis. Thus, they have not taken into account what Gelan
and Hennig call “the context dependence” (Gelman and Hennig, 2017).
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The first important issue is the question asked to the expert.
In this case, the first demand was “to determine reference
values for various urinary analytes (sodium, potassium, chloride,
calcium, creatinine, and urinary density) coming from samples
taken from top athletes tested at the time of Vancouver XXI
Winter Olympic Games.” This goal could be achieved only
with a statistical approach taking into account the distribution
of the values of athletes having participated in the Vancouver
Games. The second objective was to examine the distribution
and statistics of each sample collected from the XXII Olympic
Winter Games, which occurred in Sochi and to evaluate them
in the light of the reference values obtained in Vancouver. As
Taroni et al. correctly pointed out, the populations were different,
the former containing athletes of all countries, including Russia,
and the latter only samples from Russia and this might have
explained some differences due to country-specific diets. This is
reason why two analyses were done, one within each population,
and one between populations. With this approach, some values
were clearly outside the distribution of both the Vancouver and
the Sochi populations of athletes and could be considered as
“outliers” or extremes of extremes as Taroni et al. name them.
Of note, our objective was not to determine who was doped
or not, identifying the presence of a prohibited substance. The
baseline hypothesis was that some samples had beenmanipulated
and urine perhaps reconstituted with an excess of salt to match
the initial urinary density that was the only parameter available.
Therefore, the expert focused on samples with very high sodium
and chloride concentrations, which could fit with the hypothesis.
Samples eventually manipulated but with a normal sodium
chloride concentration would of course escape from this strategy.
Now, if no Bayesian analysis was performed in this expertise
to assess the probabilities of extremes to be real outliers, other
aspects of plausibility were considered in my analysis using an
approach fitting with the abductive approach discussed recently
by Simon and Dettweiler (2019). One of them is the coherence
between several measured analytes. Indeed, humans are not
eating sodium chloride but a diet containing salt but also
potassium and calcium. Consequently, humans on a very high
salt diet also ingest more calcium and potassium. Interestingly,
in the outliers of the Sochi group of athletes, there was a clear
gap between urinary sodium and chloride excretions and the
excretion of potassium, this latter being in the normal range
and comparable to the athletes tested in Vancouver. To a certain
degree, the same was true for calcium. Thus, there appears to be
incoherence between the urinary content of analytes in subjects
recognized as outliers based on urinary sodium concentrations.
In addition, one must also take into account the physiological
plausibility when examining samples. In some of the athletes,
the measured urinary sodium concentrations were so high
that they were incompatible with human physiology and were
therefore more than suspect. At last, the level of plausibility
became extremely high when one noted that several outliers
were not isolated athletes but fellow-members of the same
competition team.
Thus, Taroni et al. had the impression that our conclusions
were based only on a statistical analysis but this is clearly wrong.
Interestingly, in their publication Taroni et al. do not propose
any alternative for this kind of analysis and even suggest in
their publication that results might be the same using a Bayesian
approach. Today, the data are available and the authors are
welcome to confront their approach with the one used in my
expertise. But, as long as no comparison has been performed, the
results of my expertise must be considered as correct and reliable
and judges can use these data to integrate them in the overall set
of evidence, tomake their opinion and finally take their decisions.
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